A general human science and an investigation about the species Homo sapiens could be an analysis about the basics and the structures of the human imagination. This individual survey can only be an incessant oscillation between the individual sensorial creations, and this that we assume as generally valid knowledge about the human being. We would know nothing about the human being without these individual sensorial creations and their comprehension.
Sensorial creation does not mean vagueness or indistinctness. The sensorial creation certainly presupposes a certain vagueness of being, with the meaning that the existing is always such that it allows the emersion of new forms and new depictions. The sensorial creation is the faculty to make emerge something new that is neither given nor may be deduced by the given. Immediately, as soon as we cease using them superficially only, we think that this ability is the one that precisely corresponds to the profound significance of the meanings imagination and imaginary.
The imagination is not simply the ability to combine elements that are already given in order to produce another variant of an already given form. We would say that the imagination is the ability of an individual to create new forms. Certainly this new form manages elements that already exist, but the form as such is new. As it was already anticipated by Aristotle and Kant and by some other philosophers who again concealed this immediately afterwards the imagination is more fundamentally this, which allows us to bring forth a world for us. That is to say, more keenly said the imagination enables us to construct something about its existence, we otherwise would know nothing and could say nothing.
The imagination begins with the sensation and is evident in its most elementary facts. We can locate a physical-physiologic equivalence between definite wave lengths of the red or blue colour, but in any case we cannot explain the sensation of red or blue in its quality either by the terms of physics or by the terms of the physiology. We could see red instead of blue or blue instead of red or see other colours, but however there is not an explanation of which quality may be a colour. The incorporated imagination in our sensation constructs this form of being that does not exist in the nature. In nature there are not colours, there is only radiation, such as the red and the blue and generally the colour, as we visualize this. The other animals visualize this differently, because their perceptive imagination is different. Imagination, our mind's eye, means picture-setting which is naturally given and it is something common in all of us, because we as Homo sapiens to one species belong. But it is always absolutely unique for every one of us. The same is also valid for this function that we call construction of our social imaginary.
If however the facts are like this, then contrary to the old triviality which makes the human being to a human, it is not the fact that the human is logical or rational. This is absurd because there is not a being more disturbed than the human being either we examine his profound psyche or his daily activities. The ants or the wild animals are doubtless provided with a superior functional rationality by far than the human being, and they neither stumble nor eat poisonous mushrooms. The human beings should however learn what food is and what cannot be food.
Consequently we cannot characterize the human being based on the rationality and the logic, since these characterize in general all the living beings as a final consequential logic. The ability of construction allows us to see why the core of precisely human being could not be the consequential logic and rationality. With the logic and the rationality can we reach the infinity, we can infinitely capture the consequences of the already posed axioms. However neither the rationality nor the logic allows us to imagine a new axiom. The mathematics, the higher form of our logic can move to always higher spheres only by means of the imagination and reflection, and this is very well known to the mathematicians, even if they cannot always have a clear view of this. They know the central role of imagination not only by the solution of problems that has been posed, but also by means of the introduction of new mathematic worlds, an introduction that cannot be reduced to simple calculations, because it could otherwise be made algorithmic and given in a calculator.
· Based on this conclusion could we introduce the radical imagination and the social imaginary as an essential characteristic of the human being?
The human being is a profound and unconscious psyche, and the human being is society and it is possible only thanks to the society and its institution and the social imaginary significances that the psyche might be rendered capable of life. The society is always also history, it does not exist immovable present at all, even in a primitive and monotonous society. More precisely and in the most archaic society the present, except of others, is always constituted by a past that lives within this present and from a future which is designed before. The present is therefore always a historical construction.
Beyond the biology, which by the human being without ceasing to exist is however pathologically disorganized, the human being is a psychological being and a social-historical being. And we find the ability of creation in these two levels, which we call imagination and imaginary. There is a radical imagination of psyche, that is to say a permanent upsurge of a flow of depictions, feelings and wishes which are inseparable between them. When we cannot understand this we cannot know anything from the human being. However, as we indicated here, the psyche cannot construct any institutions. The law, or even the idea of law, cannot be created by the unconscious, but it is accepted by this. And it is accepted as an stranger, as an enemy and as an oppressor.
The psyche cannot create the language. It accepts this and it is obliged to sanction this, and by means of the language it accepts the entirety of the social imaginary significances, which the language conveys and at the same time renders it possible.
· What could we say about Language and commandments?
· Could we therefore imagine a primitive legislator who does not possess the language yet, but he is intelligent enough and could invent this without ever having access to it and could convince the other human beings, who still do not have this linguistic idea that the language may be a useful thing?
It is a stupid idea. The language shows us that the social imaginary on the work an instituting imaginary is, which simultaneously poses a strictly logical dimension that we call tautological, because in each language should be possible to say as conclusion that one and one makes two. Moreover, it poses a pure imaginary dimension, since in each language and due to this are incited the social imaginary significances that a society possesses, such as taboo, totem, god, city, nation, wealth, party, citizenship, virtue or even eternal life. The eternal life, even if it exists, is very obviously a social imaginary significance, since no one demonstrated or provided evidence of the existence of eternal life by mathematics. It is an imaginary social significance that for more than seventeen centuries regulated the life of societies that considered their selves as the most civilized of Europe and of the World.
This social imaginary that brings forth the language and also the institutions as well as the form of the institution itself, which does not have any meaning when it is seen with regard to the individual psyche, could we only imagine as the creative ability of an anonymous collective, which may be realised each time when the human beings are coming together. It establishes each time itself in a unique arranged formation, so that it might exist.
The knowledge and the activity of the human being are therefore inseparable psychologically, and they are two poles social-historically which cannot be there the one without the other, or the one cannot be reduced into the other. All social that we may find in an individual, but also the idea of individual itself is constructed or it is socially brought forth in accordance with the institutions of the society. In order to find something within the individual that is not really social, if this is possible and it is not, since it would then shift through the language at will, have we to reach the inner core of the psyche. This is to be found closely to the function of the outmost primary desires, the outmost chaotic depiction methods and the crudest and most wild feelings.
It is either about us ordinary persons, or it is about the dream that is described by a patient during the analysis, or it is about the delirium that is unfolded by a psychotic person, we always find our selves in front of social material. It is not a dream there as an analysable object, if it is not narrated by the person who saw this, even by our selves to our selves. Each dream is inhabited by social objects. It brings on the scene something of the primary desire of the psyche which cannot do it otherwise and that should not go up on scene, and especially in the particular form, because it encounters the resistance of the social institutions which is represented by all persons by this, which Freud called superego and censorship.
Not only that, "you do not accomplish this thing, and you will not make love with your mum", but something much more. The censoring and impeding authority is exactly so absurd and so logic as the large monotheistic religions. Not only that, "you will not make love with your mum", but also "you will not desire to make love with your mum". The unconscious as soon as it abandons its first and solitary phase, will turn its desire to somebody that happens to be found there around, and that is usually the mum and that is usually prohibited. This conflict that is internalized by the individual constitutes the raison d'ĂȘtre of the dream as such and at the same time the raison d'ĂȘtre of its contents and its type of processing.
Something of this that experiences the psyche of the particular human being achieves anyhow through the successive layers of socialization to come more or less on the surface. The really psychical element cannot be reduced to the social-historical one, and the social-historical one cannot be reduced to the psychical one, regardless of the efforts of Freud and others to do this. We can interpret the psychoanalytical component of this or that particular tradition by showing that it also corresponds to unconscious forms and that it satisfies unconscious tendencies or needs, and that is always in force.
The institution is always obliged except of the others to match with the search of meaning that characterizes the psyche. The fact of the institution as such is however absolutely strangeness for the psyche. For this reason is the process of socialization of the human being so long-lasting and painful. And surely also, this is the cause that the babies cry even without reason, also if they are well fed.
The question of philosophical anthropology "How are the circumstances with the human,” will therefore become to:
· How are the circumstances with the society and the history?
We immediately see that these questions are philosophical and precede each other question. Specifically, we should admit all the consequences of the known and simple fact, that is, the consequences that still have not been concluded here, for example that the philosophy emerges within and by means of the society and the history. It is enough to examine our known societies and historical periods in order to perceive that almost all the societies in almost all the epochs were not institutionalized by posing questions, but by restricting the meaning and the significance. It was always authentic and valid and legal for them, which has already been instituted and has been accepted, as well as which has been inherited as established. The human being is a being that search for the meaning and for this reason constructs this. In the first phase however, it constructs the meaning within the closure and creates the closure of the meaning, for example the body of real numbers is not algebraically closed, and the equation x2 +1 = 0 does not have any solution within this. However the body of imaginary numbers is algebraically closed and we find the solution x = i, where i the square root of -1. Finally also today and always the human aspires to come back to this closure. The rupture of this closure is precisely inaugurated and corresponds two times to the birth and the rebirth of philosophy and politics, once in ancient Greece and once in Western Europe. This is because the politics and the philosophy are radical challenges, so much of the delivered imaginary significances, as also of these institutions that personified both. Indeed the philosophy begins with the question:
· What should I think?
If we define the philosophy as based on "the question about the being" it is a fragmentary and secondary and consequently erroneous confrontation. Before there is any question about the being, it should be possible that the human being poses the question:
· What should I think?
The human being usually does not do this in the history. The human being thinks that it is said to think by the Bible, the Koran, the General Secretary, the Party, the Magician of the tribe, the Ancestors, etc. Naturally the question "what should I think," is immediately analyzed in a multitude of other questions: "What should I think for the being", but also: "What should I think for myself ", "what should I think for the thought" and thus arises the self-contemplation of the thought. However by saying: "What should I think" due to this fact we pose the question about the instituted and delivered depictions of the collective and of the tribe, we dispute them and thus we open the road for an endless debate.
These depictions, as generally the institutions also, do not only construct a part of the concrete being, of the specific being of the examined society, but also they define this. A society is what it is, and this is something that distinguishes it from the other societies, because this society brought forth the world that it constructed. The Jewish society as we have this in our head based on the Old Testament, it is the Jewish society and it is not something else, because it brought forth a world which is described in the Old Testament. This society because is ‘mythical’ describes itself by saying stories and narrates for itself the story of God, and of the world and of the Jews. This narrative however unfolds at the same time an complete structure of the world: God as the creator, the human being as the owner and the holder of the nature (that is to say, Genesis did not wait for Descartes) and at the same time as the bearer of the sin before he was even given birth, of the Law, etc. The Jews are Jews only provided that they believe all this, as the current Frenchmen, Americans or Indians, are these who they are, provided that they incarnate the imaginary significances of their corresponding societies. Provided, with the meaning that "they are" almost these imaginary significances, who walk, work, drink, etc.
Consequently, an individual by disputing these thoughts and these significances as well as these institutions, it disputes the definitions and the own laws of its being, and explicitly intentionally and calculatingly. This precisely happens by the Philosophy and the Politics. And see now a second great ontological conclusion that results from the philosophical anthropology. The being, the existence in general, is such that it is, because it presupposes and concludes that beings exist, which change their selves, and without their knowing construct the terms of their specific being. This is valid for all the societies. But it is also something else: The being is such that it is, because it presupposes and implicates that beings exist which can construct the thinking and the contemplative dialogue, and thanks to which may change in a self-reflexive and agreeable way the laws and the terms of their being. This is something, which does not exist in another region of being as far as we know.
· Nevertheless, could we specify still more this genuineness?
Each society exists by constructing imaginary social significances, that is to say, invisible immanent principles. For instance, they are such as the Jewish, the Christian or the Moslem God, or the merchandise. There is not a human being that has ever seen some merchandise. One sees a car, a kilo of bananas, one metre stuff of fabric. What makes these objects function as they function in a commercial society is the social imaginary significance "merchandise". It is an invisible immanent principle, since for a philosopher God is naturally an immanent principle regarding the society, which believes in the God, even if this society has categorized him as a transcendent entity. He is in this society more present than each material entity, and at the same time is at least not perceptible under regular conditions. What are "perceptible" with regard to God are his different and actually much deduced consequences, that is to say, a Temple in Jerusalem or elsewhere, the priests, the lamps, etc.
This invisible immanent principle that is constructed by the society does not exist in other regions of being, and the ideality comes in view by means of this invisible immanent principle. Ideality means that the significance is not strictly interconnected with a support and that this exceeds all its individual supports, without of course that it normally can be released of the need generally for some support. Each one can talk using various ways or expression and refer to signals or symbols about God, the eternal life, the ancient city, the party, the merchandise, the capital and the interest. All these are idealities. It is not fetishism. A good definition of the fundamental fetishism could begin by the following observation. Fetish is an object that brings obligatorily a significance that cannot be removed of it. This is so much valid for certain primitive opinions as of certain aspects as well as for us selves. We leave the fetishism as a sexual perversion apart that moreover completely corresponds to this definition, because the erotic significance is inflexibly tied up by an object or by a kind of an object, which corresponds to the object of the fetish.
These significances possess each time a positive and de facto validity within the society. They are justifiable, legal and indisputable within the frameworks of each society. The question of their legitimacy is not even posed and this meaning itself moves historically ahead, when we apply this at the most of the traditional societies.
However, by the moment when the reflection and the activity of the philosophy and the politics are appeared, it is another dimension created. It is the dimension that is defined by the idea and the requirement or even by the active reality of the validity that it is not anymore ‘de facto’ and positive simply, which is not the validity according to the jurisprudence, but it is rather by the philosophical meaning. Therefore it is a validity ‘de jure,’ and not simply ‘de facto’. We did not admit an image or an idea, simply, because these are delivered to us, and we do not have any obligation to accept these. We require that it should be possible to give the grounds and the reason, and the togetherness of this idea with the public political control in the agora and the forum of the citizens of the town are obvious. And the same is valid for our institutions also.
This requirement of de jure validity emerges therefore within the social-historical dimension and it is constructed thanks to this. This construction is once again an ontological creation of an unseen form until that moment. Such are upon other terms, the proof in mathematics, the proof in physics, the philosophical way of thinking, or even the political institution itself from the moment of its settling as something that always owes to be confirmed by means of a reflexive and intentional method from the collective, which it establishes.
However, here immediately emerges a question that drifts through the whole history of the philosophy, and which the philosophy confronted and handled this miserably and insufficiently. If the de jure validity and the opinion that an idea is proper, and that this is accurate today as much as it yesterday was, and would also be applicable before two millions of years or after four millions years, if this validity does emerge as of the interior and by means of the social-historical by the synergy and the collaboration of the psychical element,
· Then, how is it possible that this, which appears with such claims de jure, need not be subject to the psychological and social-historical terms, thanks to which it on every occasion does bring forth its appearance?
· How it is possible not be subject to the closure of the world within which it has been created?
In other words and this is also the question that mainly interests us and for this reason the philosophy needs always to be anthropologic,
· How could it be that the valid is also actively real, as well as the real may also be valid?
In order to make evident the importance of the question the way we do pose it, remember we for example that within a philosophy, which so great and so much important as the philosophy of Kant is, and which marked so much the history of philosophy at that time, the reality and the validity are separated by an abyss, and they are not conceivable together and they cannot be the subject of simultaneous perception. Kant does wonder,
· How can it be that we de jure have needed and true knowledge?
And he concludes to the construction or the suggestion of a transcendental subject that could be called an ideal subject, which indeed is provided from its construction by a certain a priori knowledge that is true, not trivial and is necessary.
· What does however provide this fact to us that a transcendental subject or a transcendental conscience could have this sure knowledge about which Kant talks?
We are not transcendental subjects, we are real human beings. When they say us that the transcendental subject is thus constructed and that due to this fact can accomplish a synthetically criticism a priori, it is not of interest for us. It would only be of interest, if we also were transcendental subjects. The permanent uncertainty of Kant derives also from this fact. On the one side he talks about this, what is the subject from transcendental point of view, and on the other side he refers to our experience, to our spirit, to us as human beings.
· Therefore, is it a matter about our spirit or about the spirit seen from a transcendental point of view?
This uncertainty is abolished later in the practical philosophy of Kant, but in a tragic way. According this philosophy, we can never be moral in reality after all, because we always are necessary motivated by empirical, that is to say by pragmatic terms. On this pivot remained the philosophy tied up already from the time of Plato, precisely because it did not achieve to look directly in the eyes of this question, which is the only real concerning our question.
· How the validity may possibly become a reality and the reality become validity?
It is not possible to give here the answer. We will point out only certain points that would facilitate its comprehension.
If we want to talk about the truth, by distinguishing this from the simple correctness and if we say on the one hand that the sentence 2+2=4 is correct, but that the philosophy of Aristotle or Kant is true or that it has to do with the truth, then we have to re-examine and to modify the significance of this term. We should not call truth an attribute of the sentences or of any results, but the movement itself that ruptures every instituted closure and initiates search procedures within the effort for reasonable cohesion and for giving the grounds, in order to meet this which is existent. Then if we give this meaning to the truth, then we should say that the location of truth is the social-historical dimension and the anthropology within the real significance. Because, the language, the significance, the ideality and the demand of validity de jure, are not only constructed within the social-historical and thanks to this, but also that we may only correspond to this demand, as far as possible, within the social-historical dimension and thanks to this. And mainly, only within the social-historical dimension and thanks to this, may exist the rupture of the closure and the movement that expresses this. Without this idea about the truth, we would simply be dismembered between the ‘optical angles’, which are ‘true’ in the interior of each ‘subject of closure’. Thus between an absolute relativism, and in the idea of a finally completed system that would be the closure of all closures.
Also based on the second creation, about which we talked previously and within the social-historical dimension and thanks to this, come into view the self-reflexive subjectivity and the political subject that is opposed against each type of a ‘previous’ humanity, that is to say, against any compliant and socially constructed individuals, so respectful and praiseworthy and charming may these be.
Also, only within the social-historical dimension and thanks to this are created a public space and a time of reflexive thoughtfulness, a synchronic and a diachronic agora which prevents that the subjectivity may be caged within its closure. Finally, because the social-historical is a continuous and dense construction, all the acquired philosophical thinking may be disputed and indeed it is disputed. Without such a construction, the philosophy would be once it was created in danger to be solidified or to become one simple logical directive of the given social world, acquired once and for ever, as indeed it was the fate of philosophy in India, China, Byzantium or Islam. Or finally it would simply remain an unmoved and hopeless indeterminacy of the instituted certainties to the profit of some mysticism, as it happens in the most Buddhist movements.
But of course the thinking finds in the radical imagination of the individual psyche also its positive condition. This imagination is the one that allows the construction of the new, that is to say, the emersion of prototypical forms, pictures, and shapes of the brainpower and of the intellect. And precisely because there is radical imagination, and there is not only a reproduction or a recombination of the again observed. An imagination which is not solidified and is not secured and is not limited to the already existent and known forms. Precisely for this reason the human being is capable to receive and to embrace and to welcome the original imagination of the other individuals, which otherwise would remain a personal delirium or a hobby. This is valid so much for the philosophy as well as also for the arts or for the sciences.
And in both cases, that is, of the imagination that constructs the prototype and of the imagination that is capable to welcome this, is included a new type of an individual. The contemplative and reflexive subjectivity that judges within the dialogue, which is open for the new in a critical and transparent mode, which does not drive back the efforts of its own imagination or these of the other people, but is capable by means of evaluation to acknowledge, to accept or to deny these.
Such an individual itself is a social-historical construction. It is the result and the prerequisite of challenge of the established institutions. It is a fact which in conclusion leads us to the question of politics.
As politics we mean the self-reflexive and transparent collective activity that emerges in the moment, when the question of validity de jure of institutions is posed.
· Are our laws righteous?
· Is our constitution righteous?
· Is it good?
· However, from which aspect is it good?
· Concerning what is it righteous?
Precisely, from the interior of these endless problematisations is constituted the object of the authentic politics which consequently presupposes the challenge of the existing institutions, even only in order to reconfirm the same institutions totally or partly. We come to the same result, if we say that by this politics that is so understood, the human being may challenge by itself and potentially modify his mode of being and his being as a social personality. Consequently the social-historical dimension is the location where emerges the question of the validity de jure of the institutions, therefore also of the behaviour. This last point is very important because it shows that the question of ethics is constructed within and by means of the history. The ethical behaviour, in contrary to which is said, is not necessarily given together with the history, but it constitutes an essential part of the political question. Within a traditional society, that is, in a heteronomous society, the behaviour is also instituted. You do this which is also done by all other people, you get married with him or with her or with whom you should get married, in these circumstances you should do this defined thing. In the ceremony of religious Jewish adultness by 13 years, the young Jew should have memorized more from six hundred orders. They are an instituted behaviour and predetermined answers. The question ‘what should I do?’ is not at all addressed.
On the other hand, this question is neither addressed by the Christianity, and therefore the idea of Christian ethics constitutes an absurdity. The Christian ethics do not know any question, because the answer in any question which could anyone imagine is exclusively found in the Gospel, since Jesus obviously said what should be done. That is, to abandon his father, his mother, his woman and to follow him. The only problem of Christian ethics that exists is that the Christians never did accomplish this that the Gospel says they must do. In other words, the Christianity was never the Christianity apart from a short initial period, and it was very fast transformed in an instituted Church with the later on instituted double-dealing. Consequently they began to pose their selves the question of compromise between the dictations of the Gospel and in the real life, which in fact is irrelevant for them. As of this derives also the ineradicable side of the hypocrisy, which is to be found in all the commands of the historical Christian ‘moral’.
The question ‘what should I do?’ belongs also to the entirety of contemplations that emerge in the moment of rupture of the code of behaviour.
However, if we examine simply the things from the side of ethics, that is to say, in opposition to somebody who wants to pose simply the question ‘what should I do?’ in the narrowest meaning,
· How could we forget even for one moment that the ultimate terms and standards of doing are finally established each time from the institution?
The question ‘what should I do’ appears almost without meaning, if we leave ’what should I do’ apart regarding the terms and norms of doing, consequently regarding the institutions. The last time is done a lot of discussion about the ‘other one’. There is a widespread philosophy, which claims that is constructed according to the ‘view of the other’, a fact that supposes to pose to me a requirement.
· However, who is the ‘other’ of the question?
Such philosophers have in their mind the ‘others’ who they meet or the ‘other’ generally. However the big problem is posed by those real others of the six and more billions, those who we do not meet, but those that we very well know that they exist, and that they mostly live in a heteronomous existence. The question ‘what should I do’ is thus an essential political question.
Politics is the clear and recurrent thinking activity that reflects about the institutions of the society and which defines as objective their transformation perhaps. This means that it does not take the same pieces of timber in order to combine them in a different way, but that it creates new instituted forms, which also articulate new meanings. This is proved to us by the two constructions as of which derives the European tradition, the one by the Greek democracy, and the next one much widespread, but also from a certain aspect more problematic form, that is, the democratic and revolutionary movements of the new years. New imaginary significances emerged in their bosoms, which were sustained by the institutions, were incarnated into them and were inspired through them. For example, the first democratic cities where the citizens considered their selves as ‘equals’ and as ‘coequals,’ even before the term coequal appeared, was realised a rupture with the world of the Homeric Epics. In this world is not posed the question, if Odysseus is equal to some other.
The citizens of the Polis are however equal and there is isonomy for all. Evidently, there are also the women and the slaves. As a result, it is not a concept that may be followed. We however find there some seeds of ideas. In the new years these significances are revived and channelled much more faraway. There is much talking about equality, freedom, and fraternity for all the people. This ‘for all’ is a social significance that makes its appearance in the West, and that from the political point of view is not same with the meaning of the Greeks, if we leave apart the stoics, who here are without any political influence.
· Sine when?
They say that the equality exists already in the Gospel. But the equality of the Gospel and of Paul is existent only there highly in the sky thereafter, but not here underneath. In the Christian churches there were comfortable seats for the sovereigns, chairs for the good bourgeois of the community and benches or nothing for the simple believers, who all over again are our brothers. These simple believers, who are neither Greeks nor Jews, neither free nor slaves, neither men nor women, but absolutely coequal children of God, in order to hear precisely this heavenly talking are accommodated each one in a different way or they are divided into seating and staying folks. Therefore the equality of the new years is not the equality of the Christianity, but is a construction of the new historical movement that encouraged the demand of equality, which is not a celestial one, but it is initiated nowadays. The reason that the Christian ideas were re-interpreted within this movement and thanks to this became the object of a new behaviour, it is not at all surprising. We may remember that during the French Revolution there were people, who considered Jesus as the first sans-culotte.
We live now in a world where these imaginary significances, such as freedom and equality, are always present, a fact that simultaneously reveals an enormous contradiction. If we examine the significance of freedom and equality in their strict logic and in all the profundity, we will first see that the one involves the other one, instead of reject each other, the same as a misleading argumentation repeats for more than one century. We however also observe that they have even become by no means reality in the so called ‘democratic’ societies. Actually these societies realize the institutions of a liberal oligarchy. The fine ‘political philosophy’ of our epoch closes up the eyes in front of this reality, while it is incompetent in the same time to accomplish a genuine philosophical discussion on the foundations of this oligarchic system. We have not seen whatever discussion which may be worthy of this name, e.g. about the metaphysics of the ‘representation’ or about this of the parties, which are the real centre of power of the modern societies. If we dare to talk about the reality, we will soon realize that it is a joke to talk about a political equality between the street sweeper in Germany and Mr Big Bang.
· How does the sovereign population of roughly 50 millions of voters practise the power?
It is called to vote each four or five years and to identify between 5.000 individuals at maximum, those who will represent this population for the next years by a proportion of 1 to 10.000. If we multiply this number by ten in order to take in account all the capital holders, the directors and the technocrats of the state, the members of the party’s mechanisms, the administrators of the communication media, etc. we will achieve by an extremely great generosity the number of 50.000 individuals in total of 50 millions of voters. The sovereign oligarchy is constituted from the 1 to1000. This is a percentage that would make the Roman oligarchy to pale from jealousy.
These institutions of the liberal oligarchy correspond to the compromise that has reached our society between the pure capitalism and the fights for emancipation, which tried to alter this or to turn this into a more liberal system. No one denies that this compromise guarantees not only liberties, but also definite possibilities for certain members of the dominated categories of the population.
There is however a debate about equality and also about the ‘human rights’.
· “Human rights of which human being?”
There are roughly six billions humans on the Earth. This institution of the liberal oligarchy plus a certain material comfort exists only in the countries of OECD, perhaps in one to two more or still even less, that is to say, roughly in one billion of persons. The one sixth of the human population enjoys these human rights and a certain material comfort. The big stratagem of Thatcherism and Reganism was that they suppressed the poverty to roughly the 20% of the population, that is to say, in non-privileged who do not have more anything to say or who the most that could only do were to explode without result. The other, as the English say, they never had it so good, they buy in this moment the second coloured television perhaps. Regarding the five sixth human populations that remain, they are victims of shabbiness and they generally live under tyrannical regimes. Certainly, they are not all such victims there, there are also rich and privileged.
· What then turned out to be the human rights, the equality and the freedom?
· Would it be better to say that there are not any rights of the human, but rights of the Americans and the Germans, of the English and the French, etc?
· Is there a method to come out from this situation?
A change is possible only, and only if a new awakening arises, and if a new phase of a dense political creative power of the humanity might be instigated, a fact that in the following presupposes the abandoning of the apathy and the selfishness that characterize the modern industrialized societies. Otherwise, the historical innovation will surely not disappear, first because the idea of the ‘end of the history’ is from every aspect idiotic, but there is however the danger that this innovation, instead to construct freer individuals within freer societies, it may trigger the appearance of a new type of human being, who we could currently call him a zap-person or a reflex-person. He is a type of being, who is pulled by the rope in the nose and is managed by mechanisms and anonymous configurations, which have become perfectly independent from all social control. These are mechanisms, the supremacy of which has been already put in train, and which hold him captive in the hallucination of his individuality and freedom.
This that could be done by the political thinking is to announce this dilemma that we nowadays have by transparent terms. The politics obviously cannot solve this alone. Only the human collective can do this, by wakening up from its hypnosis and by unfolding its creative activity.
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