Thursday, January 31, 2008

First Institution of Society and Second-Order Institutions

Our topic today is: Is there a theory of the institution? My answer is: Certainly not. There is not, and cannot be, a theory of the institution, for theory is theoria: the gaze that puts us face to face with something and inspects it. We cannot put ourselves face to face with the institution and then inspect it, since the means one would use to do so form a part of the institution. How could I talk about the institution in a language that professes to be rigorous, formalized, or formalizable to an indefinite degree, and so on, when this language itself is an institution, perhaps the first and most important of institutions?

We are speaking {English} here. I am speaking to you in {English} since I have learned {English}, though it happens that my mother tongue is Greek. Neither my {English} nor my Greek, however, is in any way natural. Since people here at the conference seem to be enjoying the jokes the speakers have been making, let us say that I was born in China (I am not even saying that I would be Chinese, but simply born in China). If that were the case, I would be condemned all my life not to know the difference between elections and erections, since l and r are not distinct phonemes in Chinese. Yet it is not just a matter of phonetics. All Greco-Western philosophy and thought, and the theory or theories we construct, owe much to certain grammatical rules characteristic of Indo-European languages—and in particular to that much talked-about verb einai, “to be.” Many languages, very beautiful ones and completely appropriate to the societies to which they belong, do not include the verb “to be.” And if the peoples who speak these languages undertook to constitute a fundamental philosophy, they would not call it “ontology.” Thus, I can elucidate my relation to language, but I cannot abstract myself from it and “look at” it, nor can I “construct” it from the outside. I cannot make a “theory” out of the institution, for I am on the inside. Indeed, not even this statement goes far enough. Abstracting, for a moment, from a limit point —a point I try to approach with the patient on the couch, or by myself with the aid, perhaps, of a dream—abstracting from this limit point, which is situated almost at infinity, I am a walking fragment of the institution of society, as we all are such walking fragments, each one complementary to the others. Talking bipeds, one might say.

Bipeds, for this reminds us of our biological nature, or, rather, our leaning on our biology. And talking, for that certainly reminds us once again of this leaning on, these biological underpinnings of ours, since to be able to speak one must have vocal cords, and so forth, a central nervous system organized in a certain fashion—but one must also have language as social institution. This is not the time or the place to enter into the interminable discussion that began in Greece in the fifth century B.C.E. concerning the “natural”—physei—or conventional/ instituted—nomo—character of language, which was taken up again a few decades ago, first with structural linguistics, then with Chomsky’s views and the search for universals or invariant structures extending across the different languages people speak.

One thing is certain. An enormous part, the most important part, of language, the part that concerns the significations it conveys—its semantics—does not correspond in a univocal manner to the central nervous system of homo sapiens since, if it did, all languages would be strictly isomorphic, and one would be able to pass from one to another by means of uniform, rule-governed transformations with neither loss nor gain. Now, we know there is no exact or “perfect” translation, strictly speaking, of a text into any tongue other than its original (besides the trivial case in which the text in question is merely a series of mathematical symbols). As Roman Jakobson said, “genuine” translation is always poetic re-creation. There is therefore a deep-seated dependence, in respect to language, between what I think and what I say. And this is only one example of the prevalence, indeed the penetration through and through, in each one of us, of what is instituted in our native society.

Can one then say, as has just been said, that theory is “calling the institution into question”? First, we must once again eliminate from this discussion the term theory, in its commonly accepted sense. Next, we must note that “calling the institution into question” through reflection upon it or the attempt to elucidate the institution occurs only by way of an exception in the history of humanity, and only in one line of societies: the European or Greco-Western. There is no ethnocentrism in this—and still less any privilege, political or otherwise, that would thus be conferred upon us; it is just an acknowledgment that “calling the institution into question” implies an enormous historical rupture—and that, as far as we know, this rupture has not occurred among the Nambikwara or the Bamileke.

We encounter this rupture only twice in the history of humanity: in ancient Greece for the first time, then in Western Europe beginning at the end of the High Middle Ages. This rupture implies that these same individuals who have been fabricated by society, who are its walking fragments, have been able to change themselves essentially; they have been able to create for themselves the means to challenge and to call into question the institutions they have inherited, the institutions of the society that had raised them—which obviously goes hand in hand with an essential change in the entire instituted social field. And this is expressed both by the birth of a public political space and by the creation of free inquiry, of unlimited interrogation. The possibility of having a thought about the institution, of elucidating it, exists only from the moment when—in deeds as well as in discourse —the institution is called into question. This is the birth of democracy and philosophy, which go hand in hand. People stand up and say, “The representations of the tribe are false.”

They try to think the world and man in the world in a different way. And people stand up and say, “The established power is unjust, the instituted laws are unjust, we must instaurate other ones.” These two positions are profoundly interrelated [solidaires]. What does it mean that the established power is unjust? Who gives you the right to say that? And do you want simply to put another, equally unjust power in its place, or are you claiming to instaurate a just power? But what is a just power—what is justice? On the other hand, you are destroying the tribe’s representations, you are trying to put something else in their place, therefore you are claiming that this other thing is true—and thus that you know what is true; but, what is truth?
We see already that although the institution is a fundamental fact of humanity’s history, and indeed one of the two elements that humanize man—the other being the radical imagination—one cannot talk in the same way about all institutions in history, for in a predemocratic and prephilosophic society the possibility of challenging and questioning the institution quite simply does not exist. Individuals do not know that the gods of the tribe are institutions. They do not know it, and they cannot know it. To be brief, I take one of the clearest and most well-known cases: for the Hebrews, the Law is not a law of the tribe; it has been formulated by the Lord Himself and given by Him in person. How could you call this Law in question? How could you mean that God’s Law is unjust, when Justice is defined as the will of God? How could you say that God does not exist, when God provides His own self-definition: Ego eimi ho on, I am (the one who) is, I am being (I avoid here the quarrel over the proper translation of the original Hebrew text). What do you mean by God does not exist when, in the language of the tribe, that would mean being does not exist?

In the overwhelming majority of societies—the ones I call heteronomous—on the one hand, the institution asserts on its own that it is not the work of man; on the other hand, the individuals belonging to these societies are raised, trained, and fabricated in such a way that they are, so to speak, resorbed by the institution of society. No one can assert ideas or express a will or desire opposed to the instituted order, and this is so not because they would be subject to sanctions but because each person is, anthropologically speaking, fabricated this way; everyone has internalized the institution of society to such an extent that one does not have at one’s disposal the psychical and mental means to challenge this institution. And what changes—with ancient Greece, on the one hand, and postmedieval Europe, on the other—is that the institution of society renders possible the creation of individuals who no longer see therein anything untouchable but succeed rather in calling the institution into question, be it in words, be it in deeds, be it through both at once. We thus come to the first rough historical sketch of what I call the project of social autonomy and of individual autonomy.

But what does “autonomy” signify? Autos: oneself; nomos: law. The person who gives herself her own laws is autonomous. (Not, The person who does whatever comes into her head, but rather, The person who gives herself laws.) Now, that is immensely difficult. For an individual, to give oneself one’s own law, within the fields in which this is possible, requires the ability to hold one’s own in the face of all conventions, beliefs, fashion, learned people who maintain absurd ideas, the media, the silence of the public, and so forth. And for a society, to give itself its own law means to accept at bottom the idea that it is creating its own institution and that it creates that institution without being able to invoke any extrasocial foundation, any norm of norms, any measure of its measures. This therefore boils down to saying that such a society should itself decide what is just and unjust—and this is the question with which true politics deals (we are obviously not talking here about the politics of the politicians who occupy the stage today).

Society cannot exist without institution, without law—and it must decide itself what is law without recourse (except illusorily) to an extrasocial source or foundation. Both aspects are there in the ancient Greek word nomos: nomos is that which is particular to each society or to each ethnic group; it is its institution/ convention, that which is opposed to the “natural” (and immutable) order of things, to physis; and at the same time nomos is law, that without which human beings cannot exist as human beings, since there is no city, no polis, without laws, and there are no human beings outside the polis, the city, the political collectivity/community. When Aristotle says that outside the polis man cannot be but a savage beast or a god,1 he knows and he says that the human being is humanized only in and through the polis—an idea, moreover, that returns again and again among the ancient Greek poets, historians, and philosophers.
There are therefore these two sides to nomos, to the law: it is, each time, the institution/convention of some particular society; and it is, at the same time, the transhistorical requisite for there to be society—that is to say, whatever the content of its particular nomos, no society can exist without a nomos. Without this double understanding (that we cannot exist without nomos, but also that this nomos is our institution, our work), there can be no democracy. For, of course, democracy does not signify simply “human rights” or habeas corpus. That is only a derivative (which does not mean minor or secondary) aspect of democracy. Democracy signifies the power of the people; in other words, it means that the people make their own laws—and to make them they must be convinced, as a matter of fact, that the laws are the making of human beings. But at the same time this implies that no extrasocial standard for their laws exists—and this is the tragic dimension of democracy, for it is also its dimension of radical freedom: democracy is the regime of self-limitation.

Let us return to this very idea of institution. The term, indeed, is polysemous, and this polysemy creates a feeling of malaise, for, as has been said, “all is institution.” Surely, we should distinguish the levels at which we situate ourselves when we speak of institution. To begin with, we do not mean, of course, the social security system or mental health clinics. We mean first and foremost language, religion, power; we mean what the individual is in a given society. We even intend here man and woman, who clearly are institutions, too: the non-instituted facets of man and woman are their biological underpinnings, their leaning on—Anlehnung, to borrow Freud’s term—the existence of a sexed, anatomico-physiological bodily constitution. But being-a-man and being-a-woman are defined one way in our society, were defined another way in ancient Greece, and are defined otherwise in some African or Amerindian tribe.

The same goes for being-a-child. Childhood as such quite obviously has a biological dimension; and being-a-child is an institution that has a transhistorical form in the sense that every society must give some kind of instituted status to children. At the same time, however, this institution is profoundly historical; what being-a-child signifies concretely in each particular society changes the total institution of that society: being-a-child is one thing for the child under the Ancient Regime and another for children today with their electronic games, television sets, and all that these gadgets presuppose and entail. Let us note in passing that this signification {of childhood} today seems in danger of dissolving, for no one seems to know any longer what a child is supposed to do and not do. Similarly, people seem to know less and less in what sense and under what form men are men and women are women. The radical—and fully justified—questioning of the traditional status of women has both left completely up in the air the social (and psychical) signification of being-a-woman and, thereby and ipso facto, called back into question the social and psychical status of being-a-man, since these are but two inseparable poles of signification. What are the behaviours, signs, and emblems of virility and femininity today? Does being-a-woman mean, as it did in my grandmother’s time, having fourteen successful pregnancies, or does it mean measuring twenty-four inches around your hips?

Here I insert a parenthesis relating to a question that was raised a few moments ago: How do institutions die? Someone said: The birth of institutions raises an easily answered question; what is difficult to comprehend is the disappearance of institutions. Hearing this, I smiled to myself, for to say that the birth of language, of philosophy, and so on raises an easily answered question is quite a surprising statement. What is interesting is that the speaker took a position opposite to the one traditionally taken in philosophy. In the traditional philosophical view, as well as in popular preconceptions, what goes without saying and demands almost no explanation is that things end, become corrupt, die, pass away. What is scandalous is creation; therefore, creation does not exist, except as a divine act accomplished once and for all at the beginning of time. The idea that the history of humanity might be a continuous creation—which is obvious—is strictly unthinkable within inherited thought.

By way of contrast, the fact that institutions and regimes may disappear seems to raise for people nothing but soluble problems. But in truth the two questions, the two enigmas, are perfectly symmetrical. The death of forms raises a problem that is just as formidable as is their emergence. How does it happen that “at a given moment,” as one says, in ancient Greece the idea of the polis (what I call the social imaginary signification polis), the city as community/collectivity of citizens responsible for their laws, their acts, their fate, and everything else that goes along with this signification, emerges? All functionalist, economic, “historical-materialist,” and even psychoanalytic “explanations” are just plain impotent (and in truth appear absurd) in the face of this very emergence. But they are also impotent before the fact that, starting from “another moment,” that which had held the polis together disintegrated, decayed, and disappeared.

How does it happen that, once again, at the end of the Middle Ages, in the interstices of the feudal world, communities that wanted to be self-governed collectivities were reconstituted—new cities or bourgeois communes, in which a protobourgeoisie (long before any idea or real existence of capitalism!) created the first seeds of modern democratic and emancipatory movements? And how is it that today most of the imaginary significations that were holding this society together seem to be vanishing, without anything else being put in their place? There is no way to get around these two questions, and no theory gives us an “answer” to them.
The institution of the overwhelming majority of known societies has been heteronomous, in the sense specified above. In two historical societies, of which ours is one, the seeds of autonomy have been created. These seeds are still alive and are represented in certain aspects of formal institutions, but above all they are embodied in the individuals fabricated by these societies—you, me, and others—to the extent that these individuals are still capable —at least one hopes—of standing up and saying, This law is unjust, or, The institution of society must be changed. If there is a genuine politics today, it is one that tries to preserve and to foster these seeds of autonomy. And if psychoanalytic practice has a political meaning, it is solely to the extent that it tries, as far as it possibly can, to render the individual autonomous, that is to say, lucid concerning her desire and concerning reality, and responsible for her acts: holding herself accountable for what she does.

As I said above, the mark of man’s humanization is, on the one hand, the institution. Why is there the institution? An enormous question—and at the same time absurd: Why is there something rather than nothing? But we must raise it to show the absurdity of a stupid and superannuated discourse that is still a stupid discourse even if it is held by Nobel Prize winners in Economics.

This discourse posits that society is made up of an assemblage or combination of “individuals.” But where do we get these “individuals”? Do they grow wil?
The individual is a fabrication of society; and what I know as a psychoanalyst is that what is not social in the “individual” would not only be incapable of “composing” a society but is radically and violently asocial. What is not social in the “individual,” what is in the depths of the human psyche, is assuredly not what has been called desire over these last few years. When one speaks of desire, one always means something that can, in one way or another, at least become articulated—thus presupposing that a series of separations has already been carried out. The core of the psyche, however, is a psychical monad characterized by the pure or radical imagination, which is completely undifferentiated at the outset. The emergence of the human species as a living species is characterized by the appearance of this congenital malignant growth—this psychical cancer, if you will—that is, the imagination developed out of all proportion, the imagination gone “mad,” the imagination that has broken with all “functional” subservience. This leads to the human trait, unique among all living species, whereby organ pleasure is replaced by representational pleasure. (Even for the socialized and fully developed human individual, the prevalence of representational pleasure over organ pleasure is manifest and overwhelming; otherwise, no one would be capable of going off and getting killed in a war, phantasying would not be an essential prerequisite to sexual pleasure, and so forth).
There is, therefore, defunctionalization of representation and defunctionalization of pleasure; for a human being, pleasure is no longer simply, as it is for the animal, a sign indicating what is to be sought and what is to be avoided but has become an end in itself, even when it is against the preservation of the individual and/or the species. Man is therefore not simply, as Hegel said, a sick animal; man is a mad animal, an animal radically unfit for life. Man survives only by creating society, social imaginary significations and the institutions that convey and embody these significations. Society—the institution —is there not only to “contain the violence” of the individual human being, as Hobbes believed and as the Sophists of the fifth century B.C.E. had already said; nor is it even there just to “repress one’s drives,” as Freud thought. Society is there to humanize this little wailing monster that comes into the world, making it fit for life. To do this, it must inflict a rupture in the psychical monad; it must impose upon it something that, from start to finish and in its very depths, the psyche rejects: the recognition that “omnipotence of thought” exists only on the level of phantasy, that outside the self there are other human beings, that the world is organized in a certain way (the work, each time, of the institution of society), that the obtainment of “real” pleasure must be instrumented through a series of mediations, themselves “real” in character and in themselves, most of the time, rather disagreeable, and so on.

Thus, the institution of society must each time insert into the “real” and collective life of society, by means of a radical violence inflicted upon the psychical monad, this egocentric being that brings everything back to itself and is capable of living almost indefinitely in the pure pleasure of representation. Doing this, the institution destroys that which, at the beginning, was meaningful for the psyche and gave meaning to it (self-closure, the pure pleasure of “solipsistic” representation)—and in compensation, so to speak, it furnishes the psyche with another source of meaning: the social imaginary signification. In becoming socialized—in becoming a social individual—the psyche internalizes these significations and “learns” that the true “meaning of life” is to be found elsewhere: in the fact that one has the esteem of the clan or the hope of being able to rest one day with Abraham in the bosom of God; or that one is kalos kagathos and attends to one’s kleos and kudos or is a saint; or that one accumulates wealth or develops the forces of production or “builds socialism,” and so on. We see here again the human species’ capacity to substitute representational pleasure for organ pleasure; representation is here the subjective side of the social imaginary significations conveyed by the institution. The institution therefore furnishes, from then on, “meaning” to socialized individuals. But it also furnishes them with the means to make this meaning exist for themselves, and it does so by restoring at the social level an instrumental or functional logic that no doubt existed, in another manner, on the animal level but that has been fractured in man by the unfettered development of the imagination. Once instrumented in and through this logic, the radical imagination of a singular human being can henceforth become a source of creation on the collective and “real” level. A phantasm remains a phantasm for a singular psyche, but an artist, a poet, a musician, a painter does not produce phantasms; he or she creates works. What his or her imagination engenders acquires a “real”—that is to say, social-historical—existence by utilizing an innumerable quantity of means and elements—and, to begin with, language—that the artist could never have created “all by himself.”

These are some of the elements that define what I call the first institution of society; the first institution is the fact that society itself creates itself as society and creates itself each time by giving itself institutions animated by social imaginary significations specific to that society: specific to Egyptian society at the time of the Pharaohs, to Hebrew society, to {ancient} Greek society, to French or American society today, and so on. And this first institution is articulated and instrumented through second order (which in no way means “secondary”) institutions. Such second-order institutions may be divided into two categories. There are those that are, in the abstract and in their form, transhistorical. Among these, for example, are: language (each tongue is different, but there is no society without language); the individual (the type of individual {a society fabricates} is, concretely speaking, different in each society, but there is no society that fails to institute any type of individual whatsoever); the family (the specific organization and “content” of the family are other each time the family is instituted, but no society can fail to assure the reproduction and socialization of the next generation, and the institution charged with accomplishing this task is the family, whatever its form—baby factories in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World are families in this sense). And there are second-order institutions that are specific to given societies and play an absolutely essential role therein, in the sense that what is of vital importance for the institution of the society under consideration (its social imaginary significations) is conveyed essentially by its specific institutions.

Let us take two clear examples. The Greek polis is a specific second-order institution, without which the ancient Greek world is impossible and inconceivable. The capitalist business enterprise is also such a specific second order institution. There is no capitalism without the business enterprise—and there really is not what we intend here by business enterprise in the societies that preceded capitalism: this institution that conveys a signification, this set [ensemble] of arrangements and rules that brings together a large number of people, compels them to use certain tools and machines, supervises their labour and organizes it hierarchically, and has as its end limitless self-enlargement. This institution and its signification are a creation of capitalism, and it is only through this creation that capitalism can exist. When woven together, these second-order institutions—those that are transhistorical and those that are specific to the society under consideration—provide each time the concrete texture of that society.

Let me end with two remarks concerning practice, since all of you, like myself, work with certain ultimate facts pertaining to social reality and since I presume that for you, as for me, not everything is at it should be or as we would like it to be, despite the fact that polls claim to show that 80 percent or more of the French people are, or report themselves to be, “happy.” The first remark concerns the essential inseparableness, the enormous interdependence among various institutions, of all different orders, within a given society. For a few years one has had a tendency to forget this interconnectedness of institutions, or one avoids talking about it, usually with the excuse that we must not consider society as a whole or the totality of society, because we would risk sliding toward totalitarianism. This is obviously absurd; a society is an extremely complex totality, and its different “parts” hold together in a thousand ways. It is by no means sure, for example, that with the dislocation of the traditional significations and roles of man and woman in contemporary Western society, the rest of the system will be able simply to continue to function as if nothing had happened. This even shows the incoherency of all policies that seriously profess to be “reformist” and nothing but “reformist”; for, such a politics boils down to a desire to modify a few pieces in a system without worrying about—and without even being conscious of—the effects these modifications will have on the remainder of society.

The second remark concerns a danger that is the reverse of the first one, its symmetrical opposite. This would be to tell oneself, having taken precisely this preceding remark into account that nothing can be done — or else that one’s work can consist only in aiming immediately at a radical transformation of society. As it turns out, however, a radical transformation of society, if such is possible—and I deeply believe it is—will be possible only as the work of individuals who will their autonomy, on the scale of society as well as on the individual level. Consequently, to work for preserving and enlarging the possibilities of autonomy and autonomous action, as well as to work for aiding in the formation of individuals who aspire to autonomy and for increasing their number, is already to do political work, a work whose effects are more important and more lasting than certain kinds of sterile and superficial agitation.

Imaginary and Imagination at the Crossroads

I am going to speak about the imaginary and the imagination from the standpoint of the crisis they are undergoing today in Western societies. This is a crisis of the social instituting imaginary, a crisis of the imagination of singular human beings. That is why the title of this presentation is “Imaginary and Imagination at the Crossroads.”

- And first of all, why imaginary?

A few words undoubtedly must be said, at this festival, about this notion. I say imaginary, because the history of humanity is the history of the human imaginary and its works. I am talking about the history and the works of the radical imaginary, which appears as soon as there is a human collectivity: there is the instituting social imaginary, which creates the institution in general, that is, the form institution, and the particular institutions of the society under consideration, and there is the radical imagination of the singular human being.

Here are just a few words about the notion’s destiny in the history of philosophy. Within this history, the notion of imaginary has been either ignored or mistreated. As for the imagination, it was recognized first by Aristotle, who so to speak discovered it and caught sight of its essential features, for example, that the soul never thinks without phantasm, that is to say, without imaginary representation, but who arrived at the question of the imagination nearly at the end of his treatise On the Soul and then abandoned it to carry on with the thread of his original presentation.

The question returned a few times among the neo-Platonic philosophers in the first centuries of our era, but later on the imagination was treated more or less as a “psychological faculty,” employing the most simplistic and banal features of Aristotle’s presentation, and this up until the eighteenth century. During the second half of that century, and related to the interest evinced in that age for the questions of taste and art, the term began to appear often in the writings of a number of British and Scottish Enlightenment authors, then in Germany. In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant discovered what he called the transcendental imagination, that is to say, the imagination that is required so that there might be certain and not empirical knowledge. But in the second edition of this same Critique, he reduced its role and its importance considerably.

The notion returned in force with Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and then the question sank, philosophically speaking, into oblivion until 1928, when Martin Heidegger, in his book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, rediscovered the notion of the imagination as a philosophical notion. He rediscovered Kant’s discovery of the imagination, noted that, between the first and second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had recoiled from this question and occulted it himself, and tried to give anew to the imagination an essential place in the human being’s relation to the world. And then, a third repetition in this history, after his 1928 book Heidegger no longer spoke of the imagination at all.

Yet ultimately it can be said that, for better or worse, there has been this treatment of the imagination in history of philosophy, with its successive coverings-over. But what we would search for in vain is what I call the instituting social imaginary, that is to say, the recognition of this fundamental fact that we can “explain” neither the birth of society nor the evolutions of history by natural, biological, nor other such factors any more than by some “rational” activity of a “rational” human being. One notices in history, from its origin, the emergence of the radically new; and if one doesn’t try to have recourse to transcendent factors in order to account for it, one really has to postulate a creative potential, a vis formandi, that is immanent to human collectivities as well as to singular human beings.

From then on, it is entirely natural to call imaginary and imagination this faculty of radical innovation, construction, and formation. Language, customs, norms, and technique cannot “be explained” by factors external to human collectivities. No natural, biological, or logical factor can account for them. At the very most, they can constitute their necessary and most of the time external and trivial conditions, never their sufficient conditions. We therefore must admit that there is in human collectivities a creative potential, a vis formandi, which I call the instituting social imaginary.

- Why has philosophy been unable to recognize this necessity, and why does it still now recoil with horror and irritation before this idea?

I am always being asked,

- What is this instituting imaginary?

- Whose imagination is it?

Show us the individuals who . . . or the factors that . . . , and so on. But we have here precisely a constitutive faculty of human beings and, more generally, of the social-historical field. What in this affair ruffles and irritates the representatives of the inherited philosophy, as well as those of established science, is the need to recognize the collective imaginary, as well as the radical imagination of the singular human being, as a potential for construction. Here construction means construction ex nihilo, the making be of a form that wasn’t there, the construction of new forms of being.

Ontological construction: of forms like language, the institution, music, painting, or else of such and such a particular form, this or that musical, pictorial, poetical, etc. work.

- Why does the inherited philosophy find it impossible to recognize the fact of construction?

Because this philosophy is either theological, therefore reserving creation for God—creation and not construction has taken place once and for all, or it is continual divine creation, or rationalist and deterministic and therefore has to deduce all that is on the basis of first principles,

- And upon what basis then will one deduce first principles?

Or else produce it on the basis of causes,

- And upon what basis then does one produce first causes?

But construction appertains to being in general, I won’t go on at more length about that since today we are not in a philosophy seminar, and construction appertains in a dense and massive way to social-historical being, as is attested to by the construction of society as such, of different societies, and the slow or sudden incessant historical alteration of these societies.

- How is one to detail this work of the instituting social imaginary?

It consists, on the one hand, in institutions. But a look at these institutions shows that they are animated by, or are bearers and conveyors of significations, significations that refer neither to reality nor to logic; that’s why I call them social imaginary significations. Thus, God, the God of monotheistic religions, is a social imaginary signification, borne and conveyed by a host of institutions, such as the Church. But so also are the gods of polytheistic religions or founding heroes, totems, taboos, fetishes, and so on. When we speak of the State, we’re talking about an institution animated by imaginary significations. The same goes for capital, commodities as Marx’s “social hieroglyph”, and so on.

Once constructed, both social imaginary significations and institutions crystallize or solidify, and that’s what I call the instituted social imaginary. The latter assures a society’s continuity, the reproduction and repetition of the same forms, which thenceforth rule men’s lives and remain there so long as a slow historical change or a massive new construction doesn’t come to modify or radically replace them with other ones.

Let us consider the imagination of the singular human being. Here we have the essential determination, the essence of the human psyche. This psyche is radical imagination first of all inasmuch as it is flux or incessant flow of representations, desires, and affects. This flow is continual emergence. You can try to close your eyes, or stop up your ears, there will always be something. This thing happens “within”: images, recollections, wishes, fears, “spiritual states” surge forth in a way that sometimes we can understand or even “explain,” and other times absolutely not. There is here no “logical” thought, save by way of an exception and discontinuously. The elements are not bound together in a rational or even reasonable fashion; there is surging forth, indissociable mixture or magma. There are above all representations without any functionality. One can think that animals, in any case higher animals, have a certain representation of their world, but this representation, and what composes this representation, is regulated in functional fashion; it contains essentially what is necessary for the animal to live and to continue its species. But in the human being, the imagination is defunctionalized. Humans can be made to kill for glory.

- What’s the “functionality” of glory?

At most, it will be a name written on a monument, itself eminently perishable. Glory is the subjective effect of a social imaginary value that constitutes one pole of the activity of humans, of some of them at least, and that brings into existence a desire directed toward it.

- Or, what are the various human affects, and in particular the less banal affects, for example, the affect of nostalgia?

This is a creation of the psyche’s radical imagination. If human beings were given over fully and exclusively to this radical imagination, they would not be able to survive; they would not have survived. This flow is not necessarily bound either to logic or to reality; at the outset, it is entirely alien to these, and the desires that surge forth don’t bear the subject toward a life lived in common. One of the most powerful affects that is encountered there and that manifests itself or doesn’t manifest itself for all to see, is for example the affect of hate, which can go as far as a desire for murder. I often say in joking that someone who hasn’t felt at least once a year a death wish toward someone else is seriously ill and ought to go consult a psychoanalyst as soon as possible. The “natural” reaction when someone poses an obstacle to us is to wish for him to disappear, and that, as one knows, can go as far as acting upon the wish. This radical imagination of human beings must therefore be tamed, channelled, regulated, and made to conform to life in society and also to what we call “reality.”

That is done via their socialization, during which they absorb the institution of society and its significations, internalize them, learn language, the categorization of things, what is just and unjust, what can be done and what is not to be done, what must be adored and what must be hated. When this socialization takes place, the most important manifestations of radical imagination are, up to a certain point, stifled, its expression is made to conform and becomes repetitive. Under these conditions, society as a whole is heteronomous. But heteronomous, too, are the individuals of such a society, who only in appearance exercise judgment; in fact, they judge according to social criteria. Besides, we shouldn’t overly flatter ourselves. Even in our societies a huge quantity of individuals are in fact heteronomous; they judge only according to conventions and “public opinion.”

Societies in which the possibility of and the capacity for calling the established institutions and significations into question are a tiny exception in the history of humanity. In fact, we have only two examples of such societies: a first example in ancient Greece, with the birth of democracy and philosophy, and a second example in Western Europe, after the long period of the Middle Ages.

A very important, and key, phenomenon for our discussion today is that the history of societies is marked by “pulsating” processes: phases of dense and strong construction alternate therein with phases of constructive sluggishness and regression. Examples are numerous. Obviously, all these examples belong to historical societies, since we cannot say much about the other ones. It’s possible that the disappearance of “Homeric”—Minoan and Mycenaean, civilization might not be due solely or even essentially to invasions or earthquakes but to processes of “domestic” disintegration. We don’t know anything about that, at least for the moment. One case where a society, after an epoch of rich and intense creativity, entered into a period of decline is that of ancient Greece and, notably, the city of Athens. The truly creative era unfolded until the end of the fifth century, until the end of the Peloponnesian War, when philosophy, democracy, and tragedy, not to mention the other arts and sciences, emerged. Then, starting in the fourth century, nothing much happened any longer.

Certainly, society continued to forge ahead with construction, and there is notably the paradox that two of the most important philosophers ever to have existed, Plato and Aristotle, belong to this same fourth century, yet they come after the great period of construction. This is, moreover, the probably unique and, in any case, flagrant case that offers an illustration of Hegel’s much-talked-about phrase that philosophy appears only when the works of the day are ended, like Minerva’s bird taking flight only at nightfall. Literally speaking, this statement is false: philosophy took flight in Greece at nearly the same time that Greek political construction began, and things didn’t happen otherwise in Modern Times. The phrase expresses only Hegel’s wish that the history of humanity in the strong sense of the term might draw to a close with his own system.

In any case, after the victory of Macedonia, of Philip and of Alexander, came the appearance of Hellenistic or Alexandrian civilization, which is rather comparable, if I may be allowed to look ahead from there, to our own situation: no great construction, just eclecticism, endless commentaries, which are, moreover, quite precious; the philology and the art of the grammarians developed then, and various technical forms and forms of knowledge continued to “progress,” but, with the remarkable exception of mathematics, there was no great manifestation of truly innovative radical imagination. An analogous case is that of the Roman Empire after the first century of our era. Decisively conditioned by the internal evolution of imperial Roman society and by the decomposition of the social imaginary significations that underlay its institutions, its fall was merely facilitated by the Germanic invasions. The barbarians had been knocking at the gates of the Roman dominion from the first century before our era, but they had successfully been driven back until the end of the second century. The Empire’s domestic decline at that moment is too flagrant for one to contest its existence without a lot of quibbling. Similar major instances will be found everywhere one knows about societies’ evolution: in Egypt, in the Middle East, in India, in China, and as far away as Meso-America.

The important thing here, from the standpoint of elucidating history, is the failure of “explanations.” That isn’t surprising. No more than there is any “explanation” of phases of construction in history, or of the moment they arise, or of the content of this construction can one “explain” the appearance of phases of decline, the moment they add to the content they take on. A host of partial facts can be assembled that seem to make these alternations more comprehensible, yet that won’t furnish a true “explanation” of them. There are no “laws” governing the radical imaginary, its phases of blossoming or the phases when it fades away. And obviously no “explanation” is furnished by Oswald Spengler’s biological and botanical images.
I have already noted above that, during the Hellenistic period as well as during the late period of the Roman Empire, there continues to be a certain amount of technical development, and also that this reminds us of what is going on today. We are thus led to posit a distinction that forces itself upon us for other reasons, as well. That is the distinction between culture in the strict sense of the term and the purely functional dimension of social life. Culture is the domain of the imaginary in the strict sense, the poietic domain, what in a society goes beyond what is merely instrumental. Obviously, there is no society that would be without culture. No society is reduced to the functional and the instrumental. No human society is known of that lives like bee or ant “societies.” We always find therein some songs, some dances, decorations, things that “serve no purpose.” These primitives, who had so much difficulty just living, they succeeded in finding time for such “stupid nonsense.” As we know, some prehistoric paintings have just been found in Portugal on the walls of Paleolithic caves that are probably among the oldest known. They whiled away their time in these ill-lit grottos doing cave paintings. That was more important for them than developing the forces of production or maximizing the yield of their capital.

The distinction between what I call the poietical and the functional is obviously not in things; it is to be found in the relationship between the way in which things are made and the goal assigned to them. A vase can be simply functional, a plastic vase for example, serves its purpose, but it can equally be an admirable art object, like so many ancient Chinese or African vases. In the latter case, an essential dimension of what constitutes the vase eludes finality or goes beyond it: the beauty of a vase is “useless.” These two constructions, the poietical and the functional, do not march at the same rhythm or in the same direction. Poietical construction can subside without that affecting construction in the functional domain: new inventions can be made, technical or even scientific development can continue. That’s what, as was already said, happened during the Hellenistic period as well as after the end of the culturally constructive phase of Roman history. In other cases, for example after the collapse of “Homeric” civilization or during the true European Middle Ages from the fifth to eleventh century C.E., poietical and functional regressions occur simultaneously. It is also possible for there to be periods of major poietical construction when the functional component of a society remains nearly stable; at least, that is what we are led to think in examining a number of archaic societies whose cultures are profoundly different, whereas the way they are functionally instrumented seems roughly identical.

This differentiation, which Hegelo-Marxism completely covers over, adds still another dimension to the immense question of the unity of a society.

- How is one to think through the fact that two parts of the same body can walk with different rhythms?

- How can two or several sectors of the life of one and the same society live with temporalities that are so different?

I can only raise here these interrogatory questions, without attempting to elucidate them.
After Greece, the project of autonomy emerged anew with the birth of the bourgeoisie in Western Europe, this emergence starting to manifest itself in the eleventh to-twelfth century. That was the beginning of the “modern” period in the broad sense. From that moment on, one notices that cultural creation gains, expands, and accelerates with such richness and with such rhythmic variations that render it incompressible and almost un-examinable. It is practically impossible to write a history of European culture. It takes place everywhere: in Italy, in Spain, in Portugal, in France, in England, in the Germanic countries, in the Scandinavian countries, in the Slavic societies of Central and Eastern Europe; at different moments, different activities develop in different countries, and all that cross-pollinates and interbreeds. This extraordinary profusion reaches a sort of pinnacle during the two centuries stretching between 1750 and 1950. This is a very specific period because of the very great density of cultural creation but also because of its very strong subversiveness.

I connect this explosion to the fact that the social historical project of autonomy invaded society and haunted all its aspects. It took the form of the democratic movement, the revolutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and twentieth centuries, the workers’ movement, more recently the movement of women and youth. But what really matters to us here is what happened in the properly cultural domain. There, one witnesses the creation of new forms and new contents that had the quite explicit intention of effecting change, and this at a pace hitherto practically unknown in history, except perhaps in ancient Greece during the period around the fifth century. As one knows, there was at the same time an enormous acceleration in technical inventions, incomparable to what could have been experienced in other phases and in other regions of the history of humanity. I am speaking about this here independently of the many-sided destructive effects such technical development was able to have.

But this technical progress could not have “caused” the cultural upheavals that concern us. Such progress itself depended upon changes of capital importance in the scientific imaginary. It was during this period that the form chemistry, the form electricity, the theory of heat and thermodynamics, field theory (Michael Faraday, James Clerk Maxwell), as well as the theory of relativity and quantum theory were, in the main, “constructed”; likewise, progress in medicine and applied biology are to be correlated with the emergence of a new biological science. And certainly the construction of new disciplines in the human domain, like sociology and psychoanalysis, is connected with the movement of society as a whole, not with technical developments. This is even truer for the great philosophical movements of the Enlightenment and then of German Idealism. The general movement toward the liberation of society, the questioning and the overthrow of the old political forms didn’t halt at the gates of particular activities and disciplines, in art as well as in philosophy and science.

One will perhaps be surprised if, in speaking of the deployment of the poietical, I include therein not only philosophy but also science.

- Don’t they both express a movement of “pure” Reason?

I do so because, contrary to received ideas, the constructive imagination plays a fundamental role in science as well as in philosophy. Every great philosophical work is an imaginary construction; it is construction of these particular significations that are philosophical significations. The latter are not “rational” products. The idea of idea, for example, doesn’t proceed from an empirical induction or from a logical induction, these latter two, rather, presuppose it. The same goes for ideas like potentiality and actuality, cogito, monad, or transcendental. These are great inventions, upon whose basis a set of facts concerning being, the world, nature, human thought and its relation to the other, and so on, are made clear. But the same goes for science. The great scientific advances proceed from the construction of new imaginary schemata; these are formed under the constraint of available experience, but they don’t “follow” or “result” from that experience. By definition, a logical deduction cannot give birth to a new hypothesis.

“Induction” is only a non-rigorous deduction made on the basis of an incomplete set of facts combined with already existing rules, conclusions, and so on. A “new” fact can, though not necessarily, invalidate the prevailing hypotheses; it doesn’t furnish even one ounce of new hypotheses. It’s in this respect that Karl Popper’s conception of “falsification” is fundamentally flawed. Falsification by a new observation can simply “refute” an existing conception, and even that isn’t always the case: “falsified” theories persist for a long time, sometimes wrongly and often rightly. The situation will change only with the invention of a new hypothesis. A physicist cannot formulate just any hypotheses; the new theories must account for known facts, this is the constraint, and predict new categories of hitherto unknown facts, if possible. That’s what happened when great new imaginary schemata were posited, such as the Newtonian image of the universe, Faraday and Maxwell’s idea of field, and the successive schemata formulated by Albert Einstein, and so on.

There exists a profound relationship between art on the one hand, philosophy and science on the other. Not only do we see here and there the creative imagination at work, but art as well as philosophy and science try to give a form to the chaos: to the chaos that underlies the cosmos, the world, which is behind the successive strata of appearances. There is an indetermination to being in its depths that is the effect of its creative potential, the infinite layers of the cosmos embodying its successive determinations. The institution of society also aims at covering over this chaos and at creating a world for society, and it does construct that world, but in this construction it is impossible to avoid there being some big holes, some large conduits, through which the chaos becomes evident. One of these conduits, for the human being, and no doubt the most difficult one to stop up, is death. All known institutions of society have tried to give it a signification: one dies for the fatherland; one dies in order to become one of the ancestors who will come to be reincarnated in the newborn child; one dies in order to attain the kingdom of heaven. And in this way the intrinsic non-sense of death is covered over.

Art on the one hand, philosophy and science on the other, try to give form to the chaos, a form that can be grasped by humans. Art does so in its own manner; philosophy and science do so in theirs. In both cases, we have a creation of forms. The difference is that art, in giving, in order to give, form to the chaos, constructs a new world and new worlds, and this it does in relatively free fashion. It doesn’t labour under the constraint of experience; the constraints to which it must face up are of another order, an internal order. But philosophy and science aim at elucidating the world such as it is given to us, and that imposes upon them a very strong constraint, the constraint of available experience. Of course, science does so in its own manner and in a restricted domain, that of our physical experience, and it attends to what in this experience offers an essential regularity and can be rendered explicable. For philosophy, it’s not a matter of explaining or even, truly speaking, of understanding, when it comes to disciplines involving the human domain; it’s a matter of elucidating. But a philosophy doesn’t remain standing if it doesn’t try to account for the totality of human experience. I note here, without being able to linger over it, that there exists a marvellously mixed domain, that of mathematics, which in the most important cases constructs new worlds, but in doing so contributes to the elucidation of the world as it is given to us.

I now come to what is, properly speaking, our topic today. It’s the contemporary period, starting from 1950, a date that obviously has no pretensions to exactitude. The brutal observation I make is that this great movement of construction is in the process of wearing out. This exhaustion extends beyond the domain of art. It touches both philosophy and, I think, even true theoretical creation in the scientific domain, whereas technical development and techno-scientific development are accelerating and becoming autonomized. This evolution, this drop in creativity, goes hand in hand with the triumph, during this period, of the capitalist imaginary and an ever more marked drop in the democratic movement, in the movement toward autonomy, on the social and political plane.

I begin with the domain of philosophy. Heidegger seems to have succeeded in turning his flawed diagnosis of the “end of philosophy” into a sort of self-realizing prophecy. With but a few exceptions, there are no more philosophers; there are some very erudite commentators and very scholarly historians of philosophy, but hardly any new creation. The sole experience to which philosophy can henceforth face up is that of its own history. It is condemned to nourish itself by feeding upon itself, by devouring its own flesh.

Perhaps in this case at least one can discern an internal factor that has contributed to the way things have evolved, but without that sufficing, certainly, to “explain” it. I am talking about the influence of the two great philosophers of German Idealism, Kant and Hegel. The influence they have had has no doubt played a part here on the basis of considerations that are contradictory, yet ones that have led to the same result. The radical break Kant tried, under cover of critique of metaphysics, to instaurate between philosophy and science, philosophy being reduced, in the domain of knowledge, to a “critique of theoretical reason,” has led to the idea that the domains of science and of philosophy were separated by an abyss that could be cleared only under penalty of falling into the chasm of metaphysical speculation. In a symmetrical and opposite fashion, Hegel’s elaboration of a “system” that claimed to encompass all knowledge, including science’s, and the proclamation that this scientific as well as philosophical knowledge has just found its completion in this system, seemed to demonstrate, via the failure of said system, that theoretical philosophy was thenceforth to be confined within the domain of the theory of knowledge if it didn’t want pathetically to repeat this vain Hegelian bid. Looking closely at the matter, one sees that the two effects are found again in Heidegger’s proclamation of the “end of philosophy in technicized science.”

But this watertight separation between philosophy and science, powerfully aided by the growing specialization and technicalness of contemporary science, couldn’t help but have catastrophic results for philosophy. For, that separation condemned philosophy to leave aside an enormous patch of human experience, that is, everything that concerns inanimate and living nature, and either to become itself a particular discipline of no great interest, as witness the domination of logical positivism and “linguistic philosophy” in the Anglo-Saxon world, or to claim to be a pure “thought of Being,” which is both empty and sterile, since one can say nothing of Being outside of beings.

Yet this factor was able to play only a secondary role, since an analogous evolution was noticeable in all other domains. Thus it was in the case of science itself. Some important scientific advances are certainly still being made, but in both cases, Relativity between 1905 and 1916, quantum theory between 1900 and the 1930s, the major theoretical forms upon which science has relied were constructed more than three quarters of a century ago. Both of these theories are nevertheless at once contradictory with respect to each other and, each of them, full not of puzzles, to use the terminology of Thomas Kuhn, but of veritable aporias that should have challenged the theoretical paradigms themselves. It’s true that new schemata are being proposed, such as string theories and superstrings, an inflationary universe, and so on, but up till now none of them satisfy the constraints of experience. The last great basic discovery in biology, that of DNA, took place in 1953, and besides it itself followed from Max Delbrück’s research in molecular biology, which dates back to 1943. Perhaps, by way of a possible exception, we should mention the theories of self-organization, which are based, however, upon the theory of automata created by Alan Turing and John von Neumann between 1935 and 1955.

It is worth dwelling for a moment upon the situation created by the post-1900 advances in mathematics and in physics as these relate to philosophy. These advances have challenged categories until then, and still now, deemed basic for an intelligible understanding of the physical world: causality, locality, separation, and so on. Starting in 1930, astonishing results in mathematics, the theorems of Kurt Gödel, Turing, and Alonzo Church, pulverized hitherto prevailing conceptions about mathematical foundations and possibilities. This situation desperately calls for a philosophical elucidation. But there has been nearly nothing to that effect, as if philosophy had resigned its role as elucidator of our experience.

There is, then, this exhaustion of the imagination and of the imaginary in the domains of philosophy and of science, and there is also, manifestly, exhaustion of the political imagination and of the political imaginary. We cannot help but notice the degeneration of the workers’ movement and, more generally, of the democratic movement. Both on the “Right” and on the “Left,” present-day political discourse is completely sterile and repetitive; we don’t even know in what way “Right” and “Left” differ from each other. To take just the example of France, but we could under the same heading talk about the United States, England, Spain, and so forth, there are no remarkable differences between the successive governments during President François Mitterrand’s two seven-year terms and the governments that have preceded or followed; certain details are different and not without their importance, for example, policy on the question of immigration, but the broad outlines remain the same. Gaullist Prime Minister Alain Juppé 1997 does what the Gaullist Mr. Édouard Balladur did previously, who was doing only what the Socialist Mr. Pierre Bérégovoy did before him when they were prime ministers under the French Socialist President Mitterrand.

But what matters most for our point is the exhaustion of creativity in the domain of art. When I began to write about this question, the first formulations on this topic date back to 1960, in a text entitled “Modern Capitalism and Revolution,” where I observed that the novel had arrived at an impasse, and then in a text from 1978, “Social Transformation and Cultural Creation,” I was told, “You’re exaggerating” or, “You are starting to get old; what’s being done now isn’t what was being done when you were young, so you hate the contemporary age and you look with nostalgia upon the time of your youth.” Almost twenty years have passed, and I have the sad pleasure of observing that even the “official” critics, who for a long time were devoted to the worship of the “avant-garde,” are saying the same thing, perhaps with the sole exception of the novel.

- What has been the situation of art during the last forty years?

There first was a false “avant-garde” and a simulacrum of subversion.

- What is the avant-garde?

There was, during the prior two centuries, already with Romanticism but in any case with Charles Baudelaire and with Édouard Manet, a large-scale and new phenomenon: a rupture between the creative artists and the established society, “bourgeois” society. Official opinion begins by rejecting for long period innovations of form and content constructed by art in all domains. Contrary to what some might have told you, this phenomenon was historically new. Young makers might have had some difficulties in other periods; such difficulties remained phenomena of clans and of jealousy. But starting in the nineteenth century, there really was a rupture in almost all domains.

I have mentioned Baudelaire; one can add Arthur Rimbaud, Stéphane Mallarmé, and Lautréamont in France as well as similar cases in other countries. In painting, there’s the gap created by Manet, the Impressionist, and all that followed. In music, this began already with Richard Wagner, then Igor Stravinsky and the Vienna School. Now, this avant-garde really seems to have exhausted itself after the Second World War. And one is witness, in a first phase, to the appearance of a fake avant-garde, a succession of artificial efforts to do something new for the sake of the new, to subvert for the sake of subversion, whereas one has nothing new to say. This is flagrantly the case in painting and music. Then, in a second phase, there are no longer even these gesticulations of subversion. Already before Postmodernism, but especially with it, one enters into the era of conformism, that is to say, the unscrupulous practice of eclecticism and collage. One imitates the constructions of previous times by mixing them up; one puts together the most heteroclite kinds of plagiarism.


So, too, in the domain in philosophy,
Do we see “weak thought” glorified, that is to say, the glorification of resignation before the task of philosophy?

Sterility seems to triumph. Postmodernism is the ideology that attempts to theorize and glorify these practices; more generally, it tries to present the stagnation and regression of the contemporary era as the expression of maturity, of an end to our illusions. It expressly champions the rejection of innovation and originality, and even of the coherency of form. In 1986, in New York, I heard one of the most famous post-modern architects pronounce, during a speech, this memorable line, “Postmodernism has delivered us from the tyranny of style.” In people’s mind, style is a tyranny, whereas style is the coherency of form, without which there is no work of art, at the same time that it is the expression of the creator’s individuality.

Let’s try to give all this bit of detail. Let’s take a look at what happened for example in music. After the atonal and twelve-tone school, there were various experimentations that didn’t culminate in anything viable. Presently, the music that is produced, that’s the word that fits, boils down to imitations and compilations of the music of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Luciano Berio, for example, has been seen inserting long citations of Beethoven symphonies into his music. The first half of the twentieth century had seen the marvellous creation of two new and popular forms of art, jazz and cinema. Now, the creative period of jazz in my view, or in my ears, if you prefer, ends with the deaths of Miles Davis and Thelonious Monk. Afterward, rock, rap, dance music and techno are certainly important social phenomena, but they are unrelated to musical creation, for they display a total rhythmic monotony and a harmonic and melodic stereotypy that is pathetically impoverished. The other great creation of the twentieth century, cinema, is in the process of losing itself in industrialization, facileness, and vulgarity. One can easily cite dozens of great directors of the previous period, but almost none of the recent period.
In the domain of painting, the basic way of innovating today, it seems, is to represent in quasi photographic fashion Campbell’s soup cans and ketchup bottles, to return toward different variants of realism, or to offer poor imitations of Marcel Duchamp’s provocations when, in 1920, therefore, more than three quarters of a century ago, he exhibited a bidet. Recently, at the Pompidou Center in Paris, we could go see Joseph Beuys’s piano wrapped in felt presented as a work of art. The case of the novel is more debatable. There are no doubt always a good number of excellent novelists.

- But do these novels truly contribute something new and important in comparison with the great novel as we knew it?

- Can we place these novelists on the same crest line as Balzac, Stendhal, Flaubert, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Henry James, Proust, Kafka, Joyce, and Faulkner?

- Might the novel form itself be exhausted?

I shall cite only the case of Milan Kundera, who, after having written a certain number of more or less classically crafted novels, felt the need in his last two or three books to experiment with new forms. But I shall leave the question of the novel open. This return to conformism is a general return to heteronomy. I defined heteronomy as the fact of thinking and acting as the institution and the social milieu require, openly or in subterranean fashion. Now, at present, just as there is a “uniform thought” in economics, no one dares to challenge the absurdities of neoliberalism which are leading to the ruination of the European economies, no one seems to be able to call into question the “end of philosophy” or to say that what is being presented as painting is, in the majority of cases, worthless trash, of null value, and not mediocre or merely acceptable. If you do so, you’ll hear the response that you’re a Boeotian who doesn’t understand anything about art, or else an old man who refuses to accept the evolution of history.

If we accept these facts as a whole and agree even roughly with the interpretation I’m giving of them, they give expression to a crisis of the institution of society as a whole and of social imaginary significations. As I have already indicated, this crisis is not incompatible with continued technical “progress” and continued “progress” on the levels of production, scholarship, and even science. For my part, and for reasons I don’t have the time to expound upon now, I doubt that even these sorts of “progress” would be able to continue for long without the roots that had nourished them.

I think that we are at a crossing in the roads of history, history in the grand sense. One road already appears clearly laid out, at least in its general orientation. That’s the road of the loss of meaning, of the repetition of empty forms, of conformism, apathy, irresponsibility, and cynicism at the same time as it is that of the tightening grip of the capitalist imaginary of unlimited expansion of “rational mastery,” pseudo-rational pseudo-mastery, of an unlimited expansion of consumption for the sake of consumption, that is to say, for nothing, and of a techno-science that has become autonomized along its path and that is evidently involved in the domination of this capitalist imaginary.

The other road should be opened: it is not at all laid out. It can be opened only through a social and political awakening, a resurgence of the project of individual and collective autonomy, that is to say, of the will to freedom. This would require an awakening of the imagination and of the creative imaginary. For reasons I have tried to formulate, such an awakening is by definition unforeseeable. It is synonymous with a social and political awakening. The two can only proceed together. All we can do is prepare it as we can, where we find ourselves.

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Psychoanalysis, pedagogy and politics

Freud wrote once that the psychoanalysis, the pedagogy and the political governing are the three impossible professions. Talking about these three professions he does not said why he considers them impossible, and the term impossible should be here conceived also literally and with great care, since Freud finally constructed the psychoanalysis and practiced the same, also to his self, continuously.

Therefore we believe that we may think on the use of this term impossible. Freud did not say that these three professions are terribly difficult as the neurosurgery or the being a pianist and giving concerts or the being a guide and bringing the persons on Himalaya, he said impossible only.
· Could we imagine that these three are impossible because they have to do with this indomitable of all the materials, that is, with the Human Being?

We do not believe that this could have a positive response, because after all the generals and the politicians as well as the prostitutes deal with this human substance, and we would not say that the profession of a prostitute or of a politician or of a general is unfeasible. Of course we can think about a reason, which may be that the psychoanalysis could be thought and be called impossible, and we could say that this reason may be located in its objective, which is to modify and not simply to manage or to handle the human beings the way they are.

However the details are not such easy. As an example, a psychiatrist who does the so called behavioural treatment and who believes that he cures the sick persons by punishments and rewards, or a pedagogue such as the initiator of the gas attack in Tokyo subway, or the guardians of the concentration camps, either of the Nazis or Stalin’s, or the agents of Mini-love in 1984 of Orwell and O’ Brian, all these act upon in order to change the human beings and frequently they achieve this target.

In all these the cases, the objective of their activity is already completely defined in the thought of the performer. The objective in the above examples is to eradicate from the thinking and the psyche of the tormented individual all kinds of self-control and self-reflection. The performer uses also predetermined means and it is supposed that he put into practice his complete control of the means and of the entire process. He could of course fail, but this is another story and these failures are by no means accidental, particularly due to the fact that the human being is what it is. After all, the objectives and the means in these cases are expected to take place within a rational relationship. That is to say, the conditions and terms as well as any relationship that the performer may need are given. And provided also that his target and what he knows or he believes to know about his object are given, that is, about the individual who is in his hands, then he performs or he may perform in the most rational and effective mode.

Obviously, this knowledge, which is thus used as a tool and is potentially used for objectives that we consider as terribly inhuman, may include and often includes a knowledge of the profound mental processes, as it was shown by the Nazi doctors, when they discussed about the treatment of the incarcerated in the Nazi camps, where the principal method was the disintegration of the image and self-picture of the imprisoned, if we may call this so, that is, the destruction of his tautological orientations. On the other hand, Orwell has revealed the same process also with a lot of profundity in 1984.

Now, when we consider the psychoanalysis, we will discover that nothing of all this is valid. Whichever could be the conclusion of the discussions on the objectives and on the terminations or of the termination of the psychoanalysis, the objective intention which the analyst tries to achieve may not be easily limited by a defined and tangible terminology.

O’ Brian in 1984 of Orwell achieves his objectives, when Smith, who is the hero and the victim of the story, does not only admit simply all they wanted him to admit, but he actually admits that he in his interior loves the Big Brother. The last and deeper moment of the book is this last phrase, which is usually overlooked by the critics, because they like to see other things readily available when Smith is shed tears by discovering that he loves the Big Brother.

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At this moment this is another thing, that is, it may be simple or complicated to make the human beings to really love Stalin or Hitler or any other person, but it is a condition of the subject that we may describe and identify. Here is the target. We cannot say anything comparable about the psychoanalysis.

As we know Freud turned often back to the question of the termination or of the terminations of the objectives of the analysis and gave to this question various, and apparently different answers at least as well as different definitions of this conclusion. One of the last answers that he gave which we believe that it is the most comprehensive and fertile is the famous phrase “where it was the ‘id’, it should turn into the ‘I’.” If we inopportunely seize this phrase as it looks to be as we are motivated by the direct formulations of Freud in the following, it appears that he means “the ‘Id’ should be conquered by the ‘I’ and should be drained, possibly also should be cultivated like the Dutch gulf Zuyderzee,” which indeed is a drained and cultivated gulf of Holland and Freud is referred literally to this.

When we give this meaning to this phrase, then we define an objective that is also impossible for us, that is, unachievable and monstrous. Impossible and unachievable, because it is not possible that a human being may exist whose unconscious has been conquered by the consciousness and whose motivations are perfectly flooded by reasonable considerations and controlled by such reasonable considerations. That is, such a being that has finished to imagine and to dream cannot be realistic.

It is monstrous, because, if we suppose that we may ever achieve this condition, we would certainly eliminate this that makes us human beings and obviously is not the logic and the rationality with the narrow meaning, but it is this not compulsory, uninhibited and not controllable continuous emersion of the creative radical imagination within the flow of our representations affects and desires. And it is true that one of the objectives of the analysis is precisely to release this flow of representations of the disgust that it usually undergoes as a result of an ‘I’ that precisely is in principle and in first approach a rigid and for the most of its part a social construct.

For this reason, it was alternatively proposed to supplement and rephrase the phrase of Freud, so that it would be “where the ‘I’ is, should also emerge the ‘Id’.” The purpose and the objective of the analysis are not to dislocate a mental instance to the profit of another one. It is to alter the relationship between the instances, and in order to do this, one of these instances, the ‘I,’ or if we want the consciousness, must be substantially altered.
· How may this ‘I’ be altered?

This might be altered, by accepting and taking over the contents of the unconscious, by reflecting and thinking and rethinking upon this, and by being rendered capable to choose by qualified clarity between motivations and ideas, in order to decide which of all might try to fulfil.

In other words the ‘I’ should become a self-reflecting and self-thinking entity that may be capable to reflect and to imagine. The endeavour of analysis is not any type of holiness of course. As Kant said also one century before Freud, a human being may never be a saint. This point that may appear ordinary has immense consequences, because it shows in which degree the psychoanalysis clearly rejects all moral, which is supported upon the condemnation of desire and consequently which is based upon the culpability. If we like to give a depiction of the ethics that we consider as the ethics of the psychoanalysis, it would be to say, “I desire to kill or to rape you, but I will not do this.”
· How could the psychoanalysis ever forget that the fundamental fact upon which it is based is that we begin our life seeing a woman and we desire her, either are we men or are we women?
· And that later also, either we are women or men, when we see a man we desire him also?
· And that this desire may never be banished, as it is shown in the dreams of human beings of any age, and more important still that without this desire we may never become human beings, and possibly we might never survive?

We may in the following describe an approach of this altered relationship between the instances, about which we have discussed. The disgust is replaced by the knowledge of the contents of the unconscious and by the reflection, self-reflection and self-thinking about these contents. The objection or the repressive action fades away and opens the way to a relatively elucidated discussion. The importance of this change does not lie in the fact that we may in this way displace the mental conflicts. None did promise us that we have the right from our birth to have a mental life without conflicts. Its importance does not lie in the establishment of a self-reflecting and self-thinking entity that has become a pseudo-logical and a socially adapted mechanism, but that on the contrary this entity has recognized and liberated the radical imagination that may be found in the core of the Psyche. In the phrase of Freud, this well-known, “where the ‘Id’ was, should become the ‘I’,” is a process and not a condition in which we come in for ever, because of this entity that we try to describe.

Therefore we would also say that we may simply clarify the objective of the analysis and strictly we may not install this. This that we call the demand of the autonomy in the field of the individual human being is the alteration and the adjustment of the subject in such a way that it can come in and remain in this process.

The objective of psychoanalysis is from this point of view consubstantial with the demand of the autonomy. This target may obviously not be accomplished and even might not be approached without the co-activity of the analyzed person, that is, the commemoration, the reappearance and the elaboration of the unconscious contents. The analyzed person is naturally the main performer in the psychoanalytical process.

Consequently, we cannot find at this point the means that are separated from the objectives. The various aspects of the framing and the adjustment of the analytic process, that is, the divan, the hours, etc, are not its means, but they are the terms under which the process may be developed. The process is the same an analytic process only insofar, as it is simultaneously also the means and the objectives. The free associations of the analyzed person are for example not a part of the analysis. Very soon, when these free associations spread out, this process of unwrapping already expresses and realises the ability of the analyzed person to expand and liberate the flow of his representations and consequently also to recognize his feelings and desires, because these things continue to be firm together.

And this liberation of the flow of representations that takes place in the psychoanalytical meeting leads to the entry on the scene of the thinking activity of the analyzed person, naturally with the punctuation and the support of interpretations of the analyst. The analyzed person thinks and imagines and above he is reflected upon himself, if we can say this, and it returns upon the material and he repeats or reaccepts this.

Precisely for these reasons the psychoanalysis is not a technique and we believe that it is mistaken to talk still for psychoanalytical technique. The psychoanalysis is a practical and poietical activity, where both participants are also performers, even if the analyzed person is the main performer, because he develops the process by his auto energy.

We call this poietical, because it is creative. Its outcome is or it should be the auto alteration of the analyzed person, that is, the emersion of another human being, if we precisely think upon this. We call this practical, because we call generally as performance the transparent activity, the objective of which is as well the human autonomy and where the only means to reach this objective is the same autonomy as it may be unfolded.


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We go now ahead to pedagogy as a second point, where the things are comparable enough as of the same point of view. The pedagogy begins by the age zero and no one knows exactly, when it will be finished. We believe that we continue to be educated from our selves and from the others in some way. The objective of the pedagogy is to help de jure this newborn hopeful and dreadful being, the hopeful and dreadful monster, to become a human being.

The objective of the pedagogy is to transform and to alter this package of drives and this boundless imagination in order to construct a human being within the complete meaning of the term. A human being that at this point is not taken by his biological significance, but by the significance of an autonomous being and by the significance of the autonomy, which we gave him. We could say as a being with the ability to be in charge and command and also to be commanded.

The pedagogy should in each moment expand the auto energy of the subject by using this same auto energy for this. This is the main dilemma of the pedagogy. The objective of pedagogy is of course not to teach specific things and specific lessons, but to expand the ability of the subject to learn and to learn to study and to learn to discover, that is, to learn finally to invent.

The pedagogy cannot obviously do this without to teach certain things, as well as the analysis cannot also move ahead without the interpretations of the analyst. But, like in the analysis, the subjects, or the objects that become an object of teaching, should always be considered as basic elements upon which we bypass the stream of the violent flow, and we do not that bypass this in order to simply make possible the teaching of more things yet, but in order to develop the learn and discovery abilities of the child’s creative imagination or of any person, who may be the object of the pedagogic activity.

The pedagogy should certainly teach stuff, and from this viewpoint many exaggerations of certain modern pedagogic schools are to be blamed in our opinion, but two cases appear to us to be absolutely unquestionable.
· Each pedagogic process is bad, if it does not aspire to develop the biggest possible expansion of the auto energy of the being mentored.
· Each pedagogic system is defective, if it cannot answer logically to the potential question of the being mentored, that is,
o Why have we to learn this thing?

We cannot at this point go through the enormous topic of the relationships between the psychoanalysis and the pedagogy, but a misunderstanding should be dissolved at least. The psychoanalysis does not obviously presume and does not pose as an axiom or as a demand one endogenously good human being. Neither it believes that the only we would have to do is to leave the desires and drives to be expressed in order to construct the happiness of the humankind. If we would leave the desires and drives not only to be expressed, but also to be freely realized, we would of course not have the world happiness, but the world massacre. For the psychoanalysis also and for the common mind as well as for all important thinkers, a mature human being has necessarily internalized an enormous number of restrictions that have been imposed to him from the exterior and which henceforth constitute a part of his Psyche. From the psychoanalytic point of view this mature human being has necessarily give up the omnipotence and has accepted that the words do not mean, what he wants that they mean, but that they mean, what the community decided that they may mean. He has accepted the existence of the other human being whose desires are often or are roughly always opposite with his own desires, and so on.

This psychoanalytic description can be translated social-historically and find its equivalent in the social-historic field, if we say that this being has potentially internalized the entirety of the existing establishments of the society and more specifically the imaginary significances, which in each particular society organize the human and non-human world and give to this a meaning .

Thus, from the psychoanalytic point of view, if we take the societies as they are, the pedagogy is the upbringing of the newborn, which brings this in the condition that we have described, but with the minimal setback of its radical imagination and the biggest possible growth of its autonomous thinking.

However, from the social-historical point of view, if we take the societies as they are, the pedagogy is supposed, and should and it happens actually to take care of the being mentored in such a way that this should internalize and also consequently accept, and more than this, it is to accept the existing institutions also whatever they might be. It is unambiguous that at this point we have contacted at one apparent antinomy at least, but we also have a profound and difficult question. This brings us precisely to the dilemma of the third impossible profession, the politics, and to the project of autonomy, which is necessarily a social and not simply an individual demand.

Before we proceed to this point, we would like to note in addition something about the Freudian term of the weak point or of the impossibility by which we opened our search. As we may see, this impossibility of the psychoanalysis and of the pedagogy is located also on the fact that both should use the autonomy, which does not exist yet in order to help the construction of the subject’s autonomy. For the usual logic, this appears as a reasonable impossibility. But obviously the human reality goes beyond this usual logic.

This impossibility comes into view, or this appears at least so that it is done specifically within the frame of the heteronomous society, also in the case of pedagogy by the effort to construct autonomous beings. And beyond this and much more radically, it appears by means of the efforts to achieve the autonomy perhaps, while or even if we absorb and internalize the prearranged institutions.

The solution, or at least the efforts to resolve this terrible puzzle, we may say that it is the most impossible job and the most impossible duty of the politics. It is as much more impossible that also the politics should obviously be sustained upon an autonomy of persons as social individuals, which is still absent, but it is needed in order to construct the autonomy.

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We come therefore upon this point of politics. The psychoanalysis intends to assist the individual to become autonomous, that is, as we said to be capable of self-reflecting activity and self-thinking. From this view the psychoanalysis belongs henceforth completely to the enormous social current, in which belong also the democracy and the philosophy.

But as we already said, the pedagogy, but also the psychoanalysis is found to be confronted with the dilemma of the existing institutions of society from the very beginnings. In pedagogy this comes into view immediately and instantaneously. Concerning the psychoanalysis this get-together is more hidden, maybe because we do not see the things clear enough, but in effect it is the social event of togetherness with the concrete ‘I’ of the analyzed person, because this ‘I’ is to an enormous part a social construction. This is originally planned to function in a prearranged social adjustment in order to carry on, to maintain and to reproduce this adjustment, that is, the active social institutions. These institutions are not maintained and reproduced so much by open violence and clear-cut oppression, apart from some infrequent cases. They are maintained and reproduced because they adjust and anticipate and organize their internalization by means of these individuals, who are the same the constructs of the same institutions.

What was positively said, the polis teaches the man, it may also enter negatively in force, and if we want valid for all cases. The “teaches” at this point does not mean to literally to teach. The polis constructs the man and naturally also the woman, the person, the citizen.
· What are these institutions and the social imaginary significances?

They are creations of the social imaginary, that is, of the established radical imaginary. This imaginary is the creative faculty of the anonymous community, so as this appears evidently and unquestionably, for example, within the creation and the development of the language, or of the forms of the familial life and of the morals and of the ideas. This community cannot ever exist otherwise, but only as an instituted. Nevertheless, its institutions are all times its own constructions. But also all times as soon as they are constructed or already the moment of construction, they emerge in the community or the community provides an image of them as prearranged. Prearranged by the ancestors, by the gods, by God, by the nature, by the reason, by the laws of history, by the processes of economic competition, by everything what we want. Thus, they become frozen and inflexible and actually everywhere and almost always are they an object of adoration. And in these institutions there is always a central powerful and effective element of self-eternization or repetition, as we would say in the psychoanalysis, and obviously the main corpse of this perpetuation are the same socially conditioned and conformist subjects.

We may call this social situation heteronomous. The other at this point, the other one who gave once the rule, he is not another than the same instituting society which for very profound reasons must cover up this fact. And we may call autonomous a society, which does not only explicitly knows that the same has constructed its institutions, but also that it has instituted itself, so that may liberate its radical imaginary and it is capable to alter its institutions by a collective activity, which is then self-reflexive or self-provident and purposeful.

And we may call politics the clarified activity that has as an objective the institution of an autonomous society and the decisions that concern the collective undertakings of such a society. It is immediately obvious that this project for an autonomous society loses each meaning and becomes absurd, when it is not a project that aspires to simultaneously construct autonomous individuals. And it is also reversely valid and in force.

We believe that there is enough helpful part, but obviously there is not an identity and even not a structural consent between the questions and the activities that concern the project of autonomy by the individual and also within the social field. In the case of heteronomy, the inflexible structure of the institution and its disguise, as well as the concealing of the radical social imaginary that is accomplished by the institution, all these correspond to the rigidity of the socially constructed and conditioned individual and to the suppression of the work of the radical imagination of the psyche.

Within the idea of the autonomy project, we firstly tried to determine the objective of the psychoanalysis and pedagogy also as the establishment of another type of relationship between the self-provident subject, which is the subject of willpower and thinking, and its unconscious, that is, its radical imagination. Secondly, we tried precisely to liberate the ability of the subject to do and to act, that is, to form an open project for its life and to work within this project.

In the same way we may define the objective of the real and genuine politics, firstly as the institution of another type of relationships between the instituting force and the instituted society, that is to say, between the rules, which are each time also prearranged and the provident and planned activity of the political body. And secondly, we may define it as the liberation of the collective creativity, which allows to the community to form collective projects for collective activities and also to work actively for these projects.

Moreover, we can here observe that the essential bond between these two definitions is found precisely by the pedagogy, that is to say, by the education, which was certainly known by the ancient societies.
· Because otherwise, how could be established there a self-provident society without self-provident individuals?

An autonomous society, since it is a community that is self-instituted and self-governed, presupposes the enlarged ability of all its members to participate to the activities of the collective thinking, consideration and decision. From this view the democracy may be defined as the arrangement of the collective thought process in its complete meaning. And we could show that all the subsequent things arise from this meaning, but this is another area under discussion. Democracy obviously cannot exist without democratic individuals, as well as democratic individuals could not be there without democracy. And we are coming again within the circle of construction.

We could also show still more clearly the intimate solidarity between the individual and the social dimensions of the autonomy project. The socialization of the psyche and its simple survival even oblige this to recognize and to admit that its fundamental desires cannot be realized ever. The heteronomous societies do not achieve this result, which is basic for the socialization of psyche, by merely prohibiting the actions, but by prohibiting the thoughts, that is, by binding the flow of representations and by convicting the radical imagination to silence. The real significance of the heteronomous society is not that the action is prohibited, because there are constables or courts or guardians. The essence is that the thoughts are prohibited, which could lead to actions that the society does not admit.

And here happens the following noteworthy fact. It appears that the things happen as if the society would apply the same methods that apply the unconscious and the repulsion in reverse. That is to say, the heteronomous society answers to the omnipotence of the unconscious thinking by trying to achieve the complete weakness and disability of this thinking, and finally of the thinking simply, as if this complete weakness of thinking would be the only way in order to restrict the actions.

This directs by far more away of the point, which Freud calls the authoritarian and wild superego. The history shows that this process of repulsion and exclusion that even renders impossible for the subject also the thought of the prohibited things puts into effect an amputation or a castration of the psyche. What we want are autonomous subjects, that is to say, individuals capable of this self-reflexive activity, but the content and the objects of this activity and the growth of its means and methods cannot be provided, but only from the radical imagination of the psyche, unless we are going through an interminable repetition. This is the source of contribution of the individual to the social-historical creation. And this is the reason, why a pedagogy which would not turn out the persons to cripples as well as a genuine education has the enormous significance that they has.

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We come back in the enigma of politics. An autonomous society presupposes autonomous individuals. The individuals become this that they are by absorbing and internalizing the institutions. The individuals are the specific embodiment of the institutions in some meaning. We know that this internalisation is anything but superficial. The modes of thinking and the modes of action, the rules and the values, the same the identity of the individuals as social beings, all depend from this internalization.

In a heteronomous society the internalisation of all laws in the broader meaning of term law in addition to all of the institutions, it would be meaningless, if this were not accompanied by the internalization of this meta-law and ultimate law, that is, you should never question the laws. This is not written anywhere, but it sustains the whole structure. In an autonomous society now the meta-law could not be nothing other than, you will comply with the laws, but you have the right to interpellate and dispute the law. You can raise the question of the law’s justice or in other words, if it is allowed, its fitness, that is to say, if this is the proper law. There are also clauses possible that could accompany this meta-law.

We could thus maybe formulate the answer to the riddle that we posed and also we may formulate the first object of an autonomic politics, that is to say, of a democratic politics. This is to help the community to construct the institutions of which the internalization from the individuals would not restrict, but enlarge their aptitude to become autonomous.

Already from this phrasing is obvious that we may figure out the main regulations for a full democratic institution of the society, if we receive this together with the principle of equality that is incorporated in the plural of the word individuals. But we will not like to discuss more about this topic at this point, apart from one observation only.

We said that this is the first topic and the first objective of politics, that is, to help the community to construct such institutions which, when they are internalized by the individuals their abilities of autonomy are expanded, instead to be restricted. This is the first of all objectives; this is first because this is the condition that all the others exist; and because by virtue of that it includes all the others. There are obviously also other objectives and other objects, which are not secondary. Such are for example the construction of special institutions that match with this axiom and specify this within the particular conditions and such are of course the self-governing, as well as the proposals and the decisions that concern the collective works and the collective activities. This is because autonomy is not a self-objective, either in the individual or in the social field.

Sometimes it may become also a self-objective and something less as a self-objective. That is to say, we desire to have autonomy for the same the autonomy, we desire to have freedom because we wish for the freedom, but we desire this also in order to be free to do and to act, and to do and to perform tangible things. And the real and genuine politics should join in by all these activities and duties. The politics is neither the psychoanalyst of the society, nor its educator nor its conscience, but it is an essential and crucial dimension of its self-thoughtfulness and its self-reflectivity.

And as such this politics is compelled to act upon the human beings by establishing them as autonomous and helping them to achieve their autonomy, without ever to forget that the last source of the historical construction is the radical imagination of the anonymous community. By this meaning, we believe that we may understand why politics is one weak or impossible profession, such as the psychoanalysis and the pedagogy and it is still more impossibly fragile perhaps, given the nature and the dimension of its subject.


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We may come to an end by bringing some observations upon the most important of all the questions, which is also common by the psychoanalysis and by the politics too.

The social institutions dominate upon the individuals simply and just because they construct and form the individuals. They construct and also form these completely by the traditional societies and they construct and they also form these to an essential extent by the liberal societies within which we live. Once more, it is the internalization of the institutions by the individual that endures all its life. This that is important by this internalization is the internalization of the meanings and of the social imaginary significances that are embodied within these institutions. The society cuts off the specific human being from the closed universe of the initial psychical unit, and obliges this always in a violent sense to enter into the hard universe of the social reality, that is to say, of the reality, because the reality is always a social reality, but it has to offer to this being something in return.

This that the society offers as return, it is a meaning of the day, that is to say, a meaning that is not used for dreams, but a meaning that may remain by the light. In the real world, such as it is constructed by the society every time, the things and the relationships have a meaning, the other persons and our status in the society as well as the relationship with the other persons have a meaning. The life has a meaning, but it is thought that also the death has a meaning. Let us think about all societies apart of the modern one.

This meaning is the subjective side of this, which are the social significances, if we consider these social-historically with regard to the individual. Thus, an interpretation of the meanings is done by the society, or still better a construction of meanings and significances, which are the crucial and the difficult point. Since the psychoanalysis does not obviously provide and does not offer, as well as it does not teach any meaning about the life. It may only help the analyzed person to find and to invent this meaning and to construct it for its life. And we may say that this meaning, which the analyzed person might create for his life, may not be in advance and also in an all-inclusive way defined.

In one of his most pessimistic days Freud has written that the analysis does not convey the happiness, but it may transform the neurotic misery in common and usual infelicity at the most. We think that by this he was pessimistic. Obviously the analysis may not offer the happiness, but it helps the analyzed person not only to do away with the neurotic misery, but also to form his own project for his life.

But this assertion may not exhaust the issue.
· Why frequently, in order to not say ‘very frequently’, the analysis fails or why is rendered never-ending or infinite?

In one of his latest scripts Freud brings up a lot of reasons for this relative malfunction and he points out this that he calls a rock, which paradoxically for the two expressions that he gives to this is packed together in the same thing. The rock is the renunciation of femininity that by the woman appears in the form of the penis jealousy, and by the man in the form of rejecting the passive attitude or the feminine attitude toward another male.

This that characterizes an immense analysis is obviously the repetition. It is like a neurosis in a superior level or rather like a squared neurosis.
· Why is there the repetition?

By saying this shortly, it is the repetition with the meaning that interest us at this point, that is to say, the retails of death and the small change of death is the method which the analyzed person uses in order to defend against the reality of the full death. Here we have a classic psychical mechanism, but in a much bigger dimension.

The explanation, why the analysis may fail or may become infinite is without doubt, firstly the incapability of the analyzed person and also of the analyst, who is engaged with him, to accept the death in the first form, that is to say, the death of him who he was in order to become some other person. But we think that the second and more significant thing is the incapability of the analyzed person to accept the reality of the real and absolute death, and he is necessarily initially and finally on his own in this.

We think that death in its essence is the utmost rock upon which could deviate or even break up each analysis. We know all that life includes the continuously postponed temporariness of the meaning and the temporariness of the invested objects, as well as the temporariness of the invested activities, which have a meaning. But death as we all know is also the foolishness and non-meaningfulness of the meaning itself. Our time is not time, it is not the time and it has not any time.

The analysis as well as the maturity does not arrive at the location that it should achieve, apart when and only by the condition that the person in question, may be capable to live constantly at the edge of the abyss and in this ultimate and unresolved double bind:
· Live as a mortal, live as if you were immortal.

The heteronomous societies enact upon giving an interpretation of the meaning for all and they oblige us all to internalize this. And these heteronomous societies institutionalize authentic or symbolic representatives of an eternal meaning and a phantastic and not an imaginary immortality, and that in the eternal meaning and in the phantastic immortality of which is supposed that the entire world may join in various modalities. These modalities may be the myth of a personal immortality or the metempsychosis or the resurrection of the dead, but it may also be the myth of the eternity of the institutionalized artificial construct, like the king, the state, the nation, the race, the party, etc., that is, by the institutionalized artificial construct by which each person may identify himself as far as possible.

We think that an autonomous society would not tolerate anything from all these in the public field certainly. That anyone may think what he wishes is another story and that this one of the main difficulties, if not the difficulty at all, which confronts the autonomy project. It is the difficulty of the human beings to accept without much invented story and without decoration and consolation the mortality of the individual and of the community and in addition the mortality of their constructs.

Indeed the main support of the institutions is the fear of death, but not the fear that the neighbour will kill me. But the justified fear that everything, also the meaning, will be dissolved. Obviously nobody may resolve this problem. Whenever and if might this be resolved, this may not be done otherwise, but by means of an innovative social-historical construction and by a corresponding alteration of the human being and his attitude in front of the life and the death.

Whoever desires to think more about this issue, it would be good to think about some answers to this problem, which have been given by the two societies, where the project of autonomy was constructed and continued, that is to say, the ancient Greek and the Western European Societies. And more specifically, there is nobody here, who may not be impressed by the enormous difference between the two answers. It is an enormous topic of study and thinking. All the stories about immortality jointly with happiness begin after the 5th century BC. Before, there were these dreadful shades who Odysseus meets in the Hades.
· How did the ancient Greeks reconcile their immense liveliness and their creativity with the deep knowledge of their mortality?
· And how did try the western Europeans to find other counterweights and other economies of death, when they slowly-slowly did come out partly from the grip of the Christianity?

A research, which would try to understand the how were interconnected the political efforts and the political institutions as well as the political prospects of these two societies with their attitude towards the problem of the mortality, would surely bring into being essential results.