Perhaps there have been wars that mobilized only “limited” aggressive drives, including, for example, the minimum of aggression involved in self-defence. But what we have been witnessing for years now, in Europe and in Africa, as well as what happened in Europe and in East Asia during the last world war, is an explosion of unlimited aggression, as expressed through racism, indiscriminate murder of civilians, rape, destruction of monuments and homes, killing or torture of prisoners, and so on. And what we know of human history forces us to think that the recent innovations in this field pertain mostly to the quantitative dimensions and the technical instrumentations of the phenomena, as well as to their articulations with the imaginary of the groups concerned, but not at all to their nature. Whatever the importance of other concomitant factors or conditions might be, it is impossible to understand the behaviour of the people involved in these events unless we see in it the materialization of extremely strong affects of hate. I shall endeavour to show that there are two sources of hate, each reinforcing the other:
- the fundamental drive of the psyche to reject (thus, to hate) that which is not itself;
- the near necessity of closure for the social institution and the imaginary significations it bears.
The Psychical Root
“Hate . . . is older than love,” wrote Freud, and this is true if one takes love in the usual sense, as object-love. But hate is not older than archaic, primordial love of “self,” what is often and inadequately called “primary narcissism,” the original psychical nucleus of representational/affective/ desiring closure upon itself. I call this core the psychical monad.
Freud had had a glimpse of this self-closure. He used Bleuler’s word autism to characterize it, and he likened this primordial state of the human being, including the feeding function of the mother, to the fullness of a bird’s egg.
Such closure becomes, for the psyche, the matrix of meaning. More precisely, what the psychical core will, now and forever, “understand” or “consider” as meaning is this “unitary” state, where “subject” and “object” are identical and where representation, affect, and desire are one and the same because desire is immediately representation (psychical possession) of the desired and hence affect of pleasure (which is the purest and strongest form of the omnipotence of thought). This is the meaning the psyche will forever seek after. Of course, that will never be fully attainable in the “real world,” and substitutes for it will come in the form of long series of mediations or else unworldly “mystical” visions. Unless we understand this, we will never be able to understand why identification—with persons, with tasks, with collectivities, with significations, with institutions—is such a potent and omnipresent process in psychical life. Nor could we understand why society can, almost boundlessly, play with the psyche’s plasticity—on the sole condition, that is, that society provides the subject with meaning (rigorously speaking, a social substitute for meaning) in “real life.”
From the moment (perhaps a theoretical or “ideal” limit) this primeval state of “psychical quiescence” (to use Freud’s expression) is broken—and broken it must be, if the infant is to survive—the initial “energy” of this self-love is split into three parts:
- a part of it remains as self-cathexis of the core of the psyche, and its influence impregnates all the subsequent phases of the subject’s psychical development and the corresponding strata of the mature personality;
- another part is transferred, under the form of self, to the breast: Ich bin die Brust, “I am the breast,” is one of the last sentences Freud wrote;
- a last part is transformed into hate of the “external world,” which we have to take here to mean: all that is external to the psychical monad, and which thus includes the avatars of the developing psychical and somatic “reality-Ego” (Real-Ich).
The first part (remanent self-love) accounts for the ineradicable egocentrism that, in a more or less thinly disguised way, dominates in the final analysis all our thoughts and deeds. From another, apparently unrelated point of view, what we have here is the ontological egoism necessarily immanent to any being-for-itself. Everywhere and always, I am the origin of the spatial and temporal coordinates; my here and now is the here and now; the world is my representation.
The other two parts become intermingled and entangled very quickly. Therefore, here derives the fundamental ambivalence of all affects, and, to begin with, this of the relation to the first separate love-object, the mother. They become entangled because the breast “is so often missed by the child” (Freud).
The absence of the breast would have amounted to the destruction of the closed totality of the infant, thus to a collapse of the meaning of his/her world. Initially, this destruction is palliated by an imaginary creation, the hallucination of the breast. When this hallucination of the breast ceases to be capable of covering up the break-up of the original monad’s closure, the infant is left with a gaping hole in his/her world, and s/he reacts with anxiety and rage. This hole, the absence of the breast, is meaninglessness. And here, as always, meaninglessness—or the actual or imminent, real or imagined, destruction of meaning—is source of anxiety. As the infant possesses the rudiments of inductive intelligence—that is, as his/her imagination has to make something out of repetition or regularity—a link is quickly established between the hole and the memory of the object that “normally” fills it. (The habitual becomes normal since it corresponds to the desire.) This object’s character or value is split into two contradictory attributes, the good and the bad breast. These attributes—and the affects and desires accompanying them (briefly speaking, love and hate)—are subsequently transferred to the image that has been linked with the breast, the mother as an entity or person. This becomes the matrix of the ambivalence that will henceforth be inherent in all the subject’s relationships.
But there is something more to this process and something more important. The result of the process of maturation/socialization is the formation of the social individual—which in itself is, from the point of view of the monadic core of the psyche, an alien and strange “object.” (In Freudian terms, the Real-Ich, the reality-Ego, exhibits all the attributes that are contradictory to those of the Lust-Ich, the pleasure-Ego.) It thus becomes both the support for a transfer of self-love and the object of the hate of the “unreal” psychical instances—a hate that, as was already stated, burdens whatever is “external” to the psychical core. The reality-Ego cannot escape from being the object of the ambivalence of the affects. Usually, love toward the Ego prevails over the hate of which it is the object—sufficiently, at any rate, to ensure the subject’s survival in real life. But hate of the Ego continues its noiseless life within the depths of the psyche.
There are thus, from the psychoanalytical point of view, two vectors of hate. The first, hate of the “real other,” is simply the reverse of the positive side of the cathexis of self. It is sustained by a powerful and elementary sophism that is also present in the collective forms of hatred or contempt and is perhaps more easily perceived in these latter forms: I am good; (the) good is me; he is not me; he is not good (or is less good than me). I am French (American, Italian, British, etc.); to be French (American, Italian, British . . . ) is to be (the) good; he is not French (American, Italian, British . . . ); therefore, he is not good.
The second is self-hate. For, the self—the Ego—is one of the first strangers the psyche encounters. This is also one of the meanings of Rimbaud’s phrase, “I is an other”—a meaning that is not all that different from its apparent, prima facie meaning: for, the “I” or Ego, essentially a social construct, is no more “me” than any neighbour or passer-by. Contrary to what is generally believed perhaps, this self-hatred is universal. Clearly, it (properly speaking, the subject bearing it) can survive only if it is severely tamed and/or displaced toward truly “external” objects. Through this displacement, the subject can maintain the affect while changing its object. This process is most visible in the phenomenon of racism, to which I will return.
The Social Root
The link between the psychical and the social roots, in the case of hate as in all others, is the socialization process imposed upon the psyche. Through this process, the psyche is forced into society and “reality,” while society takes care, more or less, of the psyche’s paramount need: the need for meaning.
The infant will either die or, as happens much more frequently, be socialized. This socialization process leans on biological need (hunger) and, much more heavily, on the psychical need for meaning. Neither of these needs is absolutely insurmountable: anorexia and autism demonstrate, in this case too, the a-functional and a-social nature of the psyche. Once the initial, monadic closure has been broken, the psychical need for meaning has to be satisfied by the environment of the infant—an environment made from already socialized individuals who cannot convey anything but those meanings they themselves have already absorbed and cathected. To be socialized means, first and foremost, to cathect the existing institution of society and the imaginary significations this institution bears. Among such imaginary significations are: gods, spirits, myths, totems, taboos, kinship, sovereignty, leadership, law, citizen, State, justice, commodity, capital, interest, and reality. Reality is, of course, an imaginary signification, and its particular content for each society is heavily codetermined by the imaginary institution of this society. This meaning-giving dimension of the social institution is obviously more than many-sided and extraordinarily complex; it is, in fact, the creation of a world, of this society’s world. One of its main dimensions is, of course, language. Language is not an “instrument of communication,” as if there were ready-made and fully formed individuals eager to communicate and lacking only an “instrument” for that purpose. Language is the element within which “objects,” “processes,” “states,” “qualities,” and so on, as well as various kinds of relations and links among them, are established.
What are of interest for us here are the intrinsic reasons why the institution of each society has up to now almost inevitably taken on the character of a closure of various types. There is, to be sure, always a “material” closure, in the sense of more or less well-determined territories or frontiers, and/or, in all cases, strictly limitative definitions of the individuals belonging to this particular society. But the most important one is the closure of meaning.
Territories and so on acquire their importance only because of specific meanings attributed to them: thus, the Promised Land, or the sacred character of territory for the Greek poleis, or the strident character of border disputes everywhere. This is, as we shall see, also and even more genuine of individuals: a stranger is a stranger because the significations of which he is the bearer are strange, foreign. Now a signification can be non-strange only if it is positively cathected. It suffices to replace the term non-strange in the previous sentence with the term familiar to see that this is in fact a tautology.
The metaphor of open and closed societies has been in use for a long time now. But I am using the term closure here with almost its precise mathematical sense. A world of meanings is closed if any question capable of being formulated within it either has an answer in terms of the given meanings or is posited as meaningless. Thus, the worlds of archaic or traditional societies are closed, whereas the ancient Greek world or the modern European one (in the broad sense) is more or less open.
Almost all known societies have instituted themselves by means of and within a closure. They have created for themselves a metaphysical niche of meaning, which is equivalent to saying that they have been religious. Or, alternatively, we can say that they have been heteronomous in the sense that they have covered up the fact that they have instituted themselves and, instead, attribute their institution to an extra-social source. I cannot dwell here on the reasons why these characterizations are more or less equivalent. Suffice it to say that these traits correspond to two essential traits of a heteronomous society:
- the “need” or “necessity” for an extra-social (extra-institutional) foundation and guarantee of the institution;
- the “need” or “necessity” to make it impossible to call into question in any way the institution—that is, to stop any discussion about ultimate foundations—by claiming that it rests on something beyond the knowledge of living humans.
During and by virtue of the very process of their socialization, socialized individuals have to pass from an initial meaning coextensive with their own psychical, private sphere (monadic meaning) to a shared, social one. As was already implied above, monadic meaning is completely alien to what, in waking life, we consider meaning to be. Not only does it not know time and contradiction, but it does not even know distinction, separation, and articulation. Through a series of concentric circles—family, kin or clan, locality, age group, social group or class, nation, “race,” and so on—the world of meaning of the subject who is becoming an individual is enlarged, and this enlargement goes together with an extended and more or less strong identification with these larger units. (That these identifications can sometimes be antinomic with respect to each other has supplied tragedy with a recurrent theme.)
All this is, or ought to be, quite well known. What are needed to be stressed are the consequences for the psychical organization of the individual. All identificatory bearings of the individual are part and parcel of the instituted world of social meanings, among which, of course, those that refer to the various collective instituted entities of which the individual is a member or an element are an essential component. Consider, for example, the sentence, “I am the son of X.” What a son is (beyond the simple biological fact of procreation—which, moreover, is initially unknown and at any rate always uncertain) and what he has to do qua son, who and what X is and the very idea of an “I” and an “am,” all these terms have no meaning whatsoever outside the socially instituted world of meaning in general and outside the specific meanings proper to the society under consideration.
A Roman son of 500 B.C.E. and an American son of today have very little in common. And, for obvious reasons: the nearer we are to a completely closed, archaic society, the stronger is this identification. There are well-known cases of “savages” who died just because well-meaning Europeans insisted on taking them far from their tribe and their place. And it is also well known that, most of the time, this identification supersedes the individual’s self-preservation. To kill and be killed in a family vendetta, in tribal conflicts, in feudal warfare, in national wars—pro patria mori, in all its versions—is the universal fact. It is the obligation societies impose upon their members, and it is what these members always and everywhere proudly and gladly accept—except, that is, over a small geographical area and in recent historical times, in modern societies. Meaning for the psyche is identical with the indivisibility of its initial totality. The break-up of this totality is possible only if the psyche is continuously supplied with self substitutes and with substitutes for meaning. This is the process of identification, through which quanta of cathexes levied from the initial self-cathexis are first transferred onto the immediate objects and then onto the different forms of instituted collectivities and onto significations dwelling within them. In a manner that has probably become incomprehensible to some “individuals” in modern societies, the savage is his tribe, the fanatic is his Church, the national is his nation, the member of an ethnic minority is this minority—and vice versa.
Obviously, this identification with collectivities also supplies a substitute for the lost omnipotence of the psychical monad. The individual may feel that it participates in the effective power of five thousand, or fifty million, other individuals. “We shall prevail for we are stronger” is a stupidity shared equally on both sides of the front. This identification also has important effects in the suppression of guilt and inhibitions and thus renders possible the frantic deployment of murderous destructiveness in war, but also during crowd movements, as has long been observed. It is as if, in these moments, individuals recover, without knowing it, the certitude that the source of the institution is the anonymous collective, capable of positing new rules and lifting old prohibitions.
Outcomes
There are, as I have said already, two psychical expressions of hate: hate of the other and self-hate. The latter, in general, does not appear as such. But we must understand that both have a common root, the psychical monad’s refusal to accept what is, for it, alien and thus strange: the socialized individual, whose form it has been forced to wear, and social individuals, whose coexistence it is obliged to accept (though their existence is always less real than its own existence for itself, and therefore also much more expendable). This ontological structure of the human being imposes insurmountable constraints on all social organizations, and all political projects, a point which cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to say that such constraints irrevocably rule out all ideas of a “transparent” society and all political projects that would aim at an immediate universal reconciliation and claim to short-circuit the social institution.
During the process of socialization, both dimensions of hate are tamed to a significant degree, at least in their most dramatic forms. This is accomplished, in part, through a permanent diversion of the destructive tendency toward more or less “constructive” social ends: exploitation of nature, various forms of interindividual competition (potlatch, peaceful agonistic activities such as athletic or other types of games, economic and political competition, rivalries over the acquisition of prestige, bureaucratic infighting, etc.), or just banal interhuman malice. In all known societies, all such outlets channel a part—but by no means all—of the “available” hate and destructive energy.
Up to now, however, it seems as if this channelling was possible only if the remaining part of hate and destructiveness was kept, as it were, in a reservoir, ready to be turned, at regular or irregular intervals, into formalized, institutionalized destructive activities against other collectivities—that is, into war. This is not to say that psychical hate is the “cause” of wars: that is not a question we have to discuss here. It is clear that one can find in history numerous wars—from the Germanic or Mongol invasions to the “lace wars” of the eighteenth century, not to mention civil wars—for which hate was not the primary source. Yet hate is certainly not only a necessary but an essential condition for war. I mean by essential condition a condition that maintains an intrinsic relationship with that of which it is the condition. Hate conditions war and expresses itself in war. André Malraux’s statement, “Let victory in this war rest with those who fought it without loving it,” expresses a wish contradicted by the reality of almost all real wars.
Otherwise, one would not understand how millions and millions of people throughout the known history of the human species could be ready, at the drop of a hat, to kill unknown people and be killed by them. And when the resources of this reservoir are not actively mobilized, they manifest themselves rampantly under the guise of contempt, xenophobia, and racism.
Let it be noted here, parenthetically, that psychoanalysts often speak carelessly about the taboo against murder. In truth, what is clearly and exclusively intended by the Freudian myth in Totem and Taboo is intraclan murder only. It is also the only type of murder against which there is a social sanction, whereas murder during wartime or in the course of a vendetta results in glory for the killer.
The fatal conjunction is that the destructive drives of individuals fit admirably well with the near necessity for the institution of the society to close upon itself, to reinforce the position of its own laws, values, rules, and meanings as being uniquely excellent and the only true ones. This takes place through the assertion that the laws, creeds, gods, norms, and customs of the others are inferior, false, wrong, disgusting, abominable, and diabolic. And this, in turn, is in complete harmony with the needs of the identificatory organization of the individual’s psyche. For the latter, what lies beyond the circle of meanings it has so painfully cathected along the road of its socialization is inferior, wrong, and meaningless. And these meanings are, for it, coextensive with the instituted collectivity (and network of collectivities) to which it belongs: clan, tribe, village, nation, religion.
Conflicts among these various poles of reference are of course possible. But, for all we know, they arise much less in archaic environments and much more frequently in more modern ones. What must at any rate clearly be understood as the basis for all the rest is that, as a first approximation and in principle, individuals experience any threat to the paramount instituted collectives to which they belong as more serious than a threat against their own lives.
As was said before, these characteristics can be observed with the greatest intensity and purity in fully closed societies: in archaic and traditional ones, to be sure, but, even more, in modern totalitarian societies. The cardinal fallacy is always: Our norms are good; the good is our norms; their norms are not our norms; therefore, their norms are not good. Likewise: Our God is true; Truth is our God; their God is not our God; therefore, their God is not a true God. It has always seemed almost impossible, for human collectivities, to consider alterity as just that: alterity. In the same guise, it has been almost impossible for them to see the institutions of the others as neither superior nor inferior but simply as other institutions, and in truth, mostly incomparable to their own.
To sum up an argument I have expressed in detail elsewhere, a society’s encounter with the others generally opens up three possible ways of evaluating these others:
They are superior, they are equal, or they are inferior. If they were superior, we would have to renounce our own institutions and adopt theirs. If they were equal, being a Yankee rather than a Crow Indian, a Christian rather than a Pagan, would be a matter of sheer indifference. Both possibilities are intolerable. For, both entail, or seem to entail, that the individual should give up his or her own identificatory bearings, that is, give up, or at least call into question, his or her own identity, so dearly acquired during the socialization process. There remains then the third case: They are inferior. Of course, this overlooks the possibility that the others might be our equals in the sense that our institutions and theirs might be, in an initial overall view, incomparable. It is not hard to understand why the emergence of such a view is historically improbable. It would lead us to accept in the others what for us is abomination, something that is in principle impossible for any religious culture. And even in the case of “nonreligious” cultures, it would sometimes raise questions that are insoluble on a purely theoretical level: what to do, for example, with societies that do not recognize human rights that inflict cruel punishments on their members, or that indulge in practices that in our view are horrific (such as the excision and infibulations of girls)?
Attaining to the idea of a possible incomparability of cultures is possible only for a society in which, whatever the intensity of its adherence to its own institutions, an initial internal fissure has already taken place that makes it possible to distance oneself from the established institution.
This is why the movement toward the recognition of this essential alterity starts at the same time, and with the same deep-seated motivations, as the movement toward a rupture of the closure of meaning—that is, the movement toward calling into question the given institution of society, the end of full heteronomy, the freeing of thoughts and deeds, in sum, the birth of democracy and philosophy.
From that time onward, the idea that the others are neither wicked nor inferior starts to make its way (in Homer, Herodotus, Montaigne, Swift, Montesquieu, and so on). It would be both tempting and encouraging to be able to say that the opening of thought and the partial and relative democratization of political regimes in the West have advanced in step with the decline of chauvinism, xenophobia, and racism. But, even leaving aside the terrifying explosions of xenophobic and racist barbarism in the twentieth century, one could accept such a statement only with many strong qualifications. In particular, it is necessary to reflect upon the extremely virulent revival of nationalism, xenophobia, and racism during the twentieth century in the “civilized” and “democratic” countries. As for the non-Western world, the awful contemporary situation hardly calls for comment.
One must add here again that the enigmatic multiplicity and heterogeneity of the historical forms of institutions defies any simple schema of understanding. Hostility toward strangers covers practically the whole spectrum of possibilities, from immediate murder to the most generous hospitality. Xenia was an institution common to all Greeks, though the Lacedaemonians had instaurated xenelasia, expelling foreigners from Lacedaemon after a minimal stay there. But it must also be noted that this variety of institutions and the goodwill it sometimes expresses concern exclusively foreign individuals, never their institutions as such, and foreigners “passing through,” almost never their settling down. (Multiethnic empires are in a class by themselves for evident reasons. In their case, central authority usually imposes tolerance of alien minorities—which has not prevented, as is well known, pogroms against Jews and massacres inflicted upon the Armenians.)
All that I have said up to now provides an account of the exclusion of the external other. It does not suffice to “explain” why this exclusion can become discrimination, contempt, confinement, and, finally, hatred, rage, and murderous folly. Regarding the extreme forms these behaviours can take, and their acute explosions during specific moments in history, I do not think there can be a general “explanation”: historical accounts alone can really make some sense of the bewildering diversity of the related facts. Yet such an understanding requires in the first place that we recognize and gauge accurately the extraordinary quantity of hatred contained in the psychical reservoir, which the social institution has proved unable or unwilling to divert to other objects.
Nevertheless, one factor can be singled out in relation to the massive explosions of national and racial hate during modern times. The dissolution, in capitalist societies, of almost all bodies of significant intermediate collectivities and thus the disappearance of alternative possibilities of identification for individuals have undoubtedly had the effect of an identificatory retrenchment around the entities “religion,” “nation,” or “race” and thus of a tremendous exacerbation of misoxeny in the broadest sense of the word. The situation is not essentially different in non-European societies, where the shock of invading modernity is most acutely felt and the crushing of traditional identificatory bearings leads to increased religious and/or national fanaticism.
Here is a final remark concerning racism, specifically. It is astonishing that, as far as I know, the main, defining characteristic of racism, immediately visible to the naked eye, has been overlooked by writers on the subject. This is the essential inconvertibility of the other. Any religious fanatic would gladly accept the conversion of the infidels; any “rational” nationalist should rejoice at the annexation of foreign territories and the “assimilation” of their people. Not so the racist. German Jews would have been content—or, at least, most of them would have accepted and demanded—to remain citizens of the Third Reich, but the Nazis would have none of it. And it is precisely because, in the case of racism, the object of hate must remain inconvertible that the racist imaginary has to invoke or to invent the existence of would-be physical (biological)—that is, irreversible—characteristics in the objects of its hate: the colour of the skin and facial traits are the most appropriate support for this hate, for they mark the irreducible strangeness of the object and do away with any risk of confusion with the subject. Hence also the extremely strong repulsion against cross-breading, since it blurs the frontier between the pure and the impure and shows to the racist that little would be needed for himself to be found on the other side of the hate barrier. Finally, we would certainly be justified in attaching this extreme form of hate of the other to the most obscure, solemn and repressed form of hate: self-hate.
Heteronomy and hatred of the other have one common root: the near “need” or “necessity” for the closure of meaning, which arises from the intrinsic tendencies of the institution of society and from the singular psyche’s search for ultimate certainties, and which leads to extremely strong identifications with watertight bodies of belief shared and supported by real collectivities. Autonomy, that is, full democracy, and acceptance of the other are not the natural inclination of humanity. Both face the same tremendous obstacles. We know from history that the fight for democracy has been, up to now, marginally more successful than that against chauvinism, xenophobia, and racism. But for those who are committed to the only reasonably defensible political project, the project of universal freedom, the only way open is to continue this uphill struggle.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment