Sunday, February 3, 2008

Passion and Knowledge

Everything that exists within what we call thought may not be formalized or be formalizable, that is, comparable to a mechanical operation. Rather, all that exists within thought brings both human imagination and human passion into play.

I have already written quite extensively on the imagination, so I shall limit myself here to recalling the essential points. At the two extremes of knowledge and constantly in-between rises the creative potential of the human being, namely the radical imagination. It is the radical imagination that presents an outside world formed in this way and not otherwise. It is this radical imagination, too, that creates the axioms, postulates, and fundamental schemata that underlie the constitution of knowledge. And, finally, it is radical imagination that is constantly furnishing the hypotheses-models, the ideas and images that nourish every breakthrough and every elaboration. Now, this imagination, in itself and in its basic modes of operation, as well as the social imaginary which is its counterpart on the social-historical level as creation of the anonymous collective, is neither formalized nor formalizable. Certainly, it always also contains like everything that is an ensemblistic-identitary dimension. Yet, in its operations as well as in its results, the essential thing is not to be found there, any more than in a Bach fugue may be the essence in the arithmetical relations among tones.
- Why is a computer unable to replace the human mind?

Because the former it is devoid of imagination. Because, therefore, it can neither go beyond the rules that make it function nor go back before they were laid down (unless, precisely, one has specified this as a rule, and obviously, in this last case, it would be impossible for the computer to posit a new rule capable of leading to meaningful results). And because it is devoid of passion and therefore incapable of suddenly changing its object of inquiry on account of some new, hitherto unsuspected idea of which it has become enamoured along the way. None of these deficiencies can be made up for by random operations.

The Paradoxical Relation between Passion and Knowledge.

At first glance, it seems absurd to bring together the terms passion and knowledge, which seem to exclude each other absolutely. Moreover, a moderately educated individual bolstered by most philosophers, would probably affirm that this relation could only be a negative one, passion as well as the imagination only being able to perturb or to corrupt the labour of knowledge, which is said to require instead scholarly coolness and impassiveness. It would be easy to answer this individual that every great work of knowledge has been moved by passion and tyrannical absorption with a single object, from Archimedes, who was killed after refusing to let his circles in the sand be disturbed, to the frantic last writings of Évariste Galois, who scrawled his theorems on paper all night long before his fatal duel. Our hypothetical, but not improbable, interlocutor could offer us the response that he did not intend the passion for knowledge itself, which bears on the object of knowledge or on the truth, but extrinsic, impure passions: envy, hatred, and resentment, love of money, power, or even glory, or yet again, and perhaps especially, the extension of the researcher’s egoism to “his” ideas and “his” results. Remembering Hegel, we could answer him that as in other domains in this domain too, the cunning of reason knows very well how to bring the least noble passions into its service.
- How many times has a rivalry between masters or schools, with cloudy motives (Newton-Leibniz, Kronecker-Cantor, etc.), played a driving role in the development of knowledge?
- Today especially, who would dare maintain that the passions for power, for renown at all costs, and even for money are not powerful stimuli for scientific research, as our contemporaries’ absolute rage to be first abundantly shows?

We can, and should, delve into a deeper stratum and, to that end, give a more rigorous meaning to the term passion. It can be said, along with Piera Aulagnier that there is passion when the object of pleasure is transformed into an object of need, in other words, when the object is one that could not be missed, when the subject cannot conceive its life without the possession of the object, its absorption, its pursuit, in a sense ultimately without identification with the object of the passion, which has become a matter of life or death. Does such a relation exist in the domain of knowledge?

Certainly it is so. It is not only experience that shows this; there are, so to speak, a priori considerations that oblige us to admit that there can be no non-routine work of knowledge without passion thus defined, without the subject’s total dedication to his object. But what, in the case of knowledge, is this object?

Knowledge begins with the interrogation What is . . . ?, or Why . . . ?, and so on, but becomes knowledge, even in the case of philosophy, only if it leads to certain results. We must insist on this last point in an age when people are talking only of questioning, indetermination, deconstruction, and weak thought. What, then, is stimulated in the passion to know?

The first answer that presents itself obviously is: the truth. And there is no need to enter into a philosophical discussion of the question What is truth? In order to affirm, as a first approximation, that the truth has to do with the results of knowing. But it is here that the paradoxes re-emerge. The passion for truth cannot be separated from the passion for the results in which this truth is incarnated or seems to be incarnated for the researcher, the scientist, or the thinker. Now, this truth can lead him, and most often does lead him, to a fixation on these (his) results, with which he more or less identifies, to the point that any calling them into question can be felt by him as a calling into question of his own identity, his very being. The subject’s narcissism necessarily extends outward to encompass, and this is so not only in the domain of knowledge, what the subject has produced, objects henceforth of a categorical and unconditional cathexis.

Yet this cathexis, that is to say, this possession as well as concentration of emotional energy on an object or idea, which transforms the truth into an object of possession and so often becomes, in philosophy especially but not exclusively, attachment to a system, stands in contradiction to the initial motive and driving force of the search for truth. It cannot help but halt the movement of interrogation, preventing the latter from turning toward its results, and still less from turning back on the postulates that rendered these results possible. Here we find one of the roots of various dogmatisms and fanaticisms in the domain of knowledge.

Here we have a dilemma. Either one becomes passionate about the results—without which the truth remains but a phantom (or, at best, a Kantian regulatory idea, with the antinomies that follow therefrom)—at the risk of becoming fixated on these results or one becomes passionate about the search for the truth itself, therefore ultimately passionate about boundless interrogation, at the risk of forgetting that this interrogation would then remain suspended in midair for lack of any fixed points. Is there any way out of this dilemma?

The answer to this question is many-sided. On the philosophical plane, it imposes a new idea of the truth as an open relationship between an interrogation and its results, as a sui generis movement going back and forth between processes and pauses, between excavation and encounter (“association”). On the psychoanalytical plane, it obliges admission of a singular, and historically new, type of cathexis, the possession of self as creative source and of the activity of thought in itself as such. Under what conditions knowing can be possessed as an investment of emotional energy in a person, object or idea, and as a process and activity and not simply as result? And to what extent can one possess oneself as origin and actor of this process?

Philosophical Aspects.

If you told me, “Socrates, we are acquitting you, but on the condition that you abandon this search and no longer philosophize . . . ,” I would tell you . . . that I shall not stop philosophizing . . . the unexamined life is not liveable (o de anexetastos bios ou biotos).

Undoubtedly, Socrates dies on account of several factors and motives, but above all because examination and interrogation have become the object of his passion, that without which life is not worth living. Let us note this point well: Socrates is not speaking of truth; he has always proclaimed, although in an ironic fashion, that the only thing he knew with certainty was that he knew nothing. He speaks of exetasis, examination, and inquiry. The two strands we have loosened stand clearly apart here: passion, which makes its object worth one’s life; and the nature of this object, not as possession but as quest and inquiry, as an examinative activity.
In the Phaedrus and especially in the Symposium, in the mouth of Diotima, Plato sets amorous passion, Eros, at the base of knowing—as well as, moreover, at the base of everything that is truly worthwhile in human life. Aristotle begins his Metaphysics with the famous phrase, “All human beings, by their nature, desire knowledge.” The contrast with modern times is striking: excepting Spinoza, for whom knowledge of the third kind, true intuition is the intellectual love of substance, one notices that from Descartes to Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, not to forget Anglo-Saxon philosophy, knowing becomes a strictly intellectual affair. We shall illustrate this point by a single example, this of Immanuel Kant.

Kant, as one knows, poses the question of the “human being’s interests,” and lays out this question in three moments: What can I know, what ought I to do, what am I allowed to hope for?
His huge elaboration of the first moment becomes an investigation into what he calls the transcendental conditions of knowledge, in other words, into the question: How are synthetic a priori judgments, that is, necessary and non-tautological judgments, possible?

From the point of view of interest to us here, the outcome of this investigation is the construction of a transcendental ego, wherein the “imagination” plays a certain role. But this role, which is subordinated to the requisites of an assured and certain form of knowing, consists in the perpetually unchanging production of forms that are given once and for all. At the same time, this transcendental ego necessarily is, by its very construction, totally disembodied, and not somatically but psychically. It is a mental machine; today we would say a sort of computer. There are, moreover, two computers rather than one, and they do not communicate with each other. Indeed, Kant establishes an abyssal divide, a split between transcendental subject and psychological subject. The former is postulated to function under the sole requisite of producing a priori judgments; the latter is subjected to the laws of empirical psychology and therefore emits judgments that are not motivated, but determined in the natural-sciences sense by psychical causes. Despite some of Kant’s expressions, as when he speaks of the Schematics as an “art hidden in the depths of the human psyche”, it cannot even be said that this psyche is split in two in him; it must rather be said that the psyche is for him entirely on the side of pure fact, subject to the question quid facti, and looks hopelessly toward the other edge of the abyss, where the transcendental requisite and the Idea of a pure morality shine forth, because they alone being capable of responding to the question quid juris.

At best, there is a split between a transcendental consciousness or a practical reason —about which it is not known whether it represents a pure, inaccessible “ought to be” in which case, we are given over to empiricist relativism or the effectively actual reality of “us men,” wir Menschen we would then be totally outside nature —and the empirical psyche, which, even when it speaks the truth or does what is good, can speak it or do it only for bad empirical or impure reasons. In the field of knowledge, in any case, this empirical psyche could be only a source of perturbations and errors, when, for example, the “empirical imagination” or, still worse, the passions, interfere (yet, one wonders how) with the functioning of the transcendental consciousness. Cutting a long discussion short, we have to limit ourselves to a few assertions that the preceding remarks will have rendered at least plausible.

What really matters to us is the effectively actual knowledge of effectively actual subjects, not a transcendental phantom or an inaccessible ideality. The following paradox is but apparent: exclusive preoccupation with such an ideality can end only in doubt and solipsism. These effectively actual subjects are always social-historical subjects. Their sociality and their historicity are not scoria, accidents, or obstacles but, rather, essential positive conditions for their having access to any knowledge. This is so already because there is no thought without language and because language exists only as social-historical institution.

These effectively actual subjects are also subjects in the full sense of the term. They are not mere products of social-historical conditions, but rather subjects for themselves and more particularly for human psychics. Let us take a step back and ask a question. What are, not the conditions of possibility, but the components of the effective actuality required for any being-for-itself, that is, from a bacterium to the human, to exist and to undertake any activity whatsoever?
The effectively actual existence of a being-for-itself implies that the latter:
- creates a world of its own, a “proper world,” that it itself places itself therein, and that, at a minimum, it interacts with the substrate of this world according to the modes dictated to it by the constitution of its proper world;
- pursues certain objects and runs away from other ones (for, without that, it would cease to exist); and
- evaluates, positively or negatively, the objects and results of its activities.

Let us translate this now into the language of the human psyche. The psyche has to itself create an image of the world and of its place in this world. It has to desire and detest. It has to feel some pleasure with the objects it desires and some displeasure with the objects it detests. But also, the psyche can exist only if it is socialized. That means that it receives, in the main, its image of the world and of itself, its cathected objects, its evaluative criteria, and its sources of pleasure and displeasure from the society in which it finds itself. These images, these objects, these criteria are cathected in a passionate way by the singular psyche as well as by the social collective in which it finds itself submerged. And without this possession, neither one could exist. These considerations are neither empirical nor transcendental. They are suited to the ontology of individual and collective human being and to the ontology of the human being’s relation to the world it creates, and that it makes be in making itself be. This being and this relation exist only as social-historical. Here we have the central dimension of all these questions. We are going to approach one of its aspects briefly.

Belief, Knowledge, Truth

This passionate possession of one’s self-image and one’s image of the world, of which we have spoken, does not yet relate in itself to any kind of knowledge. It appertains to the domain of belief. Belief is everywhere there is human being, as individual and as collectivity.

Living is impossible without a pragmatic belief in the being-thus and regular flow of the things of the world. We undoubtedly share such belief with every living being, even if we are the sole ones for whom it is more or less explicit and conscious. For humans, however, this belief goes far beyond the perceptibility of the things of the world and of their relationships. It is also and especially belief in the significations that hold together the world, the society, and the life and death of individuals. It is the subjective side of the imaginary institution of society. Nearly all of its contents, or objects, are social in origin and nature; they are individual only in a marginal and accidental way, inasmuch as they depend on individual experience and idiosyncrasies. That is why they are almost everywhere unquestionable almost always. One can call into question this or that material fact, but not the society’s imaginary significations. The institution of society has always been grounded on and sanctioned by religion, in the broad sense of the term; and no believer will place in doubt the dogmas of his religion. Even in societies more or less released from the grip of religion, like some contemporary societies, there is an innumerable quantity of ideas a normal citizen would never place in doubt. He believes in them, without necessarily knowing that he believes, that is, he believes that he knows.

In the strict sense that alone matters to us here, knowledge begins when a process of interrogation and inquiry starts that calls into question the beliefs of the tribe and thus creates a breach in the metaphysical niche, which the collectivity has itself constituted. Certainly, it is necessarily propped up on belief: as Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg underscored that the strange goings-on in general relativity and quantum theory presuppose the world of common everyday experience and must be confirmed in that common everyday world. Knowledge however questions belief and, as a general rule, challenges significations and the system by which established meanings are given.

To be sure, the distinction is not always as clear-cut in effectively actual history, and intermediate zones exist between the two. To take the most well-expressed example, in the three monotheistic religions the content of beliefs can generally become an object of one investigation about the “true meaning” of the sacred texts that has fed some long-standing scholarly disputes and a good number of massacres, too. Yet this interrogation is necessarily restricted, in the mathematical sense of the term: it always has to remain within the postulate of the indisputable, because revealed, ultimate truth of these texts.

Belief like knowledge is a creation of beings-for-themselves, that is, living beings, the psyche, and the society. But belief is established in closure. It suffices that belief allow the being-for-itself under consideration to exist within the world; indeed, belief constitutes its vital setting. That is why, in the simple living being totally, and in humans in its instrumental part, belief has to be, in one manner or another, adequate to what is. This constraint ceases however, when we consider the truly important part of human beliefs, that is to say, their imaginary part and the part that has to do with signification. For the latter, the sole constraint of import is the closure of meaning, the “capacity” to respond to every question that can arise in the society under consideration.
It is this closure that is broken through interrogation and the process of knowledge. Of its own agreement, knowledge subjects itself to another constraint, that of logon didonai, giving an account of and reason for, and rejects everything that avoids the question. This constraint can be itemized in the following two demands: internal coherence and an encounter with what is. These two demands already raise new questions, in themselves. For this reason alone, interrogation is unending.
- How can such an activity be possessed by the subject?
- What meaning does it have for the psyche?

These are the questions toward which we are now going to turn our attention.

Psychoanalytical Aspects.

The following particular psychical activities—believing, thinking, knowing—ought to form a central object of preoccupation for the psychoanalytic theory. After all, they are the very presuppositions for its existence. And yet, an elucidation of these particular psychical activities was hardly ever approached by Freud and that elucidation remains among his successors, nearly in the same state as he left it. In his first conception of the problem (Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality), Freud invokes a drive for knowledge—Wisstrieb—whose status, it must be recognized, is strange, to say the least. According to what Freud writes elsewhere (Triebe und Triebschicksäle, 1915), the drive is “the frontier between the somatic and the psychical”: it necessarily has a “somatic source” and a “delegation” into the psyche by means of a representation (Vorstellungsrepräsentanz des Triebes). It is difficult to see what a “somatic source” of a “drive for knowledge” might be. It certainly has to be recalled that in 1907 Freud did not yet possess a worked-out theory of the drives and that what is at issue in the Three Essays as well as in The Theories of Infantile Sexuality is the child’s sexual curiosity.
That certainly furnishes this “drive” with a certain psychoanalytic respectability, but it does not allow one to bridge the enormous gap that separates infantile sexual curiosity from religion, cosmological theories, or theorems about prime numbers.
- Why cows do not have religion—and why sexed animals in general do not produce infantile sexual theories and even seem devoid of all curiosity on this topic, going instead, in general, straight to the point?

The answer would no doubt, or, in any case, ought to be that, in animals, the sexual function is fully “instinctual,” that is, its paths and goals are predetermined, constant, assured, and functional, whereas in humans we are precisely not dealing with an “instinct” but with a “drive.”
- What is to be said of this difference that after all from the Freudian point of view governs the difference between animality and humanity?

Neither his 1915 text nor the other ones ever directly confront this question. We may note, rather, in Freud both a number of sketches of an answer and something like an avoidance of the problem.

At one of the extremes is situated the “biologist” response, which, when pushed to the limit, would lead to the erasure of this difference. Freud certainly did not do that, but it may be asked what pushes him to extend the struggle of Eros and Thanatos to the entire kingdom of living beings and, in particular, to believe that he had also discovered the “death instinct” in the most elementary organisms. At the other extreme is situated the admission, several times repeated, that we know nothing about an essential quality of at least one part of human psychical phenomena: the quality that is consciousness. At times, the invocation of “our God Logos” (The Future of an Illusion) makes one think that he is postulating one irreducibly human attribute, which would be rationality. But obviously, rationality does not imply consciousness, because every predator acts rationally, and consciousness does not imply rationality, as is shown by the most perfunctory observation of human behaviour, both individual and collective. The founding myth of Totem and Taboo could at the very most account for the origin of a specific “religious” belief, not for consciousness, for explicit rationality, or for the activity of knowing. It hardly needs to be added that neither could one link the movement of knowledge to that other “instinct,” self-preservation, which is itself also universal among living beings—not even by sticking on it a genetically higher form of “rationality” in the human sphere, for such a “rationality” could lead, at best, only to the growth of a purely functional and instrumental form of knowledge that would remain enslaved to the satisfaction of perpetually identical “needs.”

It is important to dwell on this question here within the very parameters set by Freud.
- Why would there be (why, in fact and in effect, is there?) in human children a sexual curiosity that is absent among the young of other mammals?
- And why does it lead to such bizarre infantile sexual theories?

It would be laughable to claim that the cause of this is the “secretiveness” of parental sexual activities among humans; children’s observation of animal sexual activities has been the rule in all human societies, with the (unclear) exception of the nurseries of some well-off city-dwelling layers of Victorian society. “Sexual curiosity” could spark off a search only as a function of another factor, which we shall tackle straight away. Freud nevertheless furnishes, involuntarily, it could be said, the framework within which we can bring reflection to bear on our question.
Above, I wrote that Freud never faces head-on a discussion of the difference between animality and humanity, and that is indeed the case. If, however, it is understood correctly, his 1915 text on “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” offers within itself the beginnings of a response. The drive, whose source is somatic, but which, in order to make itself heard by the psyche, has to speak the latter’s language, induces in this psyche a representation that acts as delegate or ambassador (Vorstellungsrepräsentanz des Triebes). Up to this point, there is no difference from what goes on in the animal psyche. The difference appears when one notices, which Freud did not do (though it is true that this was not at that moment his topic of investigation) that this representation is constant in the animal and variable in the human.

Without fear of being mistaken, we can affirm that, for each animal species, the “representative” representation of the drive is fixed, determinate, and canonical. Sexual excitation is each time provoked by the same stimulating representations, and the very unfolding of the act is, in the main, standardized. The same could be said of nutritional needs, and so on and so forth. While there are exceptions, these really are exceptions or deviations. In humans, however, the exception is, so to speak, the rule. In psychoanalytical terms, there is not a canonical representative of the drive across the whole species, or even for the same individual in different circumstances or moments.

To the question Why this difference?, the answer is not hard to find: The function of representation, which is an essential component of the imagination, always furnishes the animal with the same products, whereas this function is released, liberated, or driven mad, as you wish, by the human. The living being in general possesses a functional imagination whose products are fixed and settled; the human possesses a de-functionalized imagination whose products are indeterminate. This goes hand in hand, in the human, with another decisive trait: representational pleasure tends to overtake organ pleasure; a daydream can be as much a source of pleasure as an act of coitus, if not more so. This fact is in turn a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the emergence of another process that is uniquely characteristic of humans, and whose importance, as well as obscurity, Freud recognized: sublimation. For the human being, cathexes of objects and of activities that not only procure no organ pleasure and could not procure any, but whose creation and valuing are social and whose essential dimension is non-perceptible, are a source of pleasure. And they are capable of dominating biological needs or even of standing in the way of one’s mere self-preservation.

This elucidation can and must be complemented on the basis of another element sifted out by Freud, already in the Three Essays: the desire for “mastery” of reality, and already that of the subject’s own body.
- What are the status and origin of this desire for mastery? And what is its relation to sexual curiosity?

The answer to these two questions leads us to leave Freud behind, but not to betray him, I think. The desire for mastery is the offspring and the transposition into “reality” of the originary narcissistic omnipotence, the omnipotence of the monadic subject, which, under the name “magical omnipotence of thought,” Freud rightly rediscovered in everyone’s Unconscious, this of children as well as that of adults.

Now, at its origin, and always in the Unconscious, this omnipotence is omnipotence over representations (let us note, for the psyche, representation is the genus, “reality” the species), and it is in the service of the pleasure principle, which is the cement of meaning. At the psyche’s origin, a “meaningful” representation is a representation that is a source of pleasure, and a representation that is a source of displeasure is meaningless, like a cacophony. Here we have the matrix of meaning: everything holds together; everything has to hold together; and this holding-together is something sought after, positively valued, a source of pleasure.

Organ pleasure itself is the holding-together of the object as source of satisfaction and the erogenous zone as seat of this satisfaction. Coitus is copulation, or reunification of the separated. On the other hand, the basic intention of sexual curiosity in the child is to respond to the question: Where do children come from?

This is an abstract and generalized formulation of the question: Where do I come from? And this question has meaning only as background for an interrogatory investigation of origin, which is one aspect and one moment of the question of meaning: an aspect and a moment of the causes of and conditions for meaning. More than milk or sleep, the psyche demands meaning; it demands the holding-together, for itself, of what presents itself to the psyche as apparently disordered and unrelated. The question of the origin is the question of order and of meaning in the temporal, that is, “historical” dimension. The question of the origin perforates the plenitude of the present; it presupposes, therefore, the creation of a temporal horizon properly speaking (which is a work of the subject’s radical imagination): that is, a horizon upstream, birth and commencement, and a horizon downstream, horizon of the project but also of death. Of course, this temporalization can occur only in step-by-step combination with the socialization of the psyche, which furnishes it with a more and more differentiated world and which compels it to recognize this ever more differentiated world. But that aspect cannot retain us here.

To respond with an infantile sexual theory to sexual curiosity is therefore, on the part of the child, to try to instaurate the mastery of its thought over its origin, in other words, to sketch out a meaning for its history. This is what will later be prolonged into a question about the origin of everything, a question to which socially instituted theology and cosmology will always give an answer. Let us put it another way: Sexual curiosity tends toward a certain form of mastery, and mastery as such always also has sexual connotations. The ways in which all this is also related to a kind of instrumental mastery—to which Freud attached great importance, as is seen in The Future of an Illusion—cannot retain us here.

Whether we are talking, therefore, about sexual curiosity, mastery, or sources of pleasure, the break with animality is conditioned by the emergence of the radical imagination of the singular psyche and of the social imaginary qua source of institutions, therefore of objects and activities capable of nourishing sublimation. This emergence destroys the animal’s “instinctual” forms of self-regulation, adds representational pleasure to organ pleasure, gives rise to the demand of meaning and of signification, and responds to this demand through the construction, at the collective level, of social imaginary significations that account for everything that can, each time, be presented to the society under consideration. Borne and conveyed by socially instituted, desexualized, and essentially imperceptible objects, these significations are, under penalty of death or madness, possessed by singular subjects. It is the process of this possession, that is to say, of this concentration of emotional energy on an object or idea, and its results that we are to call sublimation.

Sublimation, however, is a condition for there to be knowledge, not knowledge itself. For, in almost all societies, its objects are unquestionable beliefs: the world rests on a great tortoise, or God created it in six days, after which time he rested, and so on and so forth. These beliefs guarantee a saturation of the demand of meaning by giving an answer to everything that can be, in a meaningful manner for this society, an object of questioning. And they ensure a closure of interrogation by instaurating an ultimate and catholic source of signification. In order to elucidate the origin of knowledge, we have to go further.

Knowledge and Passion for the Truth let us dare to contradict Aristotle. What the psyche, as much as society, desires, and that of which they both have need, is not knowledge, but belief. The psyche is born, certainly, with the demand of meaning. Or rather, it is born in that which, for it, is meaning and will remain the model for meaning its whole life long: that is, the closure of the psychical monad upon itself and the plenitude accompanying it. Under pressure both from corporeal need and from the presence of another human on whom satisfaction of this need depends, closure and plenitude cannot help, but be ruptured.

Non-satisfaction of need does indeed appear and can appear only as non-sense, that is, “the end of the state of psychical quiescence,” Freud writes. Therefore, the person who ensures satisfaction of this need is straight away erected into a position of the Master of meaning: that is, the Mother, or her placeholder.

In its initial form, interrogation is a moment in the psyche’s struggle to exit from the meaningless and from the anxiety to which this meaninglessness gives rise. The meaningless can appear at this stage only as a threat of the self’s destruction. To this anxiety, the search for mastery responds in the form of the mastery of meaning, which at the outset is effectively total as “hallucinatory” or “delusional” mastery.

The search for meaning is a search to bring into relationship the entire dust cloud of “elements” that presents itself, bound together with the pleasure that comes from the more or less successful restoration of the integrity of the psychical flux: that is, a re-established coalescence of representation, desire, and affect. Considered from the psychoanalytic point of view, that is the meaning of meaning, and it is not difficult to see how it relates to the meaning of meaning in philosophy; the happiness of the theoretical life.

Searching and interrogation generally reach the saturation point via the social imaginary significations the human being absorbs and internalizes during this tough schooling process that is its socialization. And these significations themselves are almost always instituted in closure, for the exclusion of interrogation is the first and best means of ensuring the perpetuation of their validity. It will be said that “reality” might call them back into question, but “reality” itself is for each society only in its being caught within the network of significations instituted and interpreted by this network.

Only significations that are purely “instrumental”, or better, only the instrumental dimension of certain significations, can sometimes be short-circuited by the “reality”-testing. What is then passionately possessed is instituted social “theory,” namely, established beliefs. The mode of adherence is here precisely that of believing, and the affective modality of this believing is passion, which manifests itself almost always as fanaticism.

Passion is in effect brought to its maximum intensity on account of the fact that the socialized individual has to, under penalty of being faced with his own non-sense and with the nonsense of all that surrounds him, identify himself with the institution of his society and with the significations that society incarnates. To deny the institution or to deny these significations is, most of the time, to commit suicide physically and, almost always, to commit suicide psychically. The obvious underside of this passion, of this boundless love for self and one’s own is the hatred of all that denies these objects, namely, the hate of the institutions and of the significations of the others and of the individuals who embody them.

Such has been, such is the state of humanity almost everywhere, almost always. We would not be speaking of knowledge as opposed to belief, however, if this state had not sometimes been ruptured. And it effectively has been broken up at least two times, in ancient Greece and in Western Europe, after which time the effects of this break-up have become potentially accessible to every human being and to every human collectivity.

We cannot know “why” such a break has occurred. And to tell the truth, the question has no meaning. The rupture has been construction. We can, however, be more precise in characterizing its content. As a resurgence of a kind of interrogation that no longer accepts being saturated by socially instituted responses, this break is conjointly: construction of philosophy, or an indefinitely open calling into question of the idols and certainties of the tribe, even if we are talking about a tribe of wise men; and construction of politics as democratic politics, or the equally open challenging of the effectively actual institutions of society and opening of the interminable question of justice; and finally, and perhaps especially, cross-pollination of these two movements. If we restrict ourselves to the domain of thought properly speaking, what henceforth becomes an object of passion is the search itself, as the term philosophy itself says so well. Not already acquired wisdom guaranteed once and for all, but love or Eros of wisdom. There is a threefold condition for this passage to be effectuated. The three elements are ontological, social-historical, and psychical in character.

Clearly, the knowledge process presupposes two conditions that have to do with being itself. Curiously, only one of these two has especially been put forward by the inherited philosophy. For there to be knowledge, at least something of being must be knowable, since obviously no subject of any kind would ever be able to know anything about an absolutely chaotic world. Being, however, must also be neither “transparent” nor even exhaustively knowable. Just as the mere existence of beings-for-themselves assures us that there are a certain stability and a certain orderliness to at least one stratum of being, its first natural stratum, the one with which the living being deals, so the existence of a history of knowledge has its own weighty ontological implications. This history shows in effect that being is not such as it would be if an initial interrogation or a first effort at attaining knowledge could exhaust it. If one pursues this line of questioning, one will note that these facts are thinkable only by positing a stratification or fragmentation of being.

The social-historical condition has to do with the emergence of open societies, namely, ones that are such that established institutions and significations can be called into question and ones in which the knowledge process itself as such would be positively possessed and valued. Given that the institution of society has effectively actual existence only in being borne and conveyed by individuals and in being incorporated, so to speak, within them, this amounts to saying that the emergence of such societies entails and presupposes the educational formation of individuals capable of sustaining and deepening the interrogation.

Finally, if, as has been said, what the psyche desires above all is not any form of knowledge but, rather, belief, a question of capital importance arises in relation to the psychical conditions of possibility for knowledge.
- What can be the supports and the objects of possession within the field of knowledge that are capable of having a meaning from the properly psychical point of view?

Here, curiously, the psychical support can only be a narcissistic passion, though one that presupposes a transubstantiation of one’s possessed self-image. The self is no longer possessed as the possessor of the truth but, rather, as source of, and incessantly renewed capacity for, creation. Or, what boils down to the same thing: the possession spreads to the activity of thought itself as apt to produce true results, yet beyond every particular given result. And this goes hand in hand with another idea of truth, both as philosophical idea and as object of passion. The true no longer is an object to be possessed, nor is it passive spectacle of the play of Being’s veiling and unveiling. The true becomes creation, always open and always capable of turning back upon itself, of forms of the thinkable and of contents of thought capable of having an encounter with what is. The possession is no longer possession of an “object,” or even of a “self-image” in the usual sense, but of a “non-object/object,” activity and source of the true. The attachment to this truth is the passion for knowledge, or thought as Eros.

1 comment:

batt said...

hmm all the posts sound pretty interesting.. but very long :-(.. will come back and read 'em at leisure