Everything that exists within what we call thought may not be formalized or be formalizable, that is, comparable to a mechanical operation. Rather, all that exists within thought brings both human imagination and human passion into play.
I have already written quite extensively on the imagination, so I shall limit myself here to recalling the essential points. At the two extremes of knowledge and constantly in-between rises the creative potential of the human being, namely the radical imagination. It is the radical imagination that presents an outside world formed in this way and not otherwise. It is this radical imagination, too, that creates the axioms, postulates, and fundamental schemata that underlie the constitution of knowledge. And, finally, it is radical imagination that is constantly furnishing the hypotheses-models, the ideas and images that nourish every breakthrough and every elaboration. Now, this imagination, in itself and in its basic modes of operation, as well as the social imaginary which is its counterpart on the social-historical level as creation of the anonymous collective, is neither formalized nor formalizable. Certainly, it always also contains like everything that is an ensemblistic-identitary dimension. Yet, in its operations as well as in its results, the essential thing is not to be found there, any more than in a Bach fugue may be the essence in the arithmetical relations among tones.
- Why is a computer unable to replace the human mind?
Because the former it is devoid of imagination. Because, therefore, it can neither go beyond the rules that make it function nor go back before they were laid down (unless, precisely, one has specified this as a rule, and obviously, in this last case, it would be impossible for the computer to posit a new rule capable of leading to meaningful results). And because it is devoid of passion and therefore incapable of suddenly changing its object of inquiry on account of some new, hitherto unsuspected idea of which it has become enamoured along the way. None of these deficiencies can be made up for by random operations.
The Paradoxical Relation between Passion and Knowledge.
At first glance, it seems absurd to bring together the terms passion and knowledge, which seem to exclude each other absolutely. Moreover, a moderately educated individual bolstered by most philosophers, would probably affirm that this relation could only be a negative one, passion as well as the imagination only being able to perturb or to corrupt the labour of knowledge, which is said to require instead scholarly coolness and impassiveness. It would be easy to answer this individual that every great work of knowledge has been moved by passion and tyrannical absorption with a single object, from Archimedes, who was killed after refusing to let his circles in the sand be disturbed, to the frantic last writings of Évariste Galois, who scrawled his theorems on paper all night long before his fatal duel. Our hypothetical, but not improbable, interlocutor could offer us the response that he did not intend the passion for knowledge itself, which bears on the object of knowledge or on the truth, but extrinsic, impure passions: envy, hatred, and resentment, love of money, power, or even glory, or yet again, and perhaps especially, the extension of the researcher’s egoism to “his” ideas and “his” results. Remembering Hegel, we could answer him that as in other domains in this domain too, the cunning of reason knows very well how to bring the least noble passions into its service.
- How many times has a rivalry between masters or schools, with cloudy motives (Newton-Leibniz, Kronecker-Cantor, etc.), played a driving role in the development of knowledge?
- Today especially, who would dare maintain that the passions for power, for renown at all costs, and even for money are not powerful stimuli for scientific research, as our contemporaries’ absolute rage to be first abundantly shows?
We can, and should, delve into a deeper stratum and, to that end, give a more rigorous meaning to the term passion. It can be said, along with Piera Aulagnier that there is passion when the object of pleasure is transformed into an object of need, in other words, when the object is one that could not be missed, when the subject cannot conceive its life without the possession of the object, its absorption, its pursuit, in a sense ultimately without identification with the object of the passion, which has become a matter of life or death. Does such a relation exist in the domain of knowledge?
Certainly it is so. It is not only experience that shows this; there are, so to speak, a priori considerations that oblige us to admit that there can be no non-routine work of knowledge without passion thus defined, without the subject’s total dedication to his object. But what, in the case of knowledge, is this object?
Knowledge begins with the interrogation What is . . . ?, or Why . . . ?, and so on, but becomes knowledge, even in the case of philosophy, only if it leads to certain results. We must insist on this last point in an age when people are talking only of questioning, indetermination, deconstruction, and weak thought. What, then, is stimulated in the passion to know?
The first answer that presents itself obviously is: the truth. And there is no need to enter into a philosophical discussion of the question What is truth? In order to affirm, as a first approximation, that the truth has to do with the results of knowing. But it is here that the paradoxes re-emerge. The passion for truth cannot be separated from the passion for the results in which this truth is incarnated or seems to be incarnated for the researcher, the scientist, or the thinker. Now, this truth can lead him, and most often does lead him, to a fixation on these (his) results, with which he more or less identifies, to the point that any calling them into question can be felt by him as a calling into question of his own identity, his very being. The subject’s narcissism necessarily extends outward to encompass, and this is so not only in the domain of knowledge, what the subject has produced, objects henceforth of a categorical and unconditional cathexis.
Yet this cathexis, that is to say, this possession as well as concentration of emotional energy on an object or idea, which transforms the truth into an object of possession and so often becomes, in philosophy especially but not exclusively, attachment to a system, stands in contradiction to the initial motive and driving force of the search for truth. It cannot help but halt the movement of interrogation, preventing the latter from turning toward its results, and still less from turning back on the postulates that rendered these results possible. Here we find one of the roots of various dogmatisms and fanaticisms in the domain of knowledge.
Here we have a dilemma. Either one becomes passionate about the results—without which the truth remains but a phantom (or, at best, a Kantian regulatory idea, with the antinomies that follow therefrom)—at the risk of becoming fixated on these results or one becomes passionate about the search for the truth itself, therefore ultimately passionate about boundless interrogation, at the risk of forgetting that this interrogation would then remain suspended in midair for lack of any fixed points. Is there any way out of this dilemma?
The answer to this question is many-sided. On the philosophical plane, it imposes a new idea of the truth as an open relationship between an interrogation and its results, as a sui generis movement going back and forth between processes and pauses, between excavation and encounter (“association”). On the psychoanalytical plane, it obliges admission of a singular, and historically new, type of cathexis, the possession of self as creative source and of the activity of thought in itself as such. Under what conditions knowing can be possessed as an investment of emotional energy in a person, object or idea, and as a process and activity and not simply as result? And to what extent can one possess oneself as origin and actor of this process?
Philosophical Aspects.
If you told me, “Socrates, we are acquitting you, but on the condition that you abandon this search and no longer philosophize . . . ,” I would tell you . . . that I shall not stop philosophizing . . . the unexamined life is not liveable (o de anexetastos bios ou biotos).
Undoubtedly, Socrates dies on account of several factors and motives, but above all because examination and interrogation have become the object of his passion, that without which life is not worth living. Let us note this point well: Socrates is not speaking of truth; he has always proclaimed, although in an ironic fashion, that the only thing he knew with certainty was that he knew nothing. He speaks of exetasis, examination, and inquiry. The two strands we have loosened stand clearly apart here: passion, which makes its object worth one’s life; and the nature of this object, not as possession but as quest and inquiry, as an examinative activity.
In the Phaedrus and especially in the Symposium, in the mouth of Diotima, Plato sets amorous passion, Eros, at the base of knowing—as well as, moreover, at the base of everything that is truly worthwhile in human life. Aristotle begins his Metaphysics with the famous phrase, “All human beings, by their nature, desire knowledge.” The contrast with modern times is striking: excepting Spinoza, for whom knowledge of the third kind, true intuition is the intellectual love of substance, one notices that from Descartes to Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, not to forget Anglo-Saxon philosophy, knowing becomes a strictly intellectual affair. We shall illustrate this point by a single example, this of Immanuel Kant.
Kant, as one knows, poses the question of the “human being’s interests,” and lays out this question in three moments: What can I know, what ought I to do, what am I allowed to hope for?
His huge elaboration of the first moment becomes an investigation into what he calls the transcendental conditions of knowledge, in other words, into the question: How are synthetic a priori judgments, that is, necessary and non-tautological judgments, possible?
From the point of view of interest to us here, the outcome of this investigation is the construction of a transcendental ego, wherein the “imagination” plays a certain role. But this role, which is subordinated to the requisites of an assured and certain form of knowing, consists in the perpetually unchanging production of forms that are given once and for all. At the same time, this transcendental ego necessarily is, by its very construction, totally disembodied, and not somatically but psychically. It is a mental machine; today we would say a sort of computer. There are, moreover, two computers rather than one, and they do not communicate with each other. Indeed, Kant establishes an abyssal divide, a split between transcendental subject and psychological subject. The former is postulated to function under the sole requisite of producing a priori judgments; the latter is subjected to the laws of empirical psychology and therefore emits judgments that are not motivated, but determined in the natural-sciences sense by psychical causes. Despite some of Kant’s expressions, as when he speaks of the Schematics as an “art hidden in the depths of the human psyche”, it cannot even be said that this psyche is split in two in him; it must rather be said that the psyche is for him entirely on the side of pure fact, subject to the question quid facti, and looks hopelessly toward the other edge of the abyss, where the transcendental requisite and the Idea of a pure morality shine forth, because they alone being capable of responding to the question quid juris.
At best, there is a split between a transcendental consciousness or a practical reason —about which it is not known whether it represents a pure, inaccessible “ought to be” in which case, we are given over to empiricist relativism or the effectively actual reality of “us men,” wir Menschen we would then be totally outside nature —and the empirical psyche, which, even when it speaks the truth or does what is good, can speak it or do it only for bad empirical or impure reasons. In the field of knowledge, in any case, this empirical psyche could be only a source of perturbations and errors, when, for example, the “empirical imagination” or, still worse, the passions, interfere (yet, one wonders how) with the functioning of the transcendental consciousness. Cutting a long discussion short, we have to limit ourselves to a few assertions that the preceding remarks will have rendered at least plausible.
What really matters to us is the effectively actual knowledge of effectively actual subjects, not a transcendental phantom or an inaccessible ideality. The following paradox is but apparent: exclusive preoccupation with such an ideality can end only in doubt and solipsism. These effectively actual subjects are always social-historical subjects. Their sociality and their historicity are not scoria, accidents, or obstacles but, rather, essential positive conditions for their having access to any knowledge. This is so already because there is no thought without language and because language exists only as social-historical institution.
These effectively actual subjects are also subjects in the full sense of the term. They are not mere products of social-historical conditions, but rather subjects for themselves and more particularly for human psychics. Let us take a step back and ask a question. What are, not the conditions of possibility, but the components of the effective actuality required for any being-for-itself, that is, from a bacterium to the human, to exist and to undertake any activity whatsoever?
The effectively actual existence of a being-for-itself implies that the latter:
- creates a world of its own, a “proper world,” that it itself places itself therein, and that, at a minimum, it interacts with the substrate of this world according to the modes dictated to it by the constitution of its proper world;
- pursues certain objects and runs away from other ones (for, without that, it would cease to exist); and
- evaluates, positively or negatively, the objects and results of its activities.
Let us translate this now into the language of the human psyche. The psyche has to itself create an image of the world and of its place in this world. It has to desire and detest. It has to feel some pleasure with the objects it desires and some displeasure with the objects it detests. But also, the psyche can exist only if it is socialized. That means that it receives, in the main, its image of the world and of itself, its cathected objects, its evaluative criteria, and its sources of pleasure and displeasure from the society in which it finds itself. These images, these objects, these criteria are cathected in a passionate way by the singular psyche as well as by the social collective in which it finds itself submerged. And without this possession, neither one could exist. These considerations are neither empirical nor transcendental. They are suited to the ontology of individual and collective human being and to the ontology of the human being’s relation to the world it creates, and that it makes be in making itself be. This being and this relation exist only as social-historical. Here we have the central dimension of all these questions. We are going to approach one of its aspects briefly.
Belief, Knowledge, Truth
This passionate possession of one’s self-image and one’s image of the world, of which we have spoken, does not yet relate in itself to any kind of knowledge. It appertains to the domain of belief. Belief is everywhere there is human being, as individual and as collectivity.
Living is impossible without a pragmatic belief in the being-thus and regular flow of the things of the world. We undoubtedly share such belief with every living being, even if we are the sole ones for whom it is more or less explicit and conscious. For humans, however, this belief goes far beyond the perceptibility of the things of the world and of their relationships. It is also and especially belief in the significations that hold together the world, the society, and the life and death of individuals. It is the subjective side of the imaginary institution of society. Nearly all of its contents, or objects, are social in origin and nature; they are individual only in a marginal and accidental way, inasmuch as they depend on individual experience and idiosyncrasies. That is why they are almost everywhere unquestionable almost always. One can call into question this or that material fact, but not the society’s imaginary significations. The institution of society has always been grounded on and sanctioned by religion, in the broad sense of the term; and no believer will place in doubt the dogmas of his religion. Even in societies more or less released from the grip of religion, like some contemporary societies, there is an innumerable quantity of ideas a normal citizen would never place in doubt. He believes in them, without necessarily knowing that he believes, that is, he believes that he knows.
In the strict sense that alone matters to us here, knowledge begins when a process of interrogation and inquiry starts that calls into question the beliefs of the tribe and thus creates a breach in the metaphysical niche, which the collectivity has itself constituted. Certainly, it is necessarily propped up on belief: as Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg underscored that the strange goings-on in general relativity and quantum theory presuppose the world of common everyday experience and must be confirmed in that common everyday world. Knowledge however questions belief and, as a general rule, challenges significations and the system by which established meanings are given.
To be sure, the distinction is not always as clear-cut in effectively actual history, and intermediate zones exist between the two. To take the most well-expressed example, in the three monotheistic religions the content of beliefs can generally become an object of one investigation about the “true meaning” of the sacred texts that has fed some long-standing scholarly disputes and a good number of massacres, too. Yet this interrogation is necessarily restricted, in the mathematical sense of the term: it always has to remain within the postulate of the indisputable, because revealed, ultimate truth of these texts.
Belief like knowledge is a creation of beings-for-themselves, that is, living beings, the psyche, and the society. But belief is established in closure. It suffices that belief allow the being-for-itself under consideration to exist within the world; indeed, belief constitutes its vital setting. That is why, in the simple living being totally, and in humans in its instrumental part, belief has to be, in one manner or another, adequate to what is. This constraint ceases however, when we consider the truly important part of human beliefs, that is to say, their imaginary part and the part that has to do with signification. For the latter, the sole constraint of import is the closure of meaning, the “capacity” to respond to every question that can arise in the society under consideration.
It is this closure that is broken through interrogation and the process of knowledge. Of its own agreement, knowledge subjects itself to another constraint, that of logon didonai, giving an account of and reason for, and rejects everything that avoids the question. This constraint can be itemized in the following two demands: internal coherence and an encounter with what is. These two demands already raise new questions, in themselves. For this reason alone, interrogation is unending.
- How can such an activity be possessed by the subject?
- What meaning does it have for the psyche?
These are the questions toward which we are now going to turn our attention.
Psychoanalytical Aspects.
The following particular psychical activities—believing, thinking, knowing—ought to form a central object of preoccupation for the psychoanalytic theory. After all, they are the very presuppositions for its existence. And yet, an elucidation of these particular psychical activities was hardly ever approached by Freud and that elucidation remains among his successors, nearly in the same state as he left it. In his first conception of the problem (Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality), Freud invokes a drive for knowledge—Wisstrieb—whose status, it must be recognized, is strange, to say the least. According to what Freud writes elsewhere (Triebe und Triebschicksäle, 1915), the drive is “the frontier between the somatic and the psychical”: it necessarily has a “somatic source” and a “delegation” into the psyche by means of a representation (Vorstellungsrepräsentanz des Triebes). It is difficult to see what a “somatic source” of a “drive for knowledge” might be. It certainly has to be recalled that in 1907 Freud did not yet possess a worked-out theory of the drives and that what is at issue in the Three Essays as well as in The Theories of Infantile Sexuality is the child’s sexual curiosity.
That certainly furnishes this “drive” with a certain psychoanalytic respectability, but it does not allow one to bridge the enormous gap that separates infantile sexual curiosity from religion, cosmological theories, or theorems about prime numbers.
- Why cows do not have religion—and why sexed animals in general do not produce infantile sexual theories and even seem devoid of all curiosity on this topic, going instead, in general, straight to the point?
The answer would no doubt, or, in any case, ought to be that, in animals, the sexual function is fully “instinctual,” that is, its paths and goals are predetermined, constant, assured, and functional, whereas in humans we are precisely not dealing with an “instinct” but with a “drive.”
- What is to be said of this difference that after all from the Freudian point of view governs the difference between animality and humanity?
Neither his 1915 text nor the other ones ever directly confront this question. We may note, rather, in Freud both a number of sketches of an answer and something like an avoidance of the problem.
At one of the extremes is situated the “biologist” response, which, when pushed to the limit, would lead to the erasure of this difference. Freud certainly did not do that, but it may be asked what pushes him to extend the struggle of Eros and Thanatos to the entire kingdom of living beings and, in particular, to believe that he had also discovered the “death instinct” in the most elementary organisms. At the other extreme is situated the admission, several times repeated, that we know nothing about an essential quality of at least one part of human psychical phenomena: the quality that is consciousness. At times, the invocation of “our God Logos” (The Future of an Illusion) makes one think that he is postulating one irreducibly human attribute, which would be rationality. But obviously, rationality does not imply consciousness, because every predator acts rationally, and consciousness does not imply rationality, as is shown by the most perfunctory observation of human behaviour, both individual and collective. The founding myth of Totem and Taboo could at the very most account for the origin of a specific “religious” belief, not for consciousness, for explicit rationality, or for the activity of knowing. It hardly needs to be added that neither could one link the movement of knowledge to that other “instinct,” self-preservation, which is itself also universal among living beings—not even by sticking on it a genetically higher form of “rationality” in the human sphere, for such a “rationality” could lead, at best, only to the growth of a purely functional and instrumental form of knowledge that would remain enslaved to the satisfaction of perpetually identical “needs.”
It is important to dwell on this question here within the very parameters set by Freud.
- Why would there be (why, in fact and in effect, is there?) in human children a sexual curiosity that is absent among the young of other mammals?
- And why does it lead to such bizarre infantile sexual theories?
It would be laughable to claim that the cause of this is the “secretiveness” of parental sexual activities among humans; children’s observation of animal sexual activities has been the rule in all human societies, with the (unclear) exception of the nurseries of some well-off city-dwelling layers of Victorian society. “Sexual curiosity” could spark off a search only as a function of another factor, which we shall tackle straight away. Freud nevertheless furnishes, involuntarily, it could be said, the framework within which we can bring reflection to bear on our question.
Above, I wrote that Freud never faces head-on a discussion of the difference between animality and humanity, and that is indeed the case. If, however, it is understood correctly, his 1915 text on “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” offers within itself the beginnings of a response. The drive, whose source is somatic, but which, in order to make itself heard by the psyche, has to speak the latter’s language, induces in this psyche a representation that acts as delegate or ambassador (Vorstellungsrepräsentanz des Triebes). Up to this point, there is no difference from what goes on in the animal psyche. The difference appears when one notices, which Freud did not do (though it is true that this was not at that moment his topic of investigation) that this representation is constant in the animal and variable in the human.
Without fear of being mistaken, we can affirm that, for each animal species, the “representative” representation of the drive is fixed, determinate, and canonical. Sexual excitation is each time provoked by the same stimulating representations, and the very unfolding of the act is, in the main, standardized. The same could be said of nutritional needs, and so on and so forth. While there are exceptions, these really are exceptions or deviations. In humans, however, the exception is, so to speak, the rule. In psychoanalytical terms, there is not a canonical representative of the drive across the whole species, or even for the same individual in different circumstances or moments.
To the question Why this difference?, the answer is not hard to find: The function of representation, which is an essential component of the imagination, always furnishes the animal with the same products, whereas this function is released, liberated, or driven mad, as you wish, by the human. The living being in general possesses a functional imagination whose products are fixed and settled; the human possesses a de-functionalized imagination whose products are indeterminate. This goes hand in hand, in the human, with another decisive trait: representational pleasure tends to overtake organ pleasure; a daydream can be as much a source of pleasure as an act of coitus, if not more so. This fact is in turn a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the emergence of another process that is uniquely characteristic of humans, and whose importance, as well as obscurity, Freud recognized: sublimation. For the human being, cathexes of objects and of activities that not only procure no organ pleasure and could not procure any, but whose creation and valuing are social and whose essential dimension is non-perceptible, are a source of pleasure. And they are capable of dominating biological needs or even of standing in the way of one’s mere self-preservation.
This elucidation can and must be complemented on the basis of another element sifted out by Freud, already in the Three Essays: the desire for “mastery” of reality, and already that of the subject’s own body.
- What are the status and origin of this desire for mastery? And what is its relation to sexual curiosity?
The answer to these two questions leads us to leave Freud behind, but not to betray him, I think. The desire for mastery is the offspring and the transposition into “reality” of the originary narcissistic omnipotence, the omnipotence of the monadic subject, which, under the name “magical omnipotence of thought,” Freud rightly rediscovered in everyone’s Unconscious, this of children as well as that of adults.
Now, at its origin, and always in the Unconscious, this omnipotence is omnipotence over representations (let us note, for the psyche, representation is the genus, “reality” the species), and it is in the service of the pleasure principle, which is the cement of meaning. At the psyche’s origin, a “meaningful” representation is a representation that is a source of pleasure, and a representation that is a source of displeasure is meaningless, like a cacophony. Here we have the matrix of meaning: everything holds together; everything has to hold together; and this holding-together is something sought after, positively valued, a source of pleasure.
Organ pleasure itself is the holding-together of the object as source of satisfaction and the erogenous zone as seat of this satisfaction. Coitus is copulation, or reunification of the separated. On the other hand, the basic intention of sexual curiosity in the child is to respond to the question: Where do children come from?
This is an abstract and generalized formulation of the question: Where do I come from? And this question has meaning only as background for an interrogatory investigation of origin, which is one aspect and one moment of the question of meaning: an aspect and a moment of the causes of and conditions for meaning. More than milk or sleep, the psyche demands meaning; it demands the holding-together, for itself, of what presents itself to the psyche as apparently disordered and unrelated. The question of the origin is the question of order and of meaning in the temporal, that is, “historical” dimension. The question of the origin perforates the plenitude of the present; it presupposes, therefore, the creation of a temporal horizon properly speaking (which is a work of the subject’s radical imagination): that is, a horizon upstream, birth and commencement, and a horizon downstream, horizon of the project but also of death. Of course, this temporalization can occur only in step-by-step combination with the socialization of the psyche, which furnishes it with a more and more differentiated world and which compels it to recognize this ever more differentiated world. But that aspect cannot retain us here.
To respond with an infantile sexual theory to sexual curiosity is therefore, on the part of the child, to try to instaurate the mastery of its thought over its origin, in other words, to sketch out a meaning for its history. This is what will later be prolonged into a question about the origin of everything, a question to which socially instituted theology and cosmology will always give an answer. Let us put it another way: Sexual curiosity tends toward a certain form of mastery, and mastery as such always also has sexual connotations. The ways in which all this is also related to a kind of instrumental mastery—to which Freud attached great importance, as is seen in The Future of an Illusion—cannot retain us here.
Whether we are talking, therefore, about sexual curiosity, mastery, or sources of pleasure, the break with animality is conditioned by the emergence of the radical imagination of the singular psyche and of the social imaginary qua source of institutions, therefore of objects and activities capable of nourishing sublimation. This emergence destroys the animal’s “instinctual” forms of self-regulation, adds representational pleasure to organ pleasure, gives rise to the demand of meaning and of signification, and responds to this demand through the construction, at the collective level, of social imaginary significations that account for everything that can, each time, be presented to the society under consideration. Borne and conveyed by socially instituted, desexualized, and essentially imperceptible objects, these significations are, under penalty of death or madness, possessed by singular subjects. It is the process of this possession, that is to say, of this concentration of emotional energy on an object or idea, and its results that we are to call sublimation.
Sublimation, however, is a condition for there to be knowledge, not knowledge itself. For, in almost all societies, its objects are unquestionable beliefs: the world rests on a great tortoise, or God created it in six days, after which time he rested, and so on and so forth. These beliefs guarantee a saturation of the demand of meaning by giving an answer to everything that can be, in a meaningful manner for this society, an object of questioning. And they ensure a closure of interrogation by instaurating an ultimate and catholic source of signification. In order to elucidate the origin of knowledge, we have to go further.
Knowledge and Passion for the Truth let us dare to contradict Aristotle. What the psyche, as much as society, desires, and that of which they both have need, is not knowledge, but belief. The psyche is born, certainly, with the demand of meaning. Or rather, it is born in that which, for it, is meaning and will remain the model for meaning its whole life long: that is, the closure of the psychical monad upon itself and the plenitude accompanying it. Under pressure both from corporeal need and from the presence of another human on whom satisfaction of this need depends, closure and plenitude cannot help, but be ruptured.
Non-satisfaction of need does indeed appear and can appear only as non-sense, that is, “the end of the state of psychical quiescence,” Freud writes. Therefore, the person who ensures satisfaction of this need is straight away erected into a position of the Master of meaning: that is, the Mother, or her placeholder.
In its initial form, interrogation is a moment in the psyche’s struggle to exit from the meaningless and from the anxiety to which this meaninglessness gives rise. The meaningless can appear at this stage only as a threat of the self’s destruction. To this anxiety, the search for mastery responds in the form of the mastery of meaning, which at the outset is effectively total as “hallucinatory” or “delusional” mastery.
The search for meaning is a search to bring into relationship the entire dust cloud of “elements” that presents itself, bound together with the pleasure that comes from the more or less successful restoration of the integrity of the psychical flux: that is, a re-established coalescence of representation, desire, and affect. Considered from the psychoanalytic point of view, that is the meaning of meaning, and it is not difficult to see how it relates to the meaning of meaning in philosophy; the happiness of the theoretical life.
Searching and interrogation generally reach the saturation point via the social imaginary significations the human being absorbs and internalizes during this tough schooling process that is its socialization. And these significations themselves are almost always instituted in closure, for the exclusion of interrogation is the first and best means of ensuring the perpetuation of their validity. It will be said that “reality” might call them back into question, but “reality” itself is for each society only in its being caught within the network of significations instituted and interpreted by this network.
Only significations that are purely “instrumental”, or better, only the instrumental dimension of certain significations, can sometimes be short-circuited by the “reality”-testing. What is then passionately possessed is instituted social “theory,” namely, established beliefs. The mode of adherence is here precisely that of believing, and the affective modality of this believing is passion, which manifests itself almost always as fanaticism.
Passion is in effect brought to its maximum intensity on account of the fact that the socialized individual has to, under penalty of being faced with his own non-sense and with the nonsense of all that surrounds him, identify himself with the institution of his society and with the significations that society incarnates. To deny the institution or to deny these significations is, most of the time, to commit suicide physically and, almost always, to commit suicide psychically. The obvious underside of this passion, of this boundless love for self and one’s own is the hatred of all that denies these objects, namely, the hate of the institutions and of the significations of the others and of the individuals who embody them.
Such has been, such is the state of humanity almost everywhere, almost always. We would not be speaking of knowledge as opposed to belief, however, if this state had not sometimes been ruptured. And it effectively has been broken up at least two times, in ancient Greece and in Western Europe, after which time the effects of this break-up have become potentially accessible to every human being and to every human collectivity.
We cannot know “why” such a break has occurred. And to tell the truth, the question has no meaning. The rupture has been construction. We can, however, be more precise in characterizing its content. As a resurgence of a kind of interrogation that no longer accepts being saturated by socially instituted responses, this break is conjointly: construction of philosophy, or an indefinitely open calling into question of the idols and certainties of the tribe, even if we are talking about a tribe of wise men; and construction of politics as democratic politics, or the equally open challenging of the effectively actual institutions of society and opening of the interminable question of justice; and finally, and perhaps especially, cross-pollination of these two movements. If we restrict ourselves to the domain of thought properly speaking, what henceforth becomes an object of passion is the search itself, as the term philosophy itself says so well. Not already acquired wisdom guaranteed once and for all, but love or Eros of wisdom. There is a threefold condition for this passage to be effectuated. The three elements are ontological, social-historical, and psychical in character.
Clearly, the knowledge process presupposes two conditions that have to do with being itself. Curiously, only one of these two has especially been put forward by the inherited philosophy. For there to be knowledge, at least something of being must be knowable, since obviously no subject of any kind would ever be able to know anything about an absolutely chaotic world. Being, however, must also be neither “transparent” nor even exhaustively knowable. Just as the mere existence of beings-for-themselves assures us that there are a certain stability and a certain orderliness to at least one stratum of being, its first natural stratum, the one with which the living being deals, so the existence of a history of knowledge has its own weighty ontological implications. This history shows in effect that being is not such as it would be if an initial interrogation or a first effort at attaining knowledge could exhaust it. If one pursues this line of questioning, one will note that these facts are thinkable only by positing a stratification or fragmentation of being.
The social-historical condition has to do with the emergence of open societies, namely, ones that are such that established institutions and significations can be called into question and ones in which the knowledge process itself as such would be positively possessed and valued. Given that the institution of society has effectively actual existence only in being borne and conveyed by individuals and in being incorporated, so to speak, within them, this amounts to saying that the emergence of such societies entails and presupposes the educational formation of individuals capable of sustaining and deepening the interrogation.
Finally, if, as has been said, what the psyche desires above all is not any form of knowledge but, rather, belief, a question of capital importance arises in relation to the psychical conditions of possibility for knowledge.
- What can be the supports and the objects of possession within the field of knowledge that are capable of having a meaning from the properly psychical point of view?
Here, curiously, the psychical support can only be a narcissistic passion, though one that presupposes a transubstantiation of one’s possessed self-image. The self is no longer possessed as the possessor of the truth but, rather, as source of, and incessantly renewed capacity for, creation. Or, what boils down to the same thing: the possession spreads to the activity of thought itself as apt to produce true results, yet beyond every particular given result. And this goes hand in hand with another idea of truth, both as philosophical idea and as object of passion. The true no longer is an object to be possessed, nor is it passive spectacle of the play of Being’s veiling and unveiling. The true becomes creation, always open and always capable of turning back upon itself, of forms of the thinkable and of contents of thought capable of having an encounter with what is. The possession is no longer possession of an “object,” or even of a “self-image” in the usual sense, but of a “non-object/object,” activity and source of the true. The attachment to this truth is the passion for knowledge, or thought as Eros.
Sunday, February 3, 2008
Saturday, February 2, 2008
The Psychical and Social Roots of Hate
Perhaps there have been wars that mobilized only “limited” aggressive drives, including, for example, the minimum of aggression involved in self-defence. But what we have been witnessing for years now, in Europe and in Africa, as well as what happened in Europe and in East Asia during the last world war, is an explosion of unlimited aggression, as expressed through racism, indiscriminate murder of civilians, rape, destruction of monuments and homes, killing or torture of prisoners, and so on. And what we know of human history forces us to think that the recent innovations in this field pertain mostly to the quantitative dimensions and the technical instrumentations of the phenomena, as well as to their articulations with the imaginary of the groups concerned, but not at all to their nature. Whatever the importance of other concomitant factors or conditions might be, it is impossible to understand the behaviour of the people involved in these events unless we see in it the materialization of extremely strong affects of hate. I shall endeavour to show that there are two sources of hate, each reinforcing the other:
- the fundamental drive of the psyche to reject (thus, to hate) that which is not itself;
- the near necessity of closure for the social institution and the imaginary significations it bears.
The Psychical Root
“Hate . . . is older than love,” wrote Freud, and this is true if one takes love in the usual sense, as object-love. But hate is not older than archaic, primordial love of “self,” what is often and inadequately called “primary narcissism,” the original psychical nucleus of representational/affective/ desiring closure upon itself. I call this core the psychical monad.
Freud had had a glimpse of this self-closure. He used Bleuler’s word autism to characterize it, and he likened this primordial state of the human being, including the feeding function of the mother, to the fullness of a bird’s egg.
Such closure becomes, for the psyche, the matrix of meaning. More precisely, what the psychical core will, now and forever, “understand” or “consider” as meaning is this “unitary” state, where “subject” and “object” are identical and where representation, affect, and desire are one and the same because desire is immediately representation (psychical possession) of the desired and hence affect of pleasure (which is the purest and strongest form of the omnipotence of thought). This is the meaning the psyche will forever seek after. Of course, that will never be fully attainable in the “real world,” and substitutes for it will come in the form of long series of mediations or else unworldly “mystical” visions. Unless we understand this, we will never be able to understand why identification—with persons, with tasks, with collectivities, with significations, with institutions—is such a potent and omnipresent process in psychical life. Nor could we understand why society can, almost boundlessly, play with the psyche’s plasticity—on the sole condition, that is, that society provides the subject with meaning (rigorously speaking, a social substitute for meaning) in “real life.”
From the moment (perhaps a theoretical or “ideal” limit) this primeval state of “psychical quiescence” (to use Freud’s expression) is broken—and broken it must be, if the infant is to survive—the initial “energy” of this self-love is split into three parts:
- a part of it remains as self-cathexis of the core of the psyche, and its influence impregnates all the subsequent phases of the subject’s psychical development and the corresponding strata of the mature personality;
- another part is transferred, under the form of self, to the breast: Ich bin die Brust, “I am the breast,” is one of the last sentences Freud wrote;
- a last part is transformed into hate of the “external world,” which we have to take here to mean: all that is external to the psychical monad, and which thus includes the avatars of the developing psychical and somatic “reality-Ego” (Real-Ich).
The first part (remanent self-love) accounts for the ineradicable egocentrism that, in a more or less thinly disguised way, dominates in the final analysis all our thoughts and deeds. From another, apparently unrelated point of view, what we have here is the ontological egoism necessarily immanent to any being-for-itself. Everywhere and always, I am the origin of the spatial and temporal coordinates; my here and now is the here and now; the world is my representation.
The other two parts become intermingled and entangled very quickly. Therefore, here derives the fundamental ambivalence of all affects, and, to begin with, this of the relation to the first separate love-object, the mother. They become entangled because the breast “is so often missed by the child” (Freud).
The absence of the breast would have amounted to the destruction of the closed totality of the infant, thus to a collapse of the meaning of his/her world. Initially, this destruction is palliated by an imaginary creation, the hallucination of the breast. When this hallucination of the breast ceases to be capable of covering up the break-up of the original monad’s closure, the infant is left with a gaping hole in his/her world, and s/he reacts with anxiety and rage. This hole, the absence of the breast, is meaninglessness. And here, as always, meaninglessness—or the actual or imminent, real or imagined, destruction of meaning—is source of anxiety. As the infant possesses the rudiments of inductive intelligence—that is, as his/her imagination has to make something out of repetition or regularity—a link is quickly established between the hole and the memory of the object that “normally” fills it. (The habitual becomes normal since it corresponds to the desire.) This object’s character or value is split into two contradictory attributes, the good and the bad breast. These attributes—and the affects and desires accompanying them (briefly speaking, love and hate)—are subsequently transferred to the image that has been linked with the breast, the mother as an entity or person. This becomes the matrix of the ambivalence that will henceforth be inherent in all the subject’s relationships.
But there is something more to this process and something more important. The result of the process of maturation/socialization is the formation of the social individual—which in itself is, from the point of view of the monadic core of the psyche, an alien and strange “object.” (In Freudian terms, the Real-Ich, the reality-Ego, exhibits all the attributes that are contradictory to those of the Lust-Ich, the pleasure-Ego.) It thus becomes both the support for a transfer of self-love and the object of the hate of the “unreal” psychical instances—a hate that, as was already stated, burdens whatever is “external” to the psychical core. The reality-Ego cannot escape from being the object of the ambivalence of the affects. Usually, love toward the Ego prevails over the hate of which it is the object—sufficiently, at any rate, to ensure the subject’s survival in real life. But hate of the Ego continues its noiseless life within the depths of the psyche.
There are thus, from the psychoanalytical point of view, two vectors of hate. The first, hate of the “real other,” is simply the reverse of the positive side of the cathexis of self. It is sustained by a powerful and elementary sophism that is also present in the collective forms of hatred or contempt and is perhaps more easily perceived in these latter forms: I am good; (the) good is me; he is not me; he is not good (or is less good than me). I am French (American, Italian, British, etc.); to be French (American, Italian, British . . . ) is to be (the) good; he is not French (American, Italian, British . . . ); therefore, he is not good.
The second is self-hate. For, the self—the Ego—is one of the first strangers the psyche encounters. This is also one of the meanings of Rimbaud’s phrase, “I is an other”—a meaning that is not all that different from its apparent, prima facie meaning: for, the “I” or Ego, essentially a social construct, is no more “me” than any neighbour or passer-by. Contrary to what is generally believed perhaps, this self-hatred is universal. Clearly, it (properly speaking, the subject bearing it) can survive only if it is severely tamed and/or displaced toward truly “external” objects. Through this displacement, the subject can maintain the affect while changing its object. This process is most visible in the phenomenon of racism, to which I will return.
The Social Root
The link between the psychical and the social roots, in the case of hate as in all others, is the socialization process imposed upon the psyche. Through this process, the psyche is forced into society and “reality,” while society takes care, more or less, of the psyche’s paramount need: the need for meaning.
The infant will either die or, as happens much more frequently, be socialized. This socialization process leans on biological need (hunger) and, much more heavily, on the psychical need for meaning. Neither of these needs is absolutely insurmountable: anorexia and autism demonstrate, in this case too, the a-functional and a-social nature of the psyche. Once the initial, monadic closure has been broken, the psychical need for meaning has to be satisfied by the environment of the infant—an environment made from already socialized individuals who cannot convey anything but those meanings they themselves have already absorbed and cathected. To be socialized means, first and foremost, to cathect the existing institution of society and the imaginary significations this institution bears. Among such imaginary significations are: gods, spirits, myths, totems, taboos, kinship, sovereignty, leadership, law, citizen, State, justice, commodity, capital, interest, and reality. Reality is, of course, an imaginary signification, and its particular content for each society is heavily codetermined by the imaginary institution of this society. This meaning-giving dimension of the social institution is obviously more than many-sided and extraordinarily complex; it is, in fact, the creation of a world, of this society’s world. One of its main dimensions is, of course, language. Language is not an “instrument of communication,” as if there were ready-made and fully formed individuals eager to communicate and lacking only an “instrument” for that purpose. Language is the element within which “objects,” “processes,” “states,” “qualities,” and so on, as well as various kinds of relations and links among them, are established.
What are of interest for us here are the intrinsic reasons why the institution of each society has up to now almost inevitably taken on the character of a closure of various types. There is, to be sure, always a “material” closure, in the sense of more or less well-determined territories or frontiers, and/or, in all cases, strictly limitative definitions of the individuals belonging to this particular society. But the most important one is the closure of meaning.
Territories and so on acquire their importance only because of specific meanings attributed to them: thus, the Promised Land, or the sacred character of territory for the Greek poleis, or the strident character of border disputes everywhere. This is, as we shall see, also and even more genuine of individuals: a stranger is a stranger because the significations of which he is the bearer are strange, foreign. Now a signification can be non-strange only if it is positively cathected. It suffices to replace the term non-strange in the previous sentence with the term familiar to see that this is in fact a tautology.
The metaphor of open and closed societies has been in use for a long time now. But I am using the term closure here with almost its precise mathematical sense. A world of meanings is closed if any question capable of being formulated within it either has an answer in terms of the given meanings or is posited as meaningless. Thus, the worlds of archaic or traditional societies are closed, whereas the ancient Greek world or the modern European one (in the broad sense) is more or less open.
Almost all known societies have instituted themselves by means of and within a closure. They have created for themselves a metaphysical niche of meaning, which is equivalent to saying that they have been religious. Or, alternatively, we can say that they have been heteronomous in the sense that they have covered up the fact that they have instituted themselves and, instead, attribute their institution to an extra-social source. I cannot dwell here on the reasons why these characterizations are more or less equivalent. Suffice it to say that these traits correspond to two essential traits of a heteronomous society:
- the “need” or “necessity” for an extra-social (extra-institutional) foundation and guarantee of the institution;
- the “need” or “necessity” to make it impossible to call into question in any way the institution—that is, to stop any discussion about ultimate foundations—by claiming that it rests on something beyond the knowledge of living humans.
During and by virtue of the very process of their socialization, socialized individuals have to pass from an initial meaning coextensive with their own psychical, private sphere (monadic meaning) to a shared, social one. As was already implied above, monadic meaning is completely alien to what, in waking life, we consider meaning to be. Not only does it not know time and contradiction, but it does not even know distinction, separation, and articulation. Through a series of concentric circles—family, kin or clan, locality, age group, social group or class, nation, “race,” and so on—the world of meaning of the subject who is becoming an individual is enlarged, and this enlargement goes together with an extended and more or less strong identification with these larger units. (That these identifications can sometimes be antinomic with respect to each other has supplied tragedy with a recurrent theme.)
All this is, or ought to be, quite well known. What are needed to be stressed are the consequences for the psychical organization of the individual. All identificatory bearings of the individual are part and parcel of the instituted world of social meanings, among which, of course, those that refer to the various collective instituted entities of which the individual is a member or an element are an essential component. Consider, for example, the sentence, “I am the son of X.” What a son is (beyond the simple biological fact of procreation—which, moreover, is initially unknown and at any rate always uncertain) and what he has to do qua son, who and what X is and the very idea of an “I” and an “am,” all these terms have no meaning whatsoever outside the socially instituted world of meaning in general and outside the specific meanings proper to the society under consideration.
A Roman son of 500 B.C.E. and an American son of today have very little in common. And, for obvious reasons: the nearer we are to a completely closed, archaic society, the stronger is this identification. There are well-known cases of “savages” who died just because well-meaning Europeans insisted on taking them far from their tribe and their place. And it is also well known that, most of the time, this identification supersedes the individual’s self-preservation. To kill and be killed in a family vendetta, in tribal conflicts, in feudal warfare, in national wars—pro patria mori, in all its versions—is the universal fact. It is the obligation societies impose upon their members, and it is what these members always and everywhere proudly and gladly accept—except, that is, over a small geographical area and in recent historical times, in modern societies. Meaning for the psyche is identical with the indivisibility of its initial totality. The break-up of this totality is possible only if the psyche is continuously supplied with self substitutes and with substitutes for meaning. This is the process of identification, through which quanta of cathexes levied from the initial self-cathexis are first transferred onto the immediate objects and then onto the different forms of instituted collectivities and onto significations dwelling within them. In a manner that has probably become incomprehensible to some “individuals” in modern societies, the savage is his tribe, the fanatic is his Church, the national is his nation, the member of an ethnic minority is this minority—and vice versa.
Obviously, this identification with collectivities also supplies a substitute for the lost omnipotence of the psychical monad. The individual may feel that it participates in the effective power of five thousand, or fifty million, other individuals. “We shall prevail for we are stronger” is a stupidity shared equally on both sides of the front. This identification also has important effects in the suppression of guilt and inhibitions and thus renders possible the frantic deployment of murderous destructiveness in war, but also during crowd movements, as has long been observed. It is as if, in these moments, individuals recover, without knowing it, the certitude that the source of the institution is the anonymous collective, capable of positing new rules and lifting old prohibitions.
Outcomes
There are, as I have said already, two psychical expressions of hate: hate of the other and self-hate. The latter, in general, does not appear as such. But we must understand that both have a common root, the psychical monad’s refusal to accept what is, for it, alien and thus strange: the socialized individual, whose form it has been forced to wear, and social individuals, whose coexistence it is obliged to accept (though their existence is always less real than its own existence for itself, and therefore also much more expendable). This ontological structure of the human being imposes insurmountable constraints on all social organizations, and all political projects, a point which cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to say that such constraints irrevocably rule out all ideas of a “transparent” society and all political projects that would aim at an immediate universal reconciliation and claim to short-circuit the social institution.
During the process of socialization, both dimensions of hate are tamed to a significant degree, at least in their most dramatic forms. This is accomplished, in part, through a permanent diversion of the destructive tendency toward more or less “constructive” social ends: exploitation of nature, various forms of interindividual competition (potlatch, peaceful agonistic activities such as athletic or other types of games, economic and political competition, rivalries over the acquisition of prestige, bureaucratic infighting, etc.), or just banal interhuman malice. In all known societies, all such outlets channel a part—but by no means all—of the “available” hate and destructive energy.
Up to now, however, it seems as if this channelling was possible only if the remaining part of hate and destructiveness was kept, as it were, in a reservoir, ready to be turned, at regular or irregular intervals, into formalized, institutionalized destructive activities against other collectivities—that is, into war. This is not to say that psychical hate is the “cause” of wars: that is not a question we have to discuss here. It is clear that one can find in history numerous wars—from the Germanic or Mongol invasions to the “lace wars” of the eighteenth century, not to mention civil wars—for which hate was not the primary source. Yet hate is certainly not only a necessary but an essential condition for war. I mean by essential condition a condition that maintains an intrinsic relationship with that of which it is the condition. Hate conditions war and expresses itself in war. André Malraux’s statement, “Let victory in this war rest with those who fought it without loving it,” expresses a wish contradicted by the reality of almost all real wars.
Otherwise, one would not understand how millions and millions of people throughout the known history of the human species could be ready, at the drop of a hat, to kill unknown people and be killed by them. And when the resources of this reservoir are not actively mobilized, they manifest themselves rampantly under the guise of contempt, xenophobia, and racism.
Let it be noted here, parenthetically, that psychoanalysts often speak carelessly about the taboo against murder. In truth, what is clearly and exclusively intended by the Freudian myth in Totem and Taboo is intraclan murder only. It is also the only type of murder against which there is a social sanction, whereas murder during wartime or in the course of a vendetta results in glory for the killer.
The fatal conjunction is that the destructive drives of individuals fit admirably well with the near necessity for the institution of the society to close upon itself, to reinforce the position of its own laws, values, rules, and meanings as being uniquely excellent and the only true ones. This takes place through the assertion that the laws, creeds, gods, norms, and customs of the others are inferior, false, wrong, disgusting, abominable, and diabolic. And this, in turn, is in complete harmony with the needs of the identificatory organization of the individual’s psyche. For the latter, what lies beyond the circle of meanings it has so painfully cathected along the road of its socialization is inferior, wrong, and meaningless. And these meanings are, for it, coextensive with the instituted collectivity (and network of collectivities) to which it belongs: clan, tribe, village, nation, religion.
Conflicts among these various poles of reference are of course possible. But, for all we know, they arise much less in archaic environments and much more frequently in more modern ones. What must at any rate clearly be understood as the basis for all the rest is that, as a first approximation and in principle, individuals experience any threat to the paramount instituted collectives to which they belong as more serious than a threat against their own lives.
As was said before, these characteristics can be observed with the greatest intensity and purity in fully closed societies: in archaic and traditional ones, to be sure, but, even more, in modern totalitarian societies. The cardinal fallacy is always: Our norms are good; the good is our norms; their norms are not our norms; therefore, their norms are not good. Likewise: Our God is true; Truth is our God; their God is not our God; therefore, their God is not a true God. It has always seemed almost impossible, for human collectivities, to consider alterity as just that: alterity. In the same guise, it has been almost impossible for them to see the institutions of the others as neither superior nor inferior but simply as other institutions, and in truth, mostly incomparable to their own.
To sum up an argument I have expressed in detail elsewhere, a society’s encounter with the others generally opens up three possible ways of evaluating these others:
They are superior, they are equal, or they are inferior. If they were superior, we would have to renounce our own institutions and adopt theirs. If they were equal, being a Yankee rather than a Crow Indian, a Christian rather than a Pagan, would be a matter of sheer indifference. Both possibilities are intolerable. For, both entail, or seem to entail, that the individual should give up his or her own identificatory bearings, that is, give up, or at least call into question, his or her own identity, so dearly acquired during the socialization process. There remains then the third case: They are inferior. Of course, this overlooks the possibility that the others might be our equals in the sense that our institutions and theirs might be, in an initial overall view, incomparable. It is not hard to understand why the emergence of such a view is historically improbable. It would lead us to accept in the others what for us is abomination, something that is in principle impossible for any religious culture. And even in the case of “nonreligious” cultures, it would sometimes raise questions that are insoluble on a purely theoretical level: what to do, for example, with societies that do not recognize human rights that inflict cruel punishments on their members, or that indulge in practices that in our view are horrific (such as the excision and infibulations of girls)?
Attaining to the idea of a possible incomparability of cultures is possible only for a society in which, whatever the intensity of its adherence to its own institutions, an initial internal fissure has already taken place that makes it possible to distance oneself from the established institution.
This is why the movement toward the recognition of this essential alterity starts at the same time, and with the same deep-seated motivations, as the movement toward a rupture of the closure of meaning—that is, the movement toward calling into question the given institution of society, the end of full heteronomy, the freeing of thoughts and deeds, in sum, the birth of democracy and philosophy.
From that time onward, the idea that the others are neither wicked nor inferior starts to make its way (in Homer, Herodotus, Montaigne, Swift, Montesquieu, and so on). It would be both tempting and encouraging to be able to say that the opening of thought and the partial and relative democratization of political regimes in the West have advanced in step with the decline of chauvinism, xenophobia, and racism. But, even leaving aside the terrifying explosions of xenophobic and racist barbarism in the twentieth century, one could accept such a statement only with many strong qualifications. In particular, it is necessary to reflect upon the extremely virulent revival of nationalism, xenophobia, and racism during the twentieth century in the “civilized” and “democratic” countries. As for the non-Western world, the awful contemporary situation hardly calls for comment.
One must add here again that the enigmatic multiplicity and heterogeneity of the historical forms of institutions defies any simple schema of understanding. Hostility toward strangers covers practically the whole spectrum of possibilities, from immediate murder to the most generous hospitality. Xenia was an institution common to all Greeks, though the Lacedaemonians had instaurated xenelasia, expelling foreigners from Lacedaemon after a minimal stay there. But it must also be noted that this variety of institutions and the goodwill it sometimes expresses concern exclusively foreign individuals, never their institutions as such, and foreigners “passing through,” almost never their settling down. (Multiethnic empires are in a class by themselves for evident reasons. In their case, central authority usually imposes tolerance of alien minorities—which has not prevented, as is well known, pogroms against Jews and massacres inflicted upon the Armenians.)
All that I have said up to now provides an account of the exclusion of the external other. It does not suffice to “explain” why this exclusion can become discrimination, contempt, confinement, and, finally, hatred, rage, and murderous folly. Regarding the extreme forms these behaviours can take, and their acute explosions during specific moments in history, I do not think there can be a general “explanation”: historical accounts alone can really make some sense of the bewildering diversity of the related facts. Yet such an understanding requires in the first place that we recognize and gauge accurately the extraordinary quantity of hatred contained in the psychical reservoir, which the social institution has proved unable or unwilling to divert to other objects.
Nevertheless, one factor can be singled out in relation to the massive explosions of national and racial hate during modern times. The dissolution, in capitalist societies, of almost all bodies of significant intermediate collectivities and thus the disappearance of alternative possibilities of identification for individuals have undoubtedly had the effect of an identificatory retrenchment around the entities “religion,” “nation,” or “race” and thus of a tremendous exacerbation of misoxeny in the broadest sense of the word. The situation is not essentially different in non-European societies, where the shock of invading modernity is most acutely felt and the crushing of traditional identificatory bearings leads to increased religious and/or national fanaticism.
Here is a final remark concerning racism, specifically. It is astonishing that, as far as I know, the main, defining characteristic of racism, immediately visible to the naked eye, has been overlooked by writers on the subject. This is the essential inconvertibility of the other. Any religious fanatic would gladly accept the conversion of the infidels; any “rational” nationalist should rejoice at the annexation of foreign territories and the “assimilation” of their people. Not so the racist. German Jews would have been content—or, at least, most of them would have accepted and demanded—to remain citizens of the Third Reich, but the Nazis would have none of it. And it is precisely because, in the case of racism, the object of hate must remain inconvertible that the racist imaginary has to invoke or to invent the existence of would-be physical (biological)—that is, irreversible—characteristics in the objects of its hate: the colour of the skin and facial traits are the most appropriate support for this hate, for they mark the irreducible strangeness of the object and do away with any risk of confusion with the subject. Hence also the extremely strong repulsion against cross-breading, since it blurs the frontier between the pure and the impure and shows to the racist that little would be needed for himself to be found on the other side of the hate barrier. Finally, we would certainly be justified in attaching this extreme form of hate of the other to the most obscure, solemn and repressed form of hate: self-hate.
Heteronomy and hatred of the other have one common root: the near “need” or “necessity” for the closure of meaning, which arises from the intrinsic tendencies of the institution of society and from the singular psyche’s search for ultimate certainties, and which leads to extremely strong identifications with watertight bodies of belief shared and supported by real collectivities. Autonomy, that is, full democracy, and acceptance of the other are not the natural inclination of humanity. Both face the same tremendous obstacles. We know from history that the fight for democracy has been, up to now, marginally more successful than that against chauvinism, xenophobia, and racism. But for those who are committed to the only reasonably defensible political project, the project of universal freedom, the only way open is to continue this uphill struggle.
- the fundamental drive of the psyche to reject (thus, to hate) that which is not itself;
- the near necessity of closure for the social institution and the imaginary significations it bears.
The Psychical Root
“Hate . . . is older than love,” wrote Freud, and this is true if one takes love in the usual sense, as object-love. But hate is not older than archaic, primordial love of “self,” what is often and inadequately called “primary narcissism,” the original psychical nucleus of representational/affective/ desiring closure upon itself. I call this core the psychical monad.
Freud had had a glimpse of this self-closure. He used Bleuler’s word autism to characterize it, and he likened this primordial state of the human being, including the feeding function of the mother, to the fullness of a bird’s egg.
Such closure becomes, for the psyche, the matrix of meaning. More precisely, what the psychical core will, now and forever, “understand” or “consider” as meaning is this “unitary” state, where “subject” and “object” are identical and where representation, affect, and desire are one and the same because desire is immediately representation (psychical possession) of the desired and hence affect of pleasure (which is the purest and strongest form of the omnipotence of thought). This is the meaning the psyche will forever seek after. Of course, that will never be fully attainable in the “real world,” and substitutes for it will come in the form of long series of mediations or else unworldly “mystical” visions. Unless we understand this, we will never be able to understand why identification—with persons, with tasks, with collectivities, with significations, with institutions—is such a potent and omnipresent process in psychical life. Nor could we understand why society can, almost boundlessly, play with the psyche’s plasticity—on the sole condition, that is, that society provides the subject with meaning (rigorously speaking, a social substitute for meaning) in “real life.”
From the moment (perhaps a theoretical or “ideal” limit) this primeval state of “psychical quiescence” (to use Freud’s expression) is broken—and broken it must be, if the infant is to survive—the initial “energy” of this self-love is split into three parts:
- a part of it remains as self-cathexis of the core of the psyche, and its influence impregnates all the subsequent phases of the subject’s psychical development and the corresponding strata of the mature personality;
- another part is transferred, under the form of self, to the breast: Ich bin die Brust, “I am the breast,” is one of the last sentences Freud wrote;
- a last part is transformed into hate of the “external world,” which we have to take here to mean: all that is external to the psychical monad, and which thus includes the avatars of the developing psychical and somatic “reality-Ego” (Real-Ich).
The first part (remanent self-love) accounts for the ineradicable egocentrism that, in a more or less thinly disguised way, dominates in the final analysis all our thoughts and deeds. From another, apparently unrelated point of view, what we have here is the ontological egoism necessarily immanent to any being-for-itself. Everywhere and always, I am the origin of the spatial and temporal coordinates; my here and now is the here and now; the world is my representation.
The other two parts become intermingled and entangled very quickly. Therefore, here derives the fundamental ambivalence of all affects, and, to begin with, this of the relation to the first separate love-object, the mother. They become entangled because the breast “is so often missed by the child” (Freud).
The absence of the breast would have amounted to the destruction of the closed totality of the infant, thus to a collapse of the meaning of his/her world. Initially, this destruction is palliated by an imaginary creation, the hallucination of the breast. When this hallucination of the breast ceases to be capable of covering up the break-up of the original monad’s closure, the infant is left with a gaping hole in his/her world, and s/he reacts with anxiety and rage. This hole, the absence of the breast, is meaninglessness. And here, as always, meaninglessness—or the actual or imminent, real or imagined, destruction of meaning—is source of anxiety. As the infant possesses the rudiments of inductive intelligence—that is, as his/her imagination has to make something out of repetition or regularity—a link is quickly established between the hole and the memory of the object that “normally” fills it. (The habitual becomes normal since it corresponds to the desire.) This object’s character or value is split into two contradictory attributes, the good and the bad breast. These attributes—and the affects and desires accompanying them (briefly speaking, love and hate)—are subsequently transferred to the image that has been linked with the breast, the mother as an entity or person. This becomes the matrix of the ambivalence that will henceforth be inherent in all the subject’s relationships.
But there is something more to this process and something more important. The result of the process of maturation/socialization is the formation of the social individual—which in itself is, from the point of view of the monadic core of the psyche, an alien and strange “object.” (In Freudian terms, the Real-Ich, the reality-Ego, exhibits all the attributes that are contradictory to those of the Lust-Ich, the pleasure-Ego.) It thus becomes both the support for a transfer of self-love and the object of the hate of the “unreal” psychical instances—a hate that, as was already stated, burdens whatever is “external” to the psychical core. The reality-Ego cannot escape from being the object of the ambivalence of the affects. Usually, love toward the Ego prevails over the hate of which it is the object—sufficiently, at any rate, to ensure the subject’s survival in real life. But hate of the Ego continues its noiseless life within the depths of the psyche.
There are thus, from the psychoanalytical point of view, two vectors of hate. The first, hate of the “real other,” is simply the reverse of the positive side of the cathexis of self. It is sustained by a powerful and elementary sophism that is also present in the collective forms of hatred or contempt and is perhaps more easily perceived in these latter forms: I am good; (the) good is me; he is not me; he is not good (or is less good than me). I am French (American, Italian, British, etc.); to be French (American, Italian, British . . . ) is to be (the) good; he is not French (American, Italian, British . . . ); therefore, he is not good.
The second is self-hate. For, the self—the Ego—is one of the first strangers the psyche encounters. This is also one of the meanings of Rimbaud’s phrase, “I is an other”—a meaning that is not all that different from its apparent, prima facie meaning: for, the “I” or Ego, essentially a social construct, is no more “me” than any neighbour or passer-by. Contrary to what is generally believed perhaps, this self-hatred is universal. Clearly, it (properly speaking, the subject bearing it) can survive only if it is severely tamed and/or displaced toward truly “external” objects. Through this displacement, the subject can maintain the affect while changing its object. This process is most visible in the phenomenon of racism, to which I will return.
The Social Root
The link between the psychical and the social roots, in the case of hate as in all others, is the socialization process imposed upon the psyche. Through this process, the psyche is forced into society and “reality,” while society takes care, more or less, of the psyche’s paramount need: the need for meaning.
The infant will either die or, as happens much more frequently, be socialized. This socialization process leans on biological need (hunger) and, much more heavily, on the psychical need for meaning. Neither of these needs is absolutely insurmountable: anorexia and autism demonstrate, in this case too, the a-functional and a-social nature of the psyche. Once the initial, monadic closure has been broken, the psychical need for meaning has to be satisfied by the environment of the infant—an environment made from already socialized individuals who cannot convey anything but those meanings they themselves have already absorbed and cathected. To be socialized means, first and foremost, to cathect the existing institution of society and the imaginary significations this institution bears. Among such imaginary significations are: gods, spirits, myths, totems, taboos, kinship, sovereignty, leadership, law, citizen, State, justice, commodity, capital, interest, and reality. Reality is, of course, an imaginary signification, and its particular content for each society is heavily codetermined by the imaginary institution of this society. This meaning-giving dimension of the social institution is obviously more than many-sided and extraordinarily complex; it is, in fact, the creation of a world, of this society’s world. One of its main dimensions is, of course, language. Language is not an “instrument of communication,” as if there were ready-made and fully formed individuals eager to communicate and lacking only an “instrument” for that purpose. Language is the element within which “objects,” “processes,” “states,” “qualities,” and so on, as well as various kinds of relations and links among them, are established.
What are of interest for us here are the intrinsic reasons why the institution of each society has up to now almost inevitably taken on the character of a closure of various types. There is, to be sure, always a “material” closure, in the sense of more or less well-determined territories or frontiers, and/or, in all cases, strictly limitative definitions of the individuals belonging to this particular society. But the most important one is the closure of meaning.
Territories and so on acquire their importance only because of specific meanings attributed to them: thus, the Promised Land, or the sacred character of territory for the Greek poleis, or the strident character of border disputes everywhere. This is, as we shall see, also and even more genuine of individuals: a stranger is a stranger because the significations of which he is the bearer are strange, foreign. Now a signification can be non-strange only if it is positively cathected. It suffices to replace the term non-strange in the previous sentence with the term familiar to see that this is in fact a tautology.
The metaphor of open and closed societies has been in use for a long time now. But I am using the term closure here with almost its precise mathematical sense. A world of meanings is closed if any question capable of being formulated within it either has an answer in terms of the given meanings or is posited as meaningless. Thus, the worlds of archaic or traditional societies are closed, whereas the ancient Greek world or the modern European one (in the broad sense) is more or less open.
Almost all known societies have instituted themselves by means of and within a closure. They have created for themselves a metaphysical niche of meaning, which is equivalent to saying that they have been religious. Or, alternatively, we can say that they have been heteronomous in the sense that they have covered up the fact that they have instituted themselves and, instead, attribute their institution to an extra-social source. I cannot dwell here on the reasons why these characterizations are more or less equivalent. Suffice it to say that these traits correspond to two essential traits of a heteronomous society:
- the “need” or “necessity” for an extra-social (extra-institutional) foundation and guarantee of the institution;
- the “need” or “necessity” to make it impossible to call into question in any way the institution—that is, to stop any discussion about ultimate foundations—by claiming that it rests on something beyond the knowledge of living humans.
During and by virtue of the very process of their socialization, socialized individuals have to pass from an initial meaning coextensive with their own psychical, private sphere (monadic meaning) to a shared, social one. As was already implied above, monadic meaning is completely alien to what, in waking life, we consider meaning to be. Not only does it not know time and contradiction, but it does not even know distinction, separation, and articulation. Through a series of concentric circles—family, kin or clan, locality, age group, social group or class, nation, “race,” and so on—the world of meaning of the subject who is becoming an individual is enlarged, and this enlargement goes together with an extended and more or less strong identification with these larger units. (That these identifications can sometimes be antinomic with respect to each other has supplied tragedy with a recurrent theme.)
All this is, or ought to be, quite well known. What are needed to be stressed are the consequences for the psychical organization of the individual. All identificatory bearings of the individual are part and parcel of the instituted world of social meanings, among which, of course, those that refer to the various collective instituted entities of which the individual is a member or an element are an essential component. Consider, for example, the sentence, “I am the son of X.” What a son is (beyond the simple biological fact of procreation—which, moreover, is initially unknown and at any rate always uncertain) and what he has to do qua son, who and what X is and the very idea of an “I” and an “am,” all these terms have no meaning whatsoever outside the socially instituted world of meaning in general and outside the specific meanings proper to the society under consideration.
A Roman son of 500 B.C.E. and an American son of today have very little in common. And, for obvious reasons: the nearer we are to a completely closed, archaic society, the stronger is this identification. There are well-known cases of “savages” who died just because well-meaning Europeans insisted on taking them far from their tribe and their place. And it is also well known that, most of the time, this identification supersedes the individual’s self-preservation. To kill and be killed in a family vendetta, in tribal conflicts, in feudal warfare, in national wars—pro patria mori, in all its versions—is the universal fact. It is the obligation societies impose upon their members, and it is what these members always and everywhere proudly and gladly accept—except, that is, over a small geographical area and in recent historical times, in modern societies. Meaning for the psyche is identical with the indivisibility of its initial totality. The break-up of this totality is possible only if the psyche is continuously supplied with self substitutes and with substitutes for meaning. This is the process of identification, through which quanta of cathexes levied from the initial self-cathexis are first transferred onto the immediate objects and then onto the different forms of instituted collectivities and onto significations dwelling within them. In a manner that has probably become incomprehensible to some “individuals” in modern societies, the savage is his tribe, the fanatic is his Church, the national is his nation, the member of an ethnic minority is this minority—and vice versa.
Obviously, this identification with collectivities also supplies a substitute for the lost omnipotence of the psychical monad. The individual may feel that it participates in the effective power of five thousand, or fifty million, other individuals. “We shall prevail for we are stronger” is a stupidity shared equally on both sides of the front. This identification also has important effects in the suppression of guilt and inhibitions and thus renders possible the frantic deployment of murderous destructiveness in war, but also during crowd movements, as has long been observed. It is as if, in these moments, individuals recover, without knowing it, the certitude that the source of the institution is the anonymous collective, capable of positing new rules and lifting old prohibitions.
Outcomes
There are, as I have said already, two psychical expressions of hate: hate of the other and self-hate. The latter, in general, does not appear as such. But we must understand that both have a common root, the psychical monad’s refusal to accept what is, for it, alien and thus strange: the socialized individual, whose form it has been forced to wear, and social individuals, whose coexistence it is obliged to accept (though their existence is always less real than its own existence for itself, and therefore also much more expendable). This ontological structure of the human being imposes insurmountable constraints on all social organizations, and all political projects, a point which cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to say that such constraints irrevocably rule out all ideas of a “transparent” society and all political projects that would aim at an immediate universal reconciliation and claim to short-circuit the social institution.
During the process of socialization, both dimensions of hate are tamed to a significant degree, at least in their most dramatic forms. This is accomplished, in part, through a permanent diversion of the destructive tendency toward more or less “constructive” social ends: exploitation of nature, various forms of interindividual competition (potlatch, peaceful agonistic activities such as athletic or other types of games, economic and political competition, rivalries over the acquisition of prestige, bureaucratic infighting, etc.), or just banal interhuman malice. In all known societies, all such outlets channel a part—but by no means all—of the “available” hate and destructive energy.
Up to now, however, it seems as if this channelling was possible only if the remaining part of hate and destructiveness was kept, as it were, in a reservoir, ready to be turned, at regular or irregular intervals, into formalized, institutionalized destructive activities against other collectivities—that is, into war. This is not to say that psychical hate is the “cause” of wars: that is not a question we have to discuss here. It is clear that one can find in history numerous wars—from the Germanic or Mongol invasions to the “lace wars” of the eighteenth century, not to mention civil wars—for which hate was not the primary source. Yet hate is certainly not only a necessary but an essential condition for war. I mean by essential condition a condition that maintains an intrinsic relationship with that of which it is the condition. Hate conditions war and expresses itself in war. André Malraux’s statement, “Let victory in this war rest with those who fought it without loving it,” expresses a wish contradicted by the reality of almost all real wars.
Otherwise, one would not understand how millions and millions of people throughout the known history of the human species could be ready, at the drop of a hat, to kill unknown people and be killed by them. And when the resources of this reservoir are not actively mobilized, they manifest themselves rampantly under the guise of contempt, xenophobia, and racism.
Let it be noted here, parenthetically, that psychoanalysts often speak carelessly about the taboo against murder. In truth, what is clearly and exclusively intended by the Freudian myth in Totem and Taboo is intraclan murder only. It is also the only type of murder against which there is a social sanction, whereas murder during wartime or in the course of a vendetta results in glory for the killer.
The fatal conjunction is that the destructive drives of individuals fit admirably well with the near necessity for the institution of the society to close upon itself, to reinforce the position of its own laws, values, rules, and meanings as being uniquely excellent and the only true ones. This takes place through the assertion that the laws, creeds, gods, norms, and customs of the others are inferior, false, wrong, disgusting, abominable, and diabolic. And this, in turn, is in complete harmony with the needs of the identificatory organization of the individual’s psyche. For the latter, what lies beyond the circle of meanings it has so painfully cathected along the road of its socialization is inferior, wrong, and meaningless. And these meanings are, for it, coextensive with the instituted collectivity (and network of collectivities) to which it belongs: clan, tribe, village, nation, religion.
Conflicts among these various poles of reference are of course possible. But, for all we know, they arise much less in archaic environments and much more frequently in more modern ones. What must at any rate clearly be understood as the basis for all the rest is that, as a first approximation and in principle, individuals experience any threat to the paramount instituted collectives to which they belong as more serious than a threat against their own lives.
As was said before, these characteristics can be observed with the greatest intensity and purity in fully closed societies: in archaic and traditional ones, to be sure, but, even more, in modern totalitarian societies. The cardinal fallacy is always: Our norms are good; the good is our norms; their norms are not our norms; therefore, their norms are not good. Likewise: Our God is true; Truth is our God; their God is not our God; therefore, their God is not a true God. It has always seemed almost impossible, for human collectivities, to consider alterity as just that: alterity. In the same guise, it has been almost impossible for them to see the institutions of the others as neither superior nor inferior but simply as other institutions, and in truth, mostly incomparable to their own.
To sum up an argument I have expressed in detail elsewhere, a society’s encounter with the others generally opens up three possible ways of evaluating these others:
They are superior, they are equal, or they are inferior. If they were superior, we would have to renounce our own institutions and adopt theirs. If they were equal, being a Yankee rather than a Crow Indian, a Christian rather than a Pagan, would be a matter of sheer indifference. Both possibilities are intolerable. For, both entail, or seem to entail, that the individual should give up his or her own identificatory bearings, that is, give up, or at least call into question, his or her own identity, so dearly acquired during the socialization process. There remains then the third case: They are inferior. Of course, this overlooks the possibility that the others might be our equals in the sense that our institutions and theirs might be, in an initial overall view, incomparable. It is not hard to understand why the emergence of such a view is historically improbable. It would lead us to accept in the others what for us is abomination, something that is in principle impossible for any religious culture. And even in the case of “nonreligious” cultures, it would sometimes raise questions that are insoluble on a purely theoretical level: what to do, for example, with societies that do not recognize human rights that inflict cruel punishments on their members, or that indulge in practices that in our view are horrific (such as the excision and infibulations of girls)?
Attaining to the idea of a possible incomparability of cultures is possible only for a society in which, whatever the intensity of its adherence to its own institutions, an initial internal fissure has already taken place that makes it possible to distance oneself from the established institution.
This is why the movement toward the recognition of this essential alterity starts at the same time, and with the same deep-seated motivations, as the movement toward a rupture of the closure of meaning—that is, the movement toward calling into question the given institution of society, the end of full heteronomy, the freeing of thoughts and deeds, in sum, the birth of democracy and philosophy.
From that time onward, the idea that the others are neither wicked nor inferior starts to make its way (in Homer, Herodotus, Montaigne, Swift, Montesquieu, and so on). It would be both tempting and encouraging to be able to say that the opening of thought and the partial and relative democratization of political regimes in the West have advanced in step with the decline of chauvinism, xenophobia, and racism. But, even leaving aside the terrifying explosions of xenophobic and racist barbarism in the twentieth century, one could accept such a statement only with many strong qualifications. In particular, it is necessary to reflect upon the extremely virulent revival of nationalism, xenophobia, and racism during the twentieth century in the “civilized” and “democratic” countries. As for the non-Western world, the awful contemporary situation hardly calls for comment.
One must add here again that the enigmatic multiplicity and heterogeneity of the historical forms of institutions defies any simple schema of understanding. Hostility toward strangers covers practically the whole spectrum of possibilities, from immediate murder to the most generous hospitality. Xenia was an institution common to all Greeks, though the Lacedaemonians had instaurated xenelasia, expelling foreigners from Lacedaemon after a minimal stay there. But it must also be noted that this variety of institutions and the goodwill it sometimes expresses concern exclusively foreign individuals, never their institutions as such, and foreigners “passing through,” almost never their settling down. (Multiethnic empires are in a class by themselves for evident reasons. In their case, central authority usually imposes tolerance of alien minorities—which has not prevented, as is well known, pogroms against Jews and massacres inflicted upon the Armenians.)
All that I have said up to now provides an account of the exclusion of the external other. It does not suffice to “explain” why this exclusion can become discrimination, contempt, confinement, and, finally, hatred, rage, and murderous folly. Regarding the extreme forms these behaviours can take, and their acute explosions during specific moments in history, I do not think there can be a general “explanation”: historical accounts alone can really make some sense of the bewildering diversity of the related facts. Yet such an understanding requires in the first place that we recognize and gauge accurately the extraordinary quantity of hatred contained in the psychical reservoir, which the social institution has proved unable or unwilling to divert to other objects.
Nevertheless, one factor can be singled out in relation to the massive explosions of national and racial hate during modern times. The dissolution, in capitalist societies, of almost all bodies of significant intermediate collectivities and thus the disappearance of alternative possibilities of identification for individuals have undoubtedly had the effect of an identificatory retrenchment around the entities “religion,” “nation,” or “race” and thus of a tremendous exacerbation of misoxeny in the broadest sense of the word. The situation is not essentially different in non-European societies, where the shock of invading modernity is most acutely felt and the crushing of traditional identificatory bearings leads to increased religious and/or national fanaticism.
Here is a final remark concerning racism, specifically. It is astonishing that, as far as I know, the main, defining characteristic of racism, immediately visible to the naked eye, has been overlooked by writers on the subject. This is the essential inconvertibility of the other. Any religious fanatic would gladly accept the conversion of the infidels; any “rational” nationalist should rejoice at the annexation of foreign territories and the “assimilation” of their people. Not so the racist. German Jews would have been content—or, at least, most of them would have accepted and demanded—to remain citizens of the Third Reich, but the Nazis would have none of it. And it is precisely because, in the case of racism, the object of hate must remain inconvertible that the racist imaginary has to invoke or to invent the existence of would-be physical (biological)—that is, irreversible—characteristics in the objects of its hate: the colour of the skin and facial traits are the most appropriate support for this hate, for they mark the irreducible strangeness of the object and do away with any risk of confusion with the subject. Hence also the extremely strong repulsion against cross-breading, since it blurs the frontier between the pure and the impure and shows to the racist that little would be needed for himself to be found on the other side of the hate barrier. Finally, we would certainly be justified in attaching this extreme form of hate of the other to the most obscure, solemn and repressed form of hate: self-hate.
Heteronomy and hatred of the other have one common root: the near “need” or “necessity” for the closure of meaning, which arises from the intrinsic tendencies of the institution of society and from the singular psyche’s search for ultimate certainties, and which leads to extremely strong identifications with watertight bodies of belief shared and supported by real collectivities. Autonomy, that is, full democracy, and acceptance of the other are not the natural inclination of humanity. Both face the same tremendous obstacles. We know from history that the fight for democracy has been, up to now, marginally more successful than that against chauvinism, xenophobia, and racism. But for those who are committed to the only reasonably defensible political project, the project of universal freedom, the only way open is to continue this uphill struggle.
Thursday, January 31, 2008
First Institution of Society and Second-Order Institutions
Our topic today is: Is there a theory of the institution? My answer is: Certainly not. There is not, and cannot be, a theory of the institution, for theory is theoria: the gaze that puts us face to face with something and inspects it. We cannot put ourselves face to face with the institution and then inspect it, since the means one would use to do so form a part of the institution. How could I talk about the institution in a language that professes to be rigorous, formalized, or formalizable to an indefinite degree, and so on, when this language itself is an institution, perhaps the first and most important of institutions?
We are speaking {English} here. I am speaking to you in {English} since I have learned {English}, though it happens that my mother tongue is Greek. Neither my {English} nor my Greek, however, is in any way natural. Since people here at the conference seem to be enjoying the jokes the speakers have been making, let us say that I was born in China (I am not even saying that I would be Chinese, but simply born in China). If that were the case, I would be condemned all my life not to know the difference between elections and erections, since l and r are not distinct phonemes in Chinese. Yet it is not just a matter of phonetics. All Greco-Western philosophy and thought, and the theory or theories we construct, owe much to certain grammatical rules characteristic of Indo-European languages—and in particular to that much talked-about verb einai, “to be.” Many languages, very beautiful ones and completely appropriate to the societies to which they belong, do not include the verb “to be.” And if the peoples who speak these languages undertook to constitute a fundamental philosophy, they would not call it “ontology.” Thus, I can elucidate my relation to language, but I cannot abstract myself from it and “look at” it, nor can I “construct” it from the outside. I cannot make a “theory” out of the institution, for I am on the inside. Indeed, not even this statement goes far enough. Abstracting, for a moment, from a limit point —a point I try to approach with the patient on the couch, or by myself with the aid, perhaps, of a dream—abstracting from this limit point, which is situated almost at infinity, I am a walking fragment of the institution of society, as we all are such walking fragments, each one complementary to the others. Talking bipeds, one might say.
Bipeds, for this reminds us of our biological nature, or, rather, our leaning on our biology. And talking, for that certainly reminds us once again of this leaning on, these biological underpinnings of ours, since to be able to speak one must have vocal cords, and so forth, a central nervous system organized in a certain fashion—but one must also have language as social institution. This is not the time or the place to enter into the interminable discussion that began in Greece in the fifth century B.C.E. concerning the “natural”—physei—or conventional/ instituted—nomo—character of language, which was taken up again a few decades ago, first with structural linguistics, then with Chomsky’s views and the search for universals or invariant structures extending across the different languages people speak.
One thing is certain. An enormous part, the most important part, of language, the part that concerns the significations it conveys—its semantics—does not correspond in a univocal manner to the central nervous system of homo sapiens since, if it did, all languages would be strictly isomorphic, and one would be able to pass from one to another by means of uniform, rule-governed transformations with neither loss nor gain. Now, we know there is no exact or “perfect” translation, strictly speaking, of a text into any tongue other than its original (besides the trivial case in which the text in question is merely a series of mathematical symbols). As Roman Jakobson said, “genuine” translation is always poetic re-creation. There is therefore a deep-seated dependence, in respect to language, between what I think and what I say. And this is only one example of the prevalence, indeed the penetration through and through, in each one of us, of what is instituted in our native society.
Can one then say, as has just been said, that theory is “calling the institution into question”? First, we must once again eliminate from this discussion the term theory, in its commonly accepted sense. Next, we must note that “calling the institution into question” through reflection upon it or the attempt to elucidate the institution occurs only by way of an exception in the history of humanity, and only in one line of societies: the European or Greco-Western. There is no ethnocentrism in this—and still less any privilege, political or otherwise, that would thus be conferred upon us; it is just an acknowledgment that “calling the institution into question” implies an enormous historical rupture—and that, as far as we know, this rupture has not occurred among the Nambikwara or the Bamileke.
We encounter this rupture only twice in the history of humanity: in ancient Greece for the first time, then in Western Europe beginning at the end of the High Middle Ages. This rupture implies that these same individuals who have been fabricated by society, who are its walking fragments, have been able to change themselves essentially; they have been able to create for themselves the means to challenge and to call into question the institutions they have inherited, the institutions of the society that had raised them—which obviously goes hand in hand with an essential change in the entire instituted social field. And this is expressed both by the birth of a public political space and by the creation of free inquiry, of unlimited interrogation. The possibility of having a thought about the institution, of elucidating it, exists only from the moment when—in deeds as well as in discourse —the institution is called into question. This is the birth of democracy and philosophy, which go hand in hand. People stand up and say, “The representations of the tribe are false.”
They try to think the world and man in the world in a different way. And people stand up and say, “The established power is unjust, the instituted laws are unjust, we must instaurate other ones.” These two positions are profoundly interrelated [solidaires]. What does it mean that the established power is unjust? Who gives you the right to say that? And do you want simply to put another, equally unjust power in its place, or are you claiming to instaurate a just power? But what is a just power—what is justice? On the other hand, you are destroying the tribe’s representations, you are trying to put something else in their place, therefore you are claiming that this other thing is true—and thus that you know what is true; but, what is truth?
We see already that although the institution is a fundamental fact of humanity’s history, and indeed one of the two elements that humanize man—the other being the radical imagination—one cannot talk in the same way about all institutions in history, for in a predemocratic and prephilosophic society the possibility of challenging and questioning the institution quite simply does not exist. Individuals do not know that the gods of the tribe are institutions. They do not know it, and they cannot know it. To be brief, I take one of the clearest and most well-known cases: for the Hebrews, the Law is not a law of the tribe; it has been formulated by the Lord Himself and given by Him in person. How could you call this Law in question? How could you mean that God’s Law is unjust, when Justice is defined as the will of God? How could you say that God does not exist, when God provides His own self-definition: Ego eimi ho on, I am (the one who) is, I am being (I avoid here the quarrel over the proper translation of the original Hebrew text). What do you mean by God does not exist when, in the language of the tribe, that would mean being does not exist?
In the overwhelming majority of societies—the ones I call heteronomous—on the one hand, the institution asserts on its own that it is not the work of man; on the other hand, the individuals belonging to these societies are raised, trained, and fabricated in such a way that they are, so to speak, resorbed by the institution of society. No one can assert ideas or express a will or desire opposed to the instituted order, and this is so not because they would be subject to sanctions but because each person is, anthropologically speaking, fabricated this way; everyone has internalized the institution of society to such an extent that one does not have at one’s disposal the psychical and mental means to challenge this institution. And what changes—with ancient Greece, on the one hand, and postmedieval Europe, on the other—is that the institution of society renders possible the creation of individuals who no longer see therein anything untouchable but succeed rather in calling the institution into question, be it in words, be it in deeds, be it through both at once. We thus come to the first rough historical sketch of what I call the project of social autonomy and of individual autonomy.
But what does “autonomy” signify? Autos: oneself; nomos: law. The person who gives herself her own laws is autonomous. (Not, The person who does whatever comes into her head, but rather, The person who gives herself laws.) Now, that is immensely difficult. For an individual, to give oneself one’s own law, within the fields in which this is possible, requires the ability to hold one’s own in the face of all conventions, beliefs, fashion, learned people who maintain absurd ideas, the media, the silence of the public, and so forth. And for a society, to give itself its own law means to accept at bottom the idea that it is creating its own institution and that it creates that institution without being able to invoke any extrasocial foundation, any norm of norms, any measure of its measures. This therefore boils down to saying that such a society should itself decide what is just and unjust—and this is the question with which true politics deals (we are obviously not talking here about the politics of the politicians who occupy the stage today).
Society cannot exist without institution, without law—and it must decide itself what is law without recourse (except illusorily) to an extrasocial source or foundation. Both aspects are there in the ancient Greek word nomos: nomos is that which is particular to each society or to each ethnic group; it is its institution/ convention, that which is opposed to the “natural” (and immutable) order of things, to physis; and at the same time nomos is law, that without which human beings cannot exist as human beings, since there is no city, no polis, without laws, and there are no human beings outside the polis, the city, the political collectivity/community. When Aristotle says that outside the polis man cannot be but a savage beast or a god,1 he knows and he says that the human being is humanized only in and through the polis—an idea, moreover, that returns again and again among the ancient Greek poets, historians, and philosophers.
There are therefore these two sides to nomos, to the law: it is, each time, the institution/convention of some particular society; and it is, at the same time, the transhistorical requisite for there to be society—that is to say, whatever the content of its particular nomos, no society can exist without a nomos. Without this double understanding (that we cannot exist without nomos, but also that this nomos is our institution, our work), there can be no democracy. For, of course, democracy does not signify simply “human rights” or habeas corpus. That is only a derivative (which does not mean minor or secondary) aspect of democracy. Democracy signifies the power of the people; in other words, it means that the people make their own laws—and to make them they must be convinced, as a matter of fact, that the laws are the making of human beings. But at the same time this implies that no extrasocial standard for their laws exists—and this is the tragic dimension of democracy, for it is also its dimension of radical freedom: democracy is the regime of self-limitation.
Let us return to this very idea of institution. The term, indeed, is polysemous, and this polysemy creates a feeling of malaise, for, as has been said, “all is institution.” Surely, we should distinguish the levels at which we situate ourselves when we speak of institution. To begin with, we do not mean, of course, the social security system or mental health clinics. We mean first and foremost language, religion, power; we mean what the individual is in a given society. We even intend here man and woman, who clearly are institutions, too: the non-instituted facets of man and woman are their biological underpinnings, their leaning on—Anlehnung, to borrow Freud’s term—the existence of a sexed, anatomico-physiological bodily constitution. But being-a-man and being-a-woman are defined one way in our society, were defined another way in ancient Greece, and are defined otherwise in some African or Amerindian tribe.
The same goes for being-a-child. Childhood as such quite obviously has a biological dimension; and being-a-child is an institution that has a transhistorical form in the sense that every society must give some kind of instituted status to children. At the same time, however, this institution is profoundly historical; what being-a-child signifies concretely in each particular society changes the total institution of that society: being-a-child is one thing for the child under the Ancient Regime and another for children today with their electronic games, television sets, and all that these gadgets presuppose and entail. Let us note in passing that this signification {of childhood} today seems in danger of dissolving, for no one seems to know any longer what a child is supposed to do and not do. Similarly, people seem to know less and less in what sense and under what form men are men and women are women. The radical—and fully justified—questioning of the traditional status of women has both left completely up in the air the social (and psychical) signification of being-a-woman and, thereby and ipso facto, called back into question the social and psychical status of being-a-man, since these are but two inseparable poles of signification. What are the behaviours, signs, and emblems of virility and femininity today? Does being-a-woman mean, as it did in my grandmother’s time, having fourteen successful pregnancies, or does it mean measuring twenty-four inches around your hips?
Here I insert a parenthesis relating to a question that was raised a few moments ago: How do institutions die? Someone said: The birth of institutions raises an easily answered question; what is difficult to comprehend is the disappearance of institutions. Hearing this, I smiled to myself, for to say that the birth of language, of philosophy, and so on raises an easily answered question is quite a surprising statement. What is interesting is that the speaker took a position opposite to the one traditionally taken in philosophy. In the traditional philosophical view, as well as in popular preconceptions, what goes without saying and demands almost no explanation is that things end, become corrupt, die, pass away. What is scandalous is creation; therefore, creation does not exist, except as a divine act accomplished once and for all at the beginning of time. The idea that the history of humanity might be a continuous creation—which is obvious—is strictly unthinkable within inherited thought.
By way of contrast, the fact that institutions and regimes may disappear seems to raise for people nothing but soluble problems. But in truth the two questions, the two enigmas, are perfectly symmetrical. The death of forms raises a problem that is just as formidable as is their emergence. How does it happen that “at a given moment,” as one says, in ancient Greece the idea of the polis (what I call the social imaginary signification polis), the city as community/collectivity of citizens responsible for their laws, their acts, their fate, and everything else that goes along with this signification, emerges? All functionalist, economic, “historical-materialist,” and even psychoanalytic “explanations” are just plain impotent (and in truth appear absurd) in the face of this very emergence. But they are also impotent before the fact that, starting from “another moment,” that which had held the polis together disintegrated, decayed, and disappeared.
How does it happen that, once again, at the end of the Middle Ages, in the interstices of the feudal world, communities that wanted to be self-governed collectivities were reconstituted—new cities or bourgeois communes, in which a protobourgeoisie (long before any idea or real existence of capitalism!) created the first seeds of modern democratic and emancipatory movements? And how is it that today most of the imaginary significations that were holding this society together seem to be vanishing, without anything else being put in their place? There is no way to get around these two questions, and no theory gives us an “answer” to them.
The institution of the overwhelming majority of known societies has been heteronomous, in the sense specified above. In two historical societies, of which ours is one, the seeds of autonomy have been created. These seeds are still alive and are represented in certain aspects of formal institutions, but above all they are embodied in the individuals fabricated by these societies—you, me, and others—to the extent that these individuals are still capable —at least one hopes—of standing up and saying, This law is unjust, or, The institution of society must be changed. If there is a genuine politics today, it is one that tries to preserve and to foster these seeds of autonomy. And if psychoanalytic practice has a political meaning, it is solely to the extent that it tries, as far as it possibly can, to render the individual autonomous, that is to say, lucid concerning her desire and concerning reality, and responsible for her acts: holding herself accountable for what she does.
As I said above, the mark of man’s humanization is, on the one hand, the institution. Why is there the institution? An enormous question—and at the same time absurd: Why is there something rather than nothing? But we must raise it to show the absurdity of a stupid and superannuated discourse that is still a stupid discourse even if it is held by Nobel Prize winners in Economics.
This discourse posits that society is made up of an assemblage or combination of “individuals.” But where do we get these “individuals”? Do they grow wil?
The individual is a fabrication of society; and what I know as a psychoanalyst is that what is not social in the “individual” would not only be incapable of “composing” a society but is radically and violently asocial. What is not social in the “individual,” what is in the depths of the human psyche, is assuredly not what has been called desire over these last few years. When one speaks of desire, one always means something that can, in one way or another, at least become articulated—thus presupposing that a series of separations has already been carried out. The core of the psyche, however, is a psychical monad characterized by the pure or radical imagination, which is completely undifferentiated at the outset. The emergence of the human species as a living species is characterized by the appearance of this congenital malignant growth—this psychical cancer, if you will—that is, the imagination developed out of all proportion, the imagination gone “mad,” the imagination that has broken with all “functional” subservience. This leads to the human trait, unique among all living species, whereby organ pleasure is replaced by representational pleasure. (Even for the socialized and fully developed human individual, the prevalence of representational pleasure over organ pleasure is manifest and overwhelming; otherwise, no one would be capable of going off and getting killed in a war, phantasying would not be an essential prerequisite to sexual pleasure, and so forth).
There is, therefore, defunctionalization of representation and defunctionalization of pleasure; for a human being, pleasure is no longer simply, as it is for the animal, a sign indicating what is to be sought and what is to be avoided but has become an end in itself, even when it is against the preservation of the individual and/or the species. Man is therefore not simply, as Hegel said, a sick animal; man is a mad animal, an animal radically unfit for life. Man survives only by creating society, social imaginary significations and the institutions that convey and embody these significations. Society—the institution —is there not only to “contain the violence” of the individual human being, as Hobbes believed and as the Sophists of the fifth century B.C.E. had already said; nor is it even there just to “repress one’s drives,” as Freud thought. Society is there to humanize this little wailing monster that comes into the world, making it fit for life. To do this, it must inflict a rupture in the psychical monad; it must impose upon it something that, from start to finish and in its very depths, the psyche rejects: the recognition that “omnipotence of thought” exists only on the level of phantasy, that outside the self there are other human beings, that the world is organized in a certain way (the work, each time, of the institution of society), that the obtainment of “real” pleasure must be instrumented through a series of mediations, themselves “real” in character and in themselves, most of the time, rather disagreeable, and so on.
Thus, the institution of society must each time insert into the “real” and collective life of society, by means of a radical violence inflicted upon the psychical monad, this egocentric being that brings everything back to itself and is capable of living almost indefinitely in the pure pleasure of representation. Doing this, the institution destroys that which, at the beginning, was meaningful for the psyche and gave meaning to it (self-closure, the pure pleasure of “solipsistic” representation)—and in compensation, so to speak, it furnishes the psyche with another source of meaning: the social imaginary signification. In becoming socialized—in becoming a social individual—the psyche internalizes these significations and “learns” that the true “meaning of life” is to be found elsewhere: in the fact that one has the esteem of the clan or the hope of being able to rest one day with Abraham in the bosom of God; or that one is kalos kagathos and attends to one’s kleos and kudos or is a saint; or that one accumulates wealth or develops the forces of production or “builds socialism,” and so on. We see here again the human species’ capacity to substitute representational pleasure for organ pleasure; representation is here the subjective side of the social imaginary significations conveyed by the institution. The institution therefore furnishes, from then on, “meaning” to socialized individuals. But it also furnishes them with the means to make this meaning exist for themselves, and it does so by restoring at the social level an instrumental or functional logic that no doubt existed, in another manner, on the animal level but that has been fractured in man by the unfettered development of the imagination. Once instrumented in and through this logic, the radical imagination of a singular human being can henceforth become a source of creation on the collective and “real” level. A phantasm remains a phantasm for a singular psyche, but an artist, a poet, a musician, a painter does not produce phantasms; he or she creates works. What his or her imagination engenders acquires a “real”—that is to say, social-historical—existence by utilizing an innumerable quantity of means and elements—and, to begin with, language—that the artist could never have created “all by himself.”
These are some of the elements that define what I call the first institution of society; the first institution is the fact that society itself creates itself as society and creates itself each time by giving itself institutions animated by social imaginary significations specific to that society: specific to Egyptian society at the time of the Pharaohs, to Hebrew society, to {ancient} Greek society, to French or American society today, and so on. And this first institution is articulated and instrumented through second order (which in no way means “secondary”) institutions. Such second-order institutions may be divided into two categories. There are those that are, in the abstract and in their form, transhistorical. Among these, for example, are: language (each tongue is different, but there is no society without language); the individual (the type of individual {a society fabricates} is, concretely speaking, different in each society, but there is no society that fails to institute any type of individual whatsoever); the family (the specific organization and “content” of the family are other each time the family is instituted, but no society can fail to assure the reproduction and socialization of the next generation, and the institution charged with accomplishing this task is the family, whatever its form—baby factories in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World are families in this sense). And there are second-order institutions that are specific to given societies and play an absolutely essential role therein, in the sense that what is of vital importance for the institution of the society under consideration (its social imaginary significations) is conveyed essentially by its specific institutions.
Let us take two clear examples. The Greek polis is a specific second-order institution, without which the ancient Greek world is impossible and inconceivable. The capitalist business enterprise is also such a specific second order institution. There is no capitalism without the business enterprise—and there really is not what we intend here by business enterprise in the societies that preceded capitalism: this institution that conveys a signification, this set [ensemble] of arrangements and rules that brings together a large number of people, compels them to use certain tools and machines, supervises their labour and organizes it hierarchically, and has as its end limitless self-enlargement. This institution and its signification are a creation of capitalism, and it is only through this creation that capitalism can exist. When woven together, these second-order institutions—those that are transhistorical and those that are specific to the society under consideration—provide each time the concrete texture of that society.
Let me end with two remarks concerning practice, since all of you, like myself, work with certain ultimate facts pertaining to social reality and since I presume that for you, as for me, not everything is at it should be or as we would like it to be, despite the fact that polls claim to show that 80 percent or more of the French people are, or report themselves to be, “happy.” The first remark concerns the essential inseparableness, the enormous interdependence among various institutions, of all different orders, within a given society. For a few years one has had a tendency to forget this interconnectedness of institutions, or one avoids talking about it, usually with the excuse that we must not consider society as a whole or the totality of society, because we would risk sliding toward totalitarianism. This is obviously absurd; a society is an extremely complex totality, and its different “parts” hold together in a thousand ways. It is by no means sure, for example, that with the dislocation of the traditional significations and roles of man and woman in contemporary Western society, the rest of the system will be able simply to continue to function as if nothing had happened. This even shows the incoherency of all policies that seriously profess to be “reformist” and nothing but “reformist”; for, such a politics boils down to a desire to modify a few pieces in a system without worrying about—and without even being conscious of—the effects these modifications will have on the remainder of society.
The second remark concerns a danger that is the reverse of the first one, its symmetrical opposite. This would be to tell oneself, having taken precisely this preceding remark into account that nothing can be done — or else that one’s work can consist only in aiming immediately at a radical transformation of society. As it turns out, however, a radical transformation of society, if such is possible—and I deeply believe it is—will be possible only as the work of individuals who will their autonomy, on the scale of society as well as on the individual level. Consequently, to work for preserving and enlarging the possibilities of autonomy and autonomous action, as well as to work for aiding in the formation of individuals who aspire to autonomy and for increasing their number, is already to do political work, a work whose effects are more important and more lasting than certain kinds of sterile and superficial agitation.
We are speaking {English} here. I am speaking to you in {English} since I have learned {English}, though it happens that my mother tongue is Greek. Neither my {English} nor my Greek, however, is in any way natural. Since people here at the conference seem to be enjoying the jokes the speakers have been making, let us say that I was born in China (I am not even saying that I would be Chinese, but simply born in China). If that were the case, I would be condemned all my life not to know the difference between elections and erections, since l and r are not distinct phonemes in Chinese. Yet it is not just a matter of phonetics. All Greco-Western philosophy and thought, and the theory or theories we construct, owe much to certain grammatical rules characteristic of Indo-European languages—and in particular to that much talked-about verb einai, “to be.” Many languages, very beautiful ones and completely appropriate to the societies to which they belong, do not include the verb “to be.” And if the peoples who speak these languages undertook to constitute a fundamental philosophy, they would not call it “ontology.” Thus, I can elucidate my relation to language, but I cannot abstract myself from it and “look at” it, nor can I “construct” it from the outside. I cannot make a “theory” out of the institution, for I am on the inside. Indeed, not even this statement goes far enough. Abstracting, for a moment, from a limit point —a point I try to approach with the patient on the couch, or by myself with the aid, perhaps, of a dream—abstracting from this limit point, which is situated almost at infinity, I am a walking fragment of the institution of society, as we all are such walking fragments, each one complementary to the others. Talking bipeds, one might say.
Bipeds, for this reminds us of our biological nature, or, rather, our leaning on our biology. And talking, for that certainly reminds us once again of this leaning on, these biological underpinnings of ours, since to be able to speak one must have vocal cords, and so forth, a central nervous system organized in a certain fashion—but one must also have language as social institution. This is not the time or the place to enter into the interminable discussion that began in Greece in the fifth century B.C.E. concerning the “natural”—physei—or conventional/ instituted—nomo—character of language, which was taken up again a few decades ago, first with structural linguistics, then with Chomsky’s views and the search for universals or invariant structures extending across the different languages people speak.
One thing is certain. An enormous part, the most important part, of language, the part that concerns the significations it conveys—its semantics—does not correspond in a univocal manner to the central nervous system of homo sapiens since, if it did, all languages would be strictly isomorphic, and one would be able to pass from one to another by means of uniform, rule-governed transformations with neither loss nor gain. Now, we know there is no exact or “perfect” translation, strictly speaking, of a text into any tongue other than its original (besides the trivial case in which the text in question is merely a series of mathematical symbols). As Roman Jakobson said, “genuine” translation is always poetic re-creation. There is therefore a deep-seated dependence, in respect to language, between what I think and what I say. And this is only one example of the prevalence, indeed the penetration through and through, in each one of us, of what is instituted in our native society.
Can one then say, as has just been said, that theory is “calling the institution into question”? First, we must once again eliminate from this discussion the term theory, in its commonly accepted sense. Next, we must note that “calling the institution into question” through reflection upon it or the attempt to elucidate the institution occurs only by way of an exception in the history of humanity, and only in one line of societies: the European or Greco-Western. There is no ethnocentrism in this—and still less any privilege, political or otherwise, that would thus be conferred upon us; it is just an acknowledgment that “calling the institution into question” implies an enormous historical rupture—and that, as far as we know, this rupture has not occurred among the Nambikwara or the Bamileke.
We encounter this rupture only twice in the history of humanity: in ancient Greece for the first time, then in Western Europe beginning at the end of the High Middle Ages. This rupture implies that these same individuals who have been fabricated by society, who are its walking fragments, have been able to change themselves essentially; they have been able to create for themselves the means to challenge and to call into question the institutions they have inherited, the institutions of the society that had raised them—which obviously goes hand in hand with an essential change in the entire instituted social field. And this is expressed both by the birth of a public political space and by the creation of free inquiry, of unlimited interrogation. The possibility of having a thought about the institution, of elucidating it, exists only from the moment when—in deeds as well as in discourse —the institution is called into question. This is the birth of democracy and philosophy, which go hand in hand. People stand up and say, “The representations of the tribe are false.”
They try to think the world and man in the world in a different way. And people stand up and say, “The established power is unjust, the instituted laws are unjust, we must instaurate other ones.” These two positions are profoundly interrelated [solidaires]. What does it mean that the established power is unjust? Who gives you the right to say that? And do you want simply to put another, equally unjust power in its place, or are you claiming to instaurate a just power? But what is a just power—what is justice? On the other hand, you are destroying the tribe’s representations, you are trying to put something else in their place, therefore you are claiming that this other thing is true—and thus that you know what is true; but, what is truth?
We see already that although the institution is a fundamental fact of humanity’s history, and indeed one of the two elements that humanize man—the other being the radical imagination—one cannot talk in the same way about all institutions in history, for in a predemocratic and prephilosophic society the possibility of challenging and questioning the institution quite simply does not exist. Individuals do not know that the gods of the tribe are institutions. They do not know it, and they cannot know it. To be brief, I take one of the clearest and most well-known cases: for the Hebrews, the Law is not a law of the tribe; it has been formulated by the Lord Himself and given by Him in person. How could you call this Law in question? How could you mean that God’s Law is unjust, when Justice is defined as the will of God? How could you say that God does not exist, when God provides His own self-definition: Ego eimi ho on, I am (the one who) is, I am being (I avoid here the quarrel over the proper translation of the original Hebrew text). What do you mean by God does not exist when, in the language of the tribe, that would mean being does not exist?
In the overwhelming majority of societies—the ones I call heteronomous—on the one hand, the institution asserts on its own that it is not the work of man; on the other hand, the individuals belonging to these societies are raised, trained, and fabricated in such a way that they are, so to speak, resorbed by the institution of society. No one can assert ideas or express a will or desire opposed to the instituted order, and this is so not because they would be subject to sanctions but because each person is, anthropologically speaking, fabricated this way; everyone has internalized the institution of society to such an extent that one does not have at one’s disposal the psychical and mental means to challenge this institution. And what changes—with ancient Greece, on the one hand, and postmedieval Europe, on the other—is that the institution of society renders possible the creation of individuals who no longer see therein anything untouchable but succeed rather in calling the institution into question, be it in words, be it in deeds, be it through both at once. We thus come to the first rough historical sketch of what I call the project of social autonomy and of individual autonomy.
But what does “autonomy” signify? Autos: oneself; nomos: law. The person who gives herself her own laws is autonomous. (Not, The person who does whatever comes into her head, but rather, The person who gives herself laws.) Now, that is immensely difficult. For an individual, to give oneself one’s own law, within the fields in which this is possible, requires the ability to hold one’s own in the face of all conventions, beliefs, fashion, learned people who maintain absurd ideas, the media, the silence of the public, and so forth. And for a society, to give itself its own law means to accept at bottom the idea that it is creating its own institution and that it creates that institution without being able to invoke any extrasocial foundation, any norm of norms, any measure of its measures. This therefore boils down to saying that such a society should itself decide what is just and unjust—and this is the question with which true politics deals (we are obviously not talking here about the politics of the politicians who occupy the stage today).
Society cannot exist without institution, without law—and it must decide itself what is law without recourse (except illusorily) to an extrasocial source or foundation. Both aspects are there in the ancient Greek word nomos: nomos is that which is particular to each society or to each ethnic group; it is its institution/ convention, that which is opposed to the “natural” (and immutable) order of things, to physis; and at the same time nomos is law, that without which human beings cannot exist as human beings, since there is no city, no polis, without laws, and there are no human beings outside the polis, the city, the political collectivity/community. When Aristotle says that outside the polis man cannot be but a savage beast or a god,1 he knows and he says that the human being is humanized only in and through the polis—an idea, moreover, that returns again and again among the ancient Greek poets, historians, and philosophers.
There are therefore these two sides to nomos, to the law: it is, each time, the institution/convention of some particular society; and it is, at the same time, the transhistorical requisite for there to be society—that is to say, whatever the content of its particular nomos, no society can exist without a nomos. Without this double understanding (that we cannot exist without nomos, but also that this nomos is our institution, our work), there can be no democracy. For, of course, democracy does not signify simply “human rights” or habeas corpus. That is only a derivative (which does not mean minor or secondary) aspect of democracy. Democracy signifies the power of the people; in other words, it means that the people make their own laws—and to make them they must be convinced, as a matter of fact, that the laws are the making of human beings. But at the same time this implies that no extrasocial standard for their laws exists—and this is the tragic dimension of democracy, for it is also its dimension of radical freedom: democracy is the regime of self-limitation.
Let us return to this very idea of institution. The term, indeed, is polysemous, and this polysemy creates a feeling of malaise, for, as has been said, “all is institution.” Surely, we should distinguish the levels at which we situate ourselves when we speak of institution. To begin with, we do not mean, of course, the social security system or mental health clinics. We mean first and foremost language, religion, power; we mean what the individual is in a given society. We even intend here man and woman, who clearly are institutions, too: the non-instituted facets of man and woman are their biological underpinnings, their leaning on—Anlehnung, to borrow Freud’s term—the existence of a sexed, anatomico-physiological bodily constitution. But being-a-man and being-a-woman are defined one way in our society, were defined another way in ancient Greece, and are defined otherwise in some African or Amerindian tribe.
The same goes for being-a-child. Childhood as such quite obviously has a biological dimension; and being-a-child is an institution that has a transhistorical form in the sense that every society must give some kind of instituted status to children. At the same time, however, this institution is profoundly historical; what being-a-child signifies concretely in each particular society changes the total institution of that society: being-a-child is one thing for the child under the Ancient Regime and another for children today with their electronic games, television sets, and all that these gadgets presuppose and entail. Let us note in passing that this signification {of childhood} today seems in danger of dissolving, for no one seems to know any longer what a child is supposed to do and not do. Similarly, people seem to know less and less in what sense and under what form men are men and women are women. The radical—and fully justified—questioning of the traditional status of women has both left completely up in the air the social (and psychical) signification of being-a-woman and, thereby and ipso facto, called back into question the social and psychical status of being-a-man, since these are but two inseparable poles of signification. What are the behaviours, signs, and emblems of virility and femininity today? Does being-a-woman mean, as it did in my grandmother’s time, having fourteen successful pregnancies, or does it mean measuring twenty-four inches around your hips?
Here I insert a parenthesis relating to a question that was raised a few moments ago: How do institutions die? Someone said: The birth of institutions raises an easily answered question; what is difficult to comprehend is the disappearance of institutions. Hearing this, I smiled to myself, for to say that the birth of language, of philosophy, and so on raises an easily answered question is quite a surprising statement. What is interesting is that the speaker took a position opposite to the one traditionally taken in philosophy. In the traditional philosophical view, as well as in popular preconceptions, what goes without saying and demands almost no explanation is that things end, become corrupt, die, pass away. What is scandalous is creation; therefore, creation does not exist, except as a divine act accomplished once and for all at the beginning of time. The idea that the history of humanity might be a continuous creation—which is obvious—is strictly unthinkable within inherited thought.
By way of contrast, the fact that institutions and regimes may disappear seems to raise for people nothing but soluble problems. But in truth the two questions, the two enigmas, are perfectly symmetrical. The death of forms raises a problem that is just as formidable as is their emergence. How does it happen that “at a given moment,” as one says, in ancient Greece the idea of the polis (what I call the social imaginary signification polis), the city as community/collectivity of citizens responsible for their laws, their acts, their fate, and everything else that goes along with this signification, emerges? All functionalist, economic, “historical-materialist,” and even psychoanalytic “explanations” are just plain impotent (and in truth appear absurd) in the face of this very emergence. But they are also impotent before the fact that, starting from “another moment,” that which had held the polis together disintegrated, decayed, and disappeared.
How does it happen that, once again, at the end of the Middle Ages, in the interstices of the feudal world, communities that wanted to be self-governed collectivities were reconstituted—new cities or bourgeois communes, in which a protobourgeoisie (long before any idea or real existence of capitalism!) created the first seeds of modern democratic and emancipatory movements? And how is it that today most of the imaginary significations that were holding this society together seem to be vanishing, without anything else being put in their place? There is no way to get around these two questions, and no theory gives us an “answer” to them.
The institution of the overwhelming majority of known societies has been heteronomous, in the sense specified above. In two historical societies, of which ours is one, the seeds of autonomy have been created. These seeds are still alive and are represented in certain aspects of formal institutions, but above all they are embodied in the individuals fabricated by these societies—you, me, and others—to the extent that these individuals are still capable —at least one hopes—of standing up and saying, This law is unjust, or, The institution of society must be changed. If there is a genuine politics today, it is one that tries to preserve and to foster these seeds of autonomy. And if psychoanalytic practice has a political meaning, it is solely to the extent that it tries, as far as it possibly can, to render the individual autonomous, that is to say, lucid concerning her desire and concerning reality, and responsible for her acts: holding herself accountable for what she does.
As I said above, the mark of man’s humanization is, on the one hand, the institution. Why is there the institution? An enormous question—and at the same time absurd: Why is there something rather than nothing? But we must raise it to show the absurdity of a stupid and superannuated discourse that is still a stupid discourse even if it is held by Nobel Prize winners in Economics.
This discourse posits that society is made up of an assemblage or combination of “individuals.” But where do we get these “individuals”? Do they grow wil?
The individual is a fabrication of society; and what I know as a psychoanalyst is that what is not social in the “individual” would not only be incapable of “composing” a society but is radically and violently asocial. What is not social in the “individual,” what is in the depths of the human psyche, is assuredly not what has been called desire over these last few years. When one speaks of desire, one always means something that can, in one way or another, at least become articulated—thus presupposing that a series of separations has already been carried out. The core of the psyche, however, is a psychical monad characterized by the pure or radical imagination, which is completely undifferentiated at the outset. The emergence of the human species as a living species is characterized by the appearance of this congenital malignant growth—this psychical cancer, if you will—that is, the imagination developed out of all proportion, the imagination gone “mad,” the imagination that has broken with all “functional” subservience. This leads to the human trait, unique among all living species, whereby organ pleasure is replaced by representational pleasure. (Even for the socialized and fully developed human individual, the prevalence of representational pleasure over organ pleasure is manifest and overwhelming; otherwise, no one would be capable of going off and getting killed in a war, phantasying would not be an essential prerequisite to sexual pleasure, and so forth).
There is, therefore, defunctionalization of representation and defunctionalization of pleasure; for a human being, pleasure is no longer simply, as it is for the animal, a sign indicating what is to be sought and what is to be avoided but has become an end in itself, even when it is against the preservation of the individual and/or the species. Man is therefore not simply, as Hegel said, a sick animal; man is a mad animal, an animal radically unfit for life. Man survives only by creating society, social imaginary significations and the institutions that convey and embody these significations. Society—the institution —is there not only to “contain the violence” of the individual human being, as Hobbes believed and as the Sophists of the fifth century B.C.E. had already said; nor is it even there just to “repress one’s drives,” as Freud thought. Society is there to humanize this little wailing monster that comes into the world, making it fit for life. To do this, it must inflict a rupture in the psychical monad; it must impose upon it something that, from start to finish and in its very depths, the psyche rejects: the recognition that “omnipotence of thought” exists only on the level of phantasy, that outside the self there are other human beings, that the world is organized in a certain way (the work, each time, of the institution of society), that the obtainment of “real” pleasure must be instrumented through a series of mediations, themselves “real” in character and in themselves, most of the time, rather disagreeable, and so on.
Thus, the institution of society must each time insert into the “real” and collective life of society, by means of a radical violence inflicted upon the psychical monad, this egocentric being that brings everything back to itself and is capable of living almost indefinitely in the pure pleasure of representation. Doing this, the institution destroys that which, at the beginning, was meaningful for the psyche and gave meaning to it (self-closure, the pure pleasure of “solipsistic” representation)—and in compensation, so to speak, it furnishes the psyche with another source of meaning: the social imaginary signification. In becoming socialized—in becoming a social individual—the psyche internalizes these significations and “learns” that the true “meaning of life” is to be found elsewhere: in the fact that one has the esteem of the clan or the hope of being able to rest one day with Abraham in the bosom of God; or that one is kalos kagathos and attends to one’s kleos and kudos or is a saint; or that one accumulates wealth or develops the forces of production or “builds socialism,” and so on. We see here again the human species’ capacity to substitute representational pleasure for organ pleasure; representation is here the subjective side of the social imaginary significations conveyed by the institution. The institution therefore furnishes, from then on, “meaning” to socialized individuals. But it also furnishes them with the means to make this meaning exist for themselves, and it does so by restoring at the social level an instrumental or functional logic that no doubt existed, in another manner, on the animal level but that has been fractured in man by the unfettered development of the imagination. Once instrumented in and through this logic, the radical imagination of a singular human being can henceforth become a source of creation on the collective and “real” level. A phantasm remains a phantasm for a singular psyche, but an artist, a poet, a musician, a painter does not produce phantasms; he or she creates works. What his or her imagination engenders acquires a “real”—that is to say, social-historical—existence by utilizing an innumerable quantity of means and elements—and, to begin with, language—that the artist could never have created “all by himself.”
These are some of the elements that define what I call the first institution of society; the first institution is the fact that society itself creates itself as society and creates itself each time by giving itself institutions animated by social imaginary significations specific to that society: specific to Egyptian society at the time of the Pharaohs, to Hebrew society, to {ancient} Greek society, to French or American society today, and so on. And this first institution is articulated and instrumented through second order (which in no way means “secondary”) institutions. Such second-order institutions may be divided into two categories. There are those that are, in the abstract and in their form, transhistorical. Among these, for example, are: language (each tongue is different, but there is no society without language); the individual (the type of individual {a society fabricates} is, concretely speaking, different in each society, but there is no society that fails to institute any type of individual whatsoever); the family (the specific organization and “content” of the family are other each time the family is instituted, but no society can fail to assure the reproduction and socialization of the next generation, and the institution charged with accomplishing this task is the family, whatever its form—baby factories in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World are families in this sense). And there are second-order institutions that are specific to given societies and play an absolutely essential role therein, in the sense that what is of vital importance for the institution of the society under consideration (its social imaginary significations) is conveyed essentially by its specific institutions.
Let us take two clear examples. The Greek polis is a specific second-order institution, without which the ancient Greek world is impossible and inconceivable. The capitalist business enterprise is also such a specific second order institution. There is no capitalism without the business enterprise—and there really is not what we intend here by business enterprise in the societies that preceded capitalism: this institution that conveys a signification, this set [ensemble] of arrangements and rules that brings together a large number of people, compels them to use certain tools and machines, supervises their labour and organizes it hierarchically, and has as its end limitless self-enlargement. This institution and its signification are a creation of capitalism, and it is only through this creation that capitalism can exist. When woven together, these second-order institutions—those that are transhistorical and those that are specific to the society under consideration—provide each time the concrete texture of that society.
Let me end with two remarks concerning practice, since all of you, like myself, work with certain ultimate facts pertaining to social reality and since I presume that for you, as for me, not everything is at it should be or as we would like it to be, despite the fact that polls claim to show that 80 percent or more of the French people are, or report themselves to be, “happy.” The first remark concerns the essential inseparableness, the enormous interdependence among various institutions, of all different orders, within a given society. For a few years one has had a tendency to forget this interconnectedness of institutions, or one avoids talking about it, usually with the excuse that we must not consider society as a whole or the totality of society, because we would risk sliding toward totalitarianism. This is obviously absurd; a society is an extremely complex totality, and its different “parts” hold together in a thousand ways. It is by no means sure, for example, that with the dislocation of the traditional significations and roles of man and woman in contemporary Western society, the rest of the system will be able simply to continue to function as if nothing had happened. This even shows the incoherency of all policies that seriously profess to be “reformist” and nothing but “reformist”; for, such a politics boils down to a desire to modify a few pieces in a system without worrying about—and without even being conscious of—the effects these modifications will have on the remainder of society.
The second remark concerns a danger that is the reverse of the first one, its symmetrical opposite. This would be to tell oneself, having taken precisely this preceding remark into account that nothing can be done — or else that one’s work can consist only in aiming immediately at a radical transformation of society. As it turns out, however, a radical transformation of society, if such is possible—and I deeply believe it is—will be possible only as the work of individuals who will their autonomy, on the scale of society as well as on the individual level. Consequently, to work for preserving and enlarging the possibilities of autonomy and autonomous action, as well as to work for aiding in the formation of individuals who aspire to autonomy and for increasing their number, is already to do political work, a work whose effects are more important and more lasting than certain kinds of sterile and superficial agitation.
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