Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Psychoanalysis, pedagogy and politics

Freud wrote once that the psychoanalysis, the pedagogy and the political governing are the three impossible professions. Talking about these three professions he does not said why he considers them impossible, and the term impossible should be here conceived also literally and with great care, since Freud finally constructed the psychoanalysis and practiced the same, also to his self, continuously.

Therefore we believe that we may think on the use of this term impossible. Freud did not say that these three professions are terribly difficult as the neurosurgery or the being a pianist and giving concerts or the being a guide and bringing the persons on Himalaya, he said impossible only.
· Could we imagine that these three are impossible because they have to do with this indomitable of all the materials, that is, with the Human Being?

We do not believe that this could have a positive response, because after all the generals and the politicians as well as the prostitutes deal with this human substance, and we would not say that the profession of a prostitute or of a politician or of a general is unfeasible. Of course we can think about a reason, which may be that the psychoanalysis could be thought and be called impossible, and we could say that this reason may be located in its objective, which is to modify and not simply to manage or to handle the human beings the way they are.

However the details are not such easy. As an example, a psychiatrist who does the so called behavioural treatment and who believes that he cures the sick persons by punishments and rewards, or a pedagogue such as the initiator of the gas attack in Tokyo subway, or the guardians of the concentration camps, either of the Nazis or Stalin’s, or the agents of Mini-love in 1984 of Orwell and O’ Brian, all these act upon in order to change the human beings and frequently they achieve this target.

In all these the cases, the objective of their activity is already completely defined in the thought of the performer. The objective in the above examples is to eradicate from the thinking and the psyche of the tormented individual all kinds of self-control and self-reflection. The performer uses also predetermined means and it is supposed that he put into practice his complete control of the means and of the entire process. He could of course fail, but this is another story and these failures are by no means accidental, particularly due to the fact that the human being is what it is. After all, the objectives and the means in these cases are expected to take place within a rational relationship. That is to say, the conditions and terms as well as any relationship that the performer may need are given. And provided also that his target and what he knows or he believes to know about his object are given, that is, about the individual who is in his hands, then he performs or he may perform in the most rational and effective mode.

Obviously, this knowledge, which is thus used as a tool and is potentially used for objectives that we consider as terribly inhuman, may include and often includes a knowledge of the profound mental processes, as it was shown by the Nazi doctors, when they discussed about the treatment of the incarcerated in the Nazi camps, where the principal method was the disintegration of the image and self-picture of the imprisoned, if we may call this so, that is, the destruction of his tautological orientations. On the other hand, Orwell has revealed the same process also with a lot of profundity in 1984.

Now, when we consider the psychoanalysis, we will discover that nothing of all this is valid. Whichever could be the conclusion of the discussions on the objectives and on the terminations or of the termination of the psychoanalysis, the objective intention which the analyst tries to achieve may not be easily limited by a defined and tangible terminology.

O’ Brian in 1984 of Orwell achieves his objectives, when Smith, who is the hero and the victim of the story, does not only admit simply all they wanted him to admit, but he actually admits that he in his interior loves the Big Brother. The last and deeper moment of the book is this last phrase, which is usually overlooked by the critics, because they like to see other things readily available when Smith is shed tears by discovering that he loves the Big Brother.

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At this moment this is another thing, that is, it may be simple or complicated to make the human beings to really love Stalin or Hitler or any other person, but it is a condition of the subject that we may describe and identify. Here is the target. We cannot say anything comparable about the psychoanalysis.

As we know Freud turned often back to the question of the termination or of the terminations of the objectives of the analysis and gave to this question various, and apparently different answers at least as well as different definitions of this conclusion. One of the last answers that he gave which we believe that it is the most comprehensive and fertile is the famous phrase “where it was the ‘id’, it should turn into the ‘I’.” If we inopportunely seize this phrase as it looks to be as we are motivated by the direct formulations of Freud in the following, it appears that he means “the ‘Id’ should be conquered by the ‘I’ and should be drained, possibly also should be cultivated like the Dutch gulf Zuyderzee,” which indeed is a drained and cultivated gulf of Holland and Freud is referred literally to this.

When we give this meaning to this phrase, then we define an objective that is also impossible for us, that is, unachievable and monstrous. Impossible and unachievable, because it is not possible that a human being may exist whose unconscious has been conquered by the consciousness and whose motivations are perfectly flooded by reasonable considerations and controlled by such reasonable considerations. That is, such a being that has finished to imagine and to dream cannot be realistic.

It is monstrous, because, if we suppose that we may ever achieve this condition, we would certainly eliminate this that makes us human beings and obviously is not the logic and the rationality with the narrow meaning, but it is this not compulsory, uninhibited and not controllable continuous emersion of the creative radical imagination within the flow of our representations affects and desires. And it is true that one of the objectives of the analysis is precisely to release this flow of representations of the disgust that it usually undergoes as a result of an ‘I’ that precisely is in principle and in first approach a rigid and for the most of its part a social construct.

For this reason, it was alternatively proposed to supplement and rephrase the phrase of Freud, so that it would be “where the ‘I’ is, should also emerge the ‘Id’.” The purpose and the objective of the analysis are not to dislocate a mental instance to the profit of another one. It is to alter the relationship between the instances, and in order to do this, one of these instances, the ‘I,’ or if we want the consciousness, must be substantially altered.
· How may this ‘I’ be altered?

This might be altered, by accepting and taking over the contents of the unconscious, by reflecting and thinking and rethinking upon this, and by being rendered capable to choose by qualified clarity between motivations and ideas, in order to decide which of all might try to fulfil.

In other words the ‘I’ should become a self-reflecting and self-thinking entity that may be capable to reflect and to imagine. The endeavour of analysis is not any type of holiness of course. As Kant said also one century before Freud, a human being may never be a saint. This point that may appear ordinary has immense consequences, because it shows in which degree the psychoanalysis clearly rejects all moral, which is supported upon the condemnation of desire and consequently which is based upon the culpability. If we like to give a depiction of the ethics that we consider as the ethics of the psychoanalysis, it would be to say, “I desire to kill or to rape you, but I will not do this.”
· How could the psychoanalysis ever forget that the fundamental fact upon which it is based is that we begin our life seeing a woman and we desire her, either are we men or are we women?
· And that later also, either we are women or men, when we see a man we desire him also?
· And that this desire may never be banished, as it is shown in the dreams of human beings of any age, and more important still that without this desire we may never become human beings, and possibly we might never survive?

We may in the following describe an approach of this altered relationship between the instances, about which we have discussed. The disgust is replaced by the knowledge of the contents of the unconscious and by the reflection, self-reflection and self-thinking about these contents. The objection or the repressive action fades away and opens the way to a relatively elucidated discussion. The importance of this change does not lie in the fact that we may in this way displace the mental conflicts. None did promise us that we have the right from our birth to have a mental life without conflicts. Its importance does not lie in the establishment of a self-reflecting and self-thinking entity that has become a pseudo-logical and a socially adapted mechanism, but that on the contrary this entity has recognized and liberated the radical imagination that may be found in the core of the Psyche. In the phrase of Freud, this well-known, “where the ‘Id’ was, should become the ‘I’,” is a process and not a condition in which we come in for ever, because of this entity that we try to describe.

Therefore we would also say that we may simply clarify the objective of the analysis and strictly we may not install this. This that we call the demand of the autonomy in the field of the individual human being is the alteration and the adjustment of the subject in such a way that it can come in and remain in this process.

The objective of psychoanalysis is from this point of view consubstantial with the demand of the autonomy. This target may obviously not be accomplished and even might not be approached without the co-activity of the analyzed person, that is, the commemoration, the reappearance and the elaboration of the unconscious contents. The analyzed person is naturally the main performer in the psychoanalytical process.

Consequently, we cannot find at this point the means that are separated from the objectives. The various aspects of the framing and the adjustment of the analytic process, that is, the divan, the hours, etc, are not its means, but they are the terms under which the process may be developed. The process is the same an analytic process only insofar, as it is simultaneously also the means and the objectives. The free associations of the analyzed person are for example not a part of the analysis. Very soon, when these free associations spread out, this process of unwrapping already expresses and realises the ability of the analyzed person to expand and liberate the flow of his representations and consequently also to recognize his feelings and desires, because these things continue to be firm together.

And this liberation of the flow of representations that takes place in the psychoanalytical meeting leads to the entry on the scene of the thinking activity of the analyzed person, naturally with the punctuation and the support of interpretations of the analyst. The analyzed person thinks and imagines and above he is reflected upon himself, if we can say this, and it returns upon the material and he repeats or reaccepts this.

Precisely for these reasons the psychoanalysis is not a technique and we believe that it is mistaken to talk still for psychoanalytical technique. The psychoanalysis is a practical and poietical activity, where both participants are also performers, even if the analyzed person is the main performer, because he develops the process by his auto energy.

We call this poietical, because it is creative. Its outcome is or it should be the auto alteration of the analyzed person, that is, the emersion of another human being, if we precisely think upon this. We call this practical, because we call generally as performance the transparent activity, the objective of which is as well the human autonomy and where the only means to reach this objective is the same autonomy as it may be unfolded.


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We go now ahead to pedagogy as a second point, where the things are comparable enough as of the same point of view. The pedagogy begins by the age zero and no one knows exactly, when it will be finished. We believe that we continue to be educated from our selves and from the others in some way. The objective of the pedagogy is to help de jure this newborn hopeful and dreadful being, the hopeful and dreadful monster, to become a human being.

The objective of the pedagogy is to transform and to alter this package of drives and this boundless imagination in order to construct a human being within the complete meaning of the term. A human being that at this point is not taken by his biological significance, but by the significance of an autonomous being and by the significance of the autonomy, which we gave him. We could say as a being with the ability to be in charge and command and also to be commanded.

The pedagogy should in each moment expand the auto energy of the subject by using this same auto energy for this. This is the main dilemma of the pedagogy. The objective of pedagogy is of course not to teach specific things and specific lessons, but to expand the ability of the subject to learn and to learn to study and to learn to discover, that is, to learn finally to invent.

The pedagogy cannot obviously do this without to teach certain things, as well as the analysis cannot also move ahead without the interpretations of the analyst. But, like in the analysis, the subjects, or the objects that become an object of teaching, should always be considered as basic elements upon which we bypass the stream of the violent flow, and we do not that bypass this in order to simply make possible the teaching of more things yet, but in order to develop the learn and discovery abilities of the child’s creative imagination or of any person, who may be the object of the pedagogic activity.

The pedagogy should certainly teach stuff, and from this viewpoint many exaggerations of certain modern pedagogic schools are to be blamed in our opinion, but two cases appear to us to be absolutely unquestionable.
· Each pedagogic process is bad, if it does not aspire to develop the biggest possible expansion of the auto energy of the being mentored.
· Each pedagogic system is defective, if it cannot answer logically to the potential question of the being mentored, that is,
o Why have we to learn this thing?

We cannot at this point go through the enormous topic of the relationships between the psychoanalysis and the pedagogy, but a misunderstanding should be dissolved at least. The psychoanalysis does not obviously presume and does not pose as an axiom or as a demand one endogenously good human being. Neither it believes that the only we would have to do is to leave the desires and drives to be expressed in order to construct the happiness of the humankind. If we would leave the desires and drives not only to be expressed, but also to be freely realized, we would of course not have the world happiness, but the world massacre. For the psychoanalysis also and for the common mind as well as for all important thinkers, a mature human being has necessarily internalized an enormous number of restrictions that have been imposed to him from the exterior and which henceforth constitute a part of his Psyche. From the psychoanalytic point of view this mature human being has necessarily give up the omnipotence and has accepted that the words do not mean, what he wants that they mean, but that they mean, what the community decided that they may mean. He has accepted the existence of the other human being whose desires are often or are roughly always opposite with his own desires, and so on.

This psychoanalytic description can be translated social-historically and find its equivalent in the social-historic field, if we say that this being has potentially internalized the entirety of the existing establishments of the society and more specifically the imaginary significances, which in each particular society organize the human and non-human world and give to this a meaning .

Thus, from the psychoanalytic point of view, if we take the societies as they are, the pedagogy is the upbringing of the newborn, which brings this in the condition that we have described, but with the minimal setback of its radical imagination and the biggest possible growth of its autonomous thinking.

However, from the social-historical point of view, if we take the societies as they are, the pedagogy is supposed, and should and it happens actually to take care of the being mentored in such a way that this should internalize and also consequently accept, and more than this, it is to accept the existing institutions also whatever they might be. It is unambiguous that at this point we have contacted at one apparent antinomy at least, but we also have a profound and difficult question. This brings us precisely to the dilemma of the third impossible profession, the politics, and to the project of autonomy, which is necessarily a social and not simply an individual demand.

Before we proceed to this point, we would like to note in addition something about the Freudian term of the weak point or of the impossibility by which we opened our search. As we may see, this impossibility of the psychoanalysis and of the pedagogy is located also on the fact that both should use the autonomy, which does not exist yet in order to help the construction of the subject’s autonomy. For the usual logic, this appears as a reasonable impossibility. But obviously the human reality goes beyond this usual logic.

This impossibility comes into view, or this appears at least so that it is done specifically within the frame of the heteronomous society, also in the case of pedagogy by the effort to construct autonomous beings. And beyond this and much more radically, it appears by means of the efforts to achieve the autonomy perhaps, while or even if we absorb and internalize the prearranged institutions.

The solution, or at least the efforts to resolve this terrible puzzle, we may say that it is the most impossible job and the most impossible duty of the politics. It is as much more impossible that also the politics should obviously be sustained upon an autonomy of persons as social individuals, which is still absent, but it is needed in order to construct the autonomy.

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We come therefore upon this point of politics. The psychoanalysis intends to assist the individual to become autonomous, that is, as we said to be capable of self-reflecting activity and self-thinking. From this view the psychoanalysis belongs henceforth completely to the enormous social current, in which belong also the democracy and the philosophy.

But as we already said, the pedagogy, but also the psychoanalysis is found to be confronted with the dilemma of the existing institutions of society from the very beginnings. In pedagogy this comes into view immediately and instantaneously. Concerning the psychoanalysis this get-together is more hidden, maybe because we do not see the things clear enough, but in effect it is the social event of togetherness with the concrete ‘I’ of the analyzed person, because this ‘I’ is to an enormous part a social construction. This is originally planned to function in a prearranged social adjustment in order to carry on, to maintain and to reproduce this adjustment, that is, the active social institutions. These institutions are not maintained and reproduced so much by open violence and clear-cut oppression, apart from some infrequent cases. They are maintained and reproduced because they adjust and anticipate and organize their internalization by means of these individuals, who are the same the constructs of the same institutions.

What was positively said, the polis teaches the man, it may also enter negatively in force, and if we want valid for all cases. The “teaches” at this point does not mean to literally to teach. The polis constructs the man and naturally also the woman, the person, the citizen.
· What are these institutions and the social imaginary significances?

They are creations of the social imaginary, that is, of the established radical imaginary. This imaginary is the creative faculty of the anonymous community, so as this appears evidently and unquestionably, for example, within the creation and the development of the language, or of the forms of the familial life and of the morals and of the ideas. This community cannot ever exist otherwise, but only as an instituted. Nevertheless, its institutions are all times its own constructions. But also all times as soon as they are constructed or already the moment of construction, they emerge in the community or the community provides an image of them as prearranged. Prearranged by the ancestors, by the gods, by God, by the nature, by the reason, by the laws of history, by the processes of economic competition, by everything what we want. Thus, they become frozen and inflexible and actually everywhere and almost always are they an object of adoration. And in these institutions there is always a central powerful and effective element of self-eternization or repetition, as we would say in the psychoanalysis, and obviously the main corpse of this perpetuation are the same socially conditioned and conformist subjects.

We may call this social situation heteronomous. The other at this point, the other one who gave once the rule, he is not another than the same instituting society which for very profound reasons must cover up this fact. And we may call autonomous a society, which does not only explicitly knows that the same has constructed its institutions, but also that it has instituted itself, so that may liberate its radical imaginary and it is capable to alter its institutions by a collective activity, which is then self-reflexive or self-provident and purposeful.

And we may call politics the clarified activity that has as an objective the institution of an autonomous society and the decisions that concern the collective undertakings of such a society. It is immediately obvious that this project for an autonomous society loses each meaning and becomes absurd, when it is not a project that aspires to simultaneously construct autonomous individuals. And it is also reversely valid and in force.

We believe that there is enough helpful part, but obviously there is not an identity and even not a structural consent between the questions and the activities that concern the project of autonomy by the individual and also within the social field. In the case of heteronomy, the inflexible structure of the institution and its disguise, as well as the concealing of the radical social imaginary that is accomplished by the institution, all these correspond to the rigidity of the socially constructed and conditioned individual and to the suppression of the work of the radical imagination of the psyche.

Within the idea of the autonomy project, we firstly tried to determine the objective of the psychoanalysis and pedagogy also as the establishment of another type of relationship between the self-provident subject, which is the subject of willpower and thinking, and its unconscious, that is, its radical imagination. Secondly, we tried precisely to liberate the ability of the subject to do and to act, that is, to form an open project for its life and to work within this project.

In the same way we may define the objective of the real and genuine politics, firstly as the institution of another type of relationships between the instituting force and the instituted society, that is to say, between the rules, which are each time also prearranged and the provident and planned activity of the political body. And secondly, we may define it as the liberation of the collective creativity, which allows to the community to form collective projects for collective activities and also to work actively for these projects.

Moreover, we can here observe that the essential bond between these two definitions is found precisely by the pedagogy, that is to say, by the education, which was certainly known by the ancient societies.
· Because otherwise, how could be established there a self-provident society without self-provident individuals?

An autonomous society, since it is a community that is self-instituted and self-governed, presupposes the enlarged ability of all its members to participate to the activities of the collective thinking, consideration and decision. From this view the democracy may be defined as the arrangement of the collective thought process in its complete meaning. And we could show that all the subsequent things arise from this meaning, but this is another area under discussion. Democracy obviously cannot exist without democratic individuals, as well as democratic individuals could not be there without democracy. And we are coming again within the circle of construction.

We could also show still more clearly the intimate solidarity between the individual and the social dimensions of the autonomy project. The socialization of the psyche and its simple survival even oblige this to recognize and to admit that its fundamental desires cannot be realized ever. The heteronomous societies do not achieve this result, which is basic for the socialization of psyche, by merely prohibiting the actions, but by prohibiting the thoughts, that is, by binding the flow of representations and by convicting the radical imagination to silence. The real significance of the heteronomous society is not that the action is prohibited, because there are constables or courts or guardians. The essence is that the thoughts are prohibited, which could lead to actions that the society does not admit.

And here happens the following noteworthy fact. It appears that the things happen as if the society would apply the same methods that apply the unconscious and the repulsion in reverse. That is to say, the heteronomous society answers to the omnipotence of the unconscious thinking by trying to achieve the complete weakness and disability of this thinking, and finally of the thinking simply, as if this complete weakness of thinking would be the only way in order to restrict the actions.

This directs by far more away of the point, which Freud calls the authoritarian and wild superego. The history shows that this process of repulsion and exclusion that even renders impossible for the subject also the thought of the prohibited things puts into effect an amputation or a castration of the psyche. What we want are autonomous subjects, that is to say, individuals capable of this self-reflexive activity, but the content and the objects of this activity and the growth of its means and methods cannot be provided, but only from the radical imagination of the psyche, unless we are going through an interminable repetition. This is the source of contribution of the individual to the social-historical creation. And this is the reason, why a pedagogy which would not turn out the persons to cripples as well as a genuine education has the enormous significance that they has.

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We come back in the enigma of politics. An autonomous society presupposes autonomous individuals. The individuals become this that they are by absorbing and internalizing the institutions. The individuals are the specific embodiment of the institutions in some meaning. We know that this internalisation is anything but superficial. The modes of thinking and the modes of action, the rules and the values, the same the identity of the individuals as social beings, all depend from this internalization.

In a heteronomous society the internalisation of all laws in the broader meaning of term law in addition to all of the institutions, it would be meaningless, if this were not accompanied by the internalization of this meta-law and ultimate law, that is, you should never question the laws. This is not written anywhere, but it sustains the whole structure. In an autonomous society now the meta-law could not be nothing other than, you will comply with the laws, but you have the right to interpellate and dispute the law. You can raise the question of the law’s justice or in other words, if it is allowed, its fitness, that is to say, if this is the proper law. There are also clauses possible that could accompany this meta-law.

We could thus maybe formulate the answer to the riddle that we posed and also we may formulate the first object of an autonomic politics, that is to say, of a democratic politics. This is to help the community to construct the institutions of which the internalization from the individuals would not restrict, but enlarge their aptitude to become autonomous.

Already from this phrasing is obvious that we may figure out the main regulations for a full democratic institution of the society, if we receive this together with the principle of equality that is incorporated in the plural of the word individuals. But we will not like to discuss more about this topic at this point, apart from one observation only.

We said that this is the first topic and the first objective of politics, that is, to help the community to construct such institutions which, when they are internalized by the individuals their abilities of autonomy are expanded, instead to be restricted. This is the first of all objectives; this is first because this is the condition that all the others exist; and because by virtue of that it includes all the others. There are obviously also other objectives and other objects, which are not secondary. Such are for example the construction of special institutions that match with this axiom and specify this within the particular conditions and such are of course the self-governing, as well as the proposals and the decisions that concern the collective works and the collective activities. This is because autonomy is not a self-objective, either in the individual or in the social field.

Sometimes it may become also a self-objective and something less as a self-objective. That is to say, we desire to have autonomy for the same the autonomy, we desire to have freedom because we wish for the freedom, but we desire this also in order to be free to do and to act, and to do and to perform tangible things. And the real and genuine politics should join in by all these activities and duties. The politics is neither the psychoanalyst of the society, nor its educator nor its conscience, but it is an essential and crucial dimension of its self-thoughtfulness and its self-reflectivity.

And as such this politics is compelled to act upon the human beings by establishing them as autonomous and helping them to achieve their autonomy, without ever to forget that the last source of the historical construction is the radical imagination of the anonymous community. By this meaning, we believe that we may understand why politics is one weak or impossible profession, such as the psychoanalysis and the pedagogy and it is still more impossibly fragile perhaps, given the nature and the dimension of its subject.


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We may come to an end by bringing some observations upon the most important of all the questions, which is also common by the psychoanalysis and by the politics too.

The social institutions dominate upon the individuals simply and just because they construct and form the individuals. They construct and also form these completely by the traditional societies and they construct and they also form these to an essential extent by the liberal societies within which we live. Once more, it is the internalization of the institutions by the individual that endures all its life. This that is important by this internalization is the internalization of the meanings and of the social imaginary significances that are embodied within these institutions. The society cuts off the specific human being from the closed universe of the initial psychical unit, and obliges this always in a violent sense to enter into the hard universe of the social reality, that is to say, of the reality, because the reality is always a social reality, but it has to offer to this being something in return.

This that the society offers as return, it is a meaning of the day, that is to say, a meaning that is not used for dreams, but a meaning that may remain by the light. In the real world, such as it is constructed by the society every time, the things and the relationships have a meaning, the other persons and our status in the society as well as the relationship with the other persons have a meaning. The life has a meaning, but it is thought that also the death has a meaning. Let us think about all societies apart of the modern one.

This meaning is the subjective side of this, which are the social significances, if we consider these social-historically with regard to the individual. Thus, an interpretation of the meanings is done by the society, or still better a construction of meanings and significances, which are the crucial and the difficult point. Since the psychoanalysis does not obviously provide and does not offer, as well as it does not teach any meaning about the life. It may only help the analyzed person to find and to invent this meaning and to construct it for its life. And we may say that this meaning, which the analyzed person might create for his life, may not be in advance and also in an all-inclusive way defined.

In one of his most pessimistic days Freud has written that the analysis does not convey the happiness, but it may transform the neurotic misery in common and usual infelicity at the most. We think that by this he was pessimistic. Obviously the analysis may not offer the happiness, but it helps the analyzed person not only to do away with the neurotic misery, but also to form his own project for his life.

But this assertion may not exhaust the issue.
· Why frequently, in order to not say ‘very frequently’, the analysis fails or why is rendered never-ending or infinite?

In one of his latest scripts Freud brings up a lot of reasons for this relative malfunction and he points out this that he calls a rock, which paradoxically for the two expressions that he gives to this is packed together in the same thing. The rock is the renunciation of femininity that by the woman appears in the form of the penis jealousy, and by the man in the form of rejecting the passive attitude or the feminine attitude toward another male.

This that characterizes an immense analysis is obviously the repetition. It is like a neurosis in a superior level or rather like a squared neurosis.
· Why is there the repetition?

By saying this shortly, it is the repetition with the meaning that interest us at this point, that is to say, the retails of death and the small change of death is the method which the analyzed person uses in order to defend against the reality of the full death. Here we have a classic psychical mechanism, but in a much bigger dimension.

The explanation, why the analysis may fail or may become infinite is without doubt, firstly the incapability of the analyzed person and also of the analyst, who is engaged with him, to accept the death in the first form, that is to say, the death of him who he was in order to become some other person. But we think that the second and more significant thing is the incapability of the analyzed person to accept the reality of the real and absolute death, and he is necessarily initially and finally on his own in this.

We think that death in its essence is the utmost rock upon which could deviate or even break up each analysis. We know all that life includes the continuously postponed temporariness of the meaning and the temporariness of the invested objects, as well as the temporariness of the invested activities, which have a meaning. But death as we all know is also the foolishness and non-meaningfulness of the meaning itself. Our time is not time, it is not the time and it has not any time.

The analysis as well as the maturity does not arrive at the location that it should achieve, apart when and only by the condition that the person in question, may be capable to live constantly at the edge of the abyss and in this ultimate and unresolved double bind:
· Live as a mortal, live as if you were immortal.

The heteronomous societies enact upon giving an interpretation of the meaning for all and they oblige us all to internalize this. And these heteronomous societies institutionalize authentic or symbolic representatives of an eternal meaning and a phantastic and not an imaginary immortality, and that in the eternal meaning and in the phantastic immortality of which is supposed that the entire world may join in various modalities. These modalities may be the myth of a personal immortality or the metempsychosis or the resurrection of the dead, but it may also be the myth of the eternity of the institutionalized artificial construct, like the king, the state, the nation, the race, the party, etc., that is, by the institutionalized artificial construct by which each person may identify himself as far as possible.

We think that an autonomous society would not tolerate anything from all these in the public field certainly. That anyone may think what he wishes is another story and that this one of the main difficulties, if not the difficulty at all, which confronts the autonomy project. It is the difficulty of the human beings to accept without much invented story and without decoration and consolation the mortality of the individual and of the community and in addition the mortality of their constructs.

Indeed the main support of the institutions is the fear of death, but not the fear that the neighbour will kill me. But the justified fear that everything, also the meaning, will be dissolved. Obviously nobody may resolve this problem. Whenever and if might this be resolved, this may not be done otherwise, but by means of an innovative social-historical construction and by a corresponding alteration of the human being and his attitude in front of the life and the death.

Whoever desires to think more about this issue, it would be good to think about some answers to this problem, which have been given by the two societies, where the project of autonomy was constructed and continued, that is to say, the ancient Greek and the Western European Societies. And more specifically, there is nobody here, who may not be impressed by the enormous difference between the two answers. It is an enormous topic of study and thinking. All the stories about immortality jointly with happiness begin after the 5th century BC. Before, there were these dreadful shades who Odysseus meets in the Hades.
· How did the ancient Greeks reconcile their immense liveliness and their creativity with the deep knowledge of their mortality?
· And how did try the western Europeans to find other counterweights and other economies of death, when they slowly-slowly did come out partly from the grip of the Christianity?

A research, which would try to understand the how were interconnected the political efforts and the political institutions as well as the political prospects of these two societies with their attitude towards the problem of the mortality, would surely bring into being essential results.

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